ROXANNE DANCA V KMART CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROXANNE DANCA,
UNPUBLISHED
August 25, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 208738
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 94-423520 CZ
KMART CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Cavanagh and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right the trial court’s denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV) regarding plaintiff’s gender discrimination and hostile work environment claims.
After a lengthy, eleven-day trial, the jury found for plaintiff with respect to both claims and awarded her
$2.5 million in damages. We reverse.
I
Defendant hired plaintiff in August 1979. After initially working in the shipping and receiving
areas of defendant’s Canton distribution center, plaintiff received a promotion in 1989 to a second shift
checking leader position. In April 1993, plaintiff was promoted to the position of second shift
warehouse receiving leader. After an October 1993 incident involving plaintiff’s tape recording of
another employee, however, plaintiff was suspended and then demoted from her receiving leader job to
a general warehouse associate position, which demotion she declined to accept.
On August 5, 1995, plaintiff filed her complaint against Kmart Corporation and nine individual
Kmart employees, six of whom represented plaintiff’s supervisory employees, and three of whom were
plaintiff’s coworkers.1 Plaintiff’s complaint alleged generally that during the years before her discharge
1
In December 1996, before trial, the trial court entered an order dismissing six of the individual
defendants, Tom Colwell, James Spears, Ernie Hendricks, Dennis Rons, Daniel Waddups and Patrick
O’Neil. The transcript of the first day of trial, June 16, 1997, indicates that plaintiff’s counsel agreed on
that date to dismiss the remaining individual defendants, Joseph Morgan, Thomas Demers and Larry
(continued…)
-1
she endured gender-related verbal and physical abuse and that she repeatedly informed her supervisors
of the harassment, but that defendants failed to respond to her complaints. Count I of the complaint
charged all defendants with conspiring “to discharge and discriminate against Plaintiff based on her
sex.”2 Count II of the complaint sought damages pursuant to the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act
(ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., on the basis that plaintiff “was made
subject to discriminatory disparate treatment, disparate impact and intentional, discrimination and
harassment, based upon her sex by the Defendants,” leading ultimately to her wrongful discharge.
On July 16, 1997, the jury unanimously returned the following special verdict:
Jury Foreperson:
Question number one, part one, was the Plaintiff treated
differently by Defendant because of her sex or gender in any terms, conditions or
privileges of her employment? Our answer was yes.
***
Was Plaintiff subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment? Our answer was yes.
Was alleged harassment based on sex or gender? Yes. Did the alleged harassment
have the effect of unreasonably interfering with Plaintiff'’ work performance and creating
an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment? Yes. Did the Defendant breach
its duty to the Plaintiff? Yes. Did Defendant’s treatment cause the Plaintiff economic
and/or non-economic damages? Yes. What is the amount of past, present and future
economic loss to Plaintiff? One and a half million dollars. What is the amount of past,
present and future non-economic loss to Plaintiff? One million dollars.
On July 25, 1997, the trial court entered a judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict. The trial court
denied defendant’s posttrial motions for JNOV, new trial, or remittitur.3
II
A
Defendant first contends that it is entitled to JNOV regarding plaintiff’s disparate treatment
gender discrimination claim. When reviewing the denial of a motion for JNOV, this Court views the
(…continued)
James. On July 16, 1997, the day the jury returned its special verdict, the trial court entered a
stipulated order dismissing all nine individual defendants.
2
The July 14, 1997 trial transcript indicates that after defendant presented its last witness, and before
the parties’ attorneys delivered their oral arguments on July 15, 1997, the conspiracy count was
withdrawn from the jury’s consideration.
3
After plaintiff’s presentation of proofs, defendant moved for directed verdicts with respect to both
counts of plaintiff’s complaint, which the trial court denied.
-2
evidence and all legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Central Cartage Co v Fewless, 232 Mich App 517, 524; 591 NW2d 422
(1998). A motion for JNOV should be granted only when the nonmoving party presented insufficient
evidence to create an issue for the jury. Pontiac Sch Dist v Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, 221
Mich App 602, 612; 563 NW2d 693 (1997), lv gtd in part 457 Mich 871; 586 NW2d 918 (1998). If
reasonable jurors could honestly have reached different conclusions, the jury verdict must stand.
Central Cartage, supra. “The general rule in a[ gender] discrimination case is that, to survive a motion
for a directed verdict, the plaintiff must present evidence that, when viewed in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable jury to find that the plaintiff [experienced an adverse employment
action] because of [gender].” Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 709-710; 565
NW2d 401 (1997). The plaintiff’s gender need not represent the only reason or even the main reason
for the adverse employment action, but must have been a determining factor in the adverse action. Id.
at 710.
B
Plaintiff sought relief pursuant to MCL 37.2202(1)(a); MSA 3.548(202)(1)(a), which prohibits
an employer from “discharg[ing], or otherwise discriminat[ing] against an individual with respect to
employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of . . . sex.”4
Plaintiff’s complaint included the allegation that she “was made subject to discriminatory disparate
treatment . . . and intentional[] discrimination and harassment, based upon her sex.”
Disparate treatment claims may be subcategorized pursuant to the different methods of proof
employed. An intentional discrimination or mixed motive claim arises when a plaintiff can present
ordinary evidence that, if believed, would require the conclusion that discrimination was at least a factor
in the adverse employment action. Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich App 347,
360; 597 NW2d 250 (1999).
The elements of a mixed motive case are (1) the plaintiff’s membership in a
protected class, (2) an adverse employment action, (3) the defendant was predisposed
to discriminating against members of the plaintiff’s protected class, and (4) the
defendant actually acted on that predisposition in visiting the adverse employment action
4
Courts have recognized two broad categories of claims under this statutory subsection: (1) disparate
treatment claims or (2) disparate impact claims. Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich
App 347, 358; 597 NW2d 250 (1999); Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 219 Mich App 441,
448; 556 NW2d 876 (1996), aff’d 460 Mich 243; 596 NW2d 574 (1999). Establishment of
disparate impact theory gender discrimination requires a showing that an otherwise facially neutral
employment practice has a discriminatory effect, but does not require that the plaintiff prove that the
defendant intended to discriminate. Donajkowski, supra at 449, 450-451. Plaintiff’s proofs,
however, did not address any facially neutral policy of defendant that allegedly had a discriminatory
effect.
-3
on the plaintiff. “[O]nce the plaintiff has met the initial burden of proving that the illegal
conduct . . . was more likely than not a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the
defendant’s decision, the defendant has the opportunity to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have reached the same decision without consideration of the
protected characteristic.” [
Wilcoxon, supra at 360-361, quoting Harrison v Olde
Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 611; 572 NW2d 679 (1997).]
“Pretextual claims” involve utilization of the prima facie test articulated in McDonnell Douglas
Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973), as a framework for evaluating
alleged gender discrimination. Town v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688, 695 (Brickley,
J., joined by Boyle and Weaver, JJ.), 707 (Riley, J., concurring in relevant part); 568 NW2d 64
(1997); Wilcoxon, supra at 359.
A plaintiff may establish a pretextual McDonnell-Douglas type prima facie case
of prohibited discrimination by demonstrating that “(1) she was a member of the
protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action . . . ; (3) she was
qualified for the position; but (4) she [suffered the adverse employment action] under
circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” [Wilcoxon,
supra at 361, quoting Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 172-173
(Weaver, J.); 579 NW2d 906 (1998).]
Circumstances give rise to an inference of unlawful gender discrimination when they reveal that the
plaintiff was treated differently than a man for the same conduct or performance. Wilcoxon, supra;
Coleman-Nichols v Tixon Corp, 203 Mich App 645, 651; 513 NW2d 441 (1994). The essence of
a gender discrimination civil rights suit is that similarly situated people have been treated differently
because of their sex. Betty v Brooks & Perkins, 446 Mich 270, 281; 521 NW2d 518 (1994).
C
A “mixed motive” or “intentional discrimination” claim
Defendant argues that absolutely no evidence shows that plaintiff’s gender played any role in its
decision to suspend and demote her. Our extensive review of the record reveals no indication, within
any of the trial testimony concerning management’s decision making process, of a Kmart management
predisposition to discriminate on the basis of gender.
The trial testimony revealed that after plaintiff’s October 1993 tape recording of Canton
distribution center second shift warehouse worker Thomas Demers, several management level
employees of defendant, Donald D. MacArthur,5 Tony Mauro,6 Michael Sanders,7 Arnold Hendricks,8
5
In September 1993, MacArthur began working in defendant’s Troy corporate headquarters as a
human resource director.
6
Mauro worked at defendant’s Troy corporate headquarters as senior vice president of transportation
and distribution.
-4
Tom Colwell,9 Dale Tritten10 and Savan Giffen,11 all contributed some input toward defendant’s
decisions to suspend and demote plaintiff. Pursuant to MacArthur’s request, Colwell investigated the
tape recording incident involving Demers. After his investigation, Colwell reported to headquarters,
perhaps inaccurately, regarding some language contained on the tape plaintiff made and advised
headquarters of associates’ complaints concerning plaintiff’s communication skills. According to
MacArthur’s testimony, Colwell and Hendricks informed headquarters that they had always supported
plaintiff.
MacArthur and Sanders specifically denied that plaintiff’s gender influenced the decisions to
suspend and demote her. Undisputed testimony indicated that warehouse associates were offended by
plaintiff’s tape recordings. MacArthur testified that plaintiff’s tape recording constituted the basis for her
demotion because the recording violated Kmart’s general policy that employees should treat each other
with mutual respect, and because plaintiff’s recording destroyed her credibility with the supervised
employees and thus undermined her ability to effectively act as a leader. Sanders similarly stated that on
verification that the taping occurred, he concluded that plaintiff had to be suspended and ultimately
demoted because she violated the trust and mutual respect inherent in the leader-associate relationship,
and could not “expect to be able to . . . get them [the associates] to follow your direction and your lead
and respond effectively and have that credibility” necessary to lead others. MacArthur and Sanders
believed that the fact of the tape recording represented the overriding concern, and that while its
contents might have had some import they would not have played a determining factor in the decision to
demote plaintiff.
Absent some indication that those participating in the Kmart management decisions to suspend
and demote plaintiff acted on a predisposition to discriminate against women, we conclude that plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case of intentional gender discrimination. Wilcoxon, supra at 360-361.
In her brief on appeal, plaintiff asserts that the following statements establish a Kmart
management predisposition to discriminate against women: (1) Hendricks’ and Colwell’s statements to
plaintiff, when she visited them to complain that some employees indicated they would refuse to listen to
her, that “one of the problems that these guys had was taking orders from a female,” and (2) Colwell’s
statement to Wendy Ihnen12 that women “were a minority in the warehouse . . . and that we should
expect to get ridiculed and harassed to some point because we were the minority.” Viewing Colwell’s
(…continued)
7
At the time of trial, Sanders worked as a vice president of logistics operations at defendant’s Troy
corporate headquarters.
8
Hendricks was the Canton distribution center’s general manager.
9
Beginning in 1993, Colwell worked as the Canton distribution center’s operations manager.
10
Tritten worked as the Canton distribution center’s human resources manager.
11
Giffen was defendant’s employment attorney.
12
From December 1992 through May 1993, Ihnen worked afternoons for Friske Building Maintenance
Company cleaning warehouse offices at the Canton distribution center.
-5
second statement in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable juror could infer that a
predisposition to discriminate existed.
Even assuming that a management predisposition to discriminate existed, however, plaintiff
presented no direct evidence suggesting that, in making its decision to suspend and demote plaintiff,
defendant’s management acted on any existing predisposition by considering plaintiff’s gender. Plaintiff
instead suggests that Colwell’s decision to act on his predisposition to discriminate against women may
be inferred from the facts that (1) while MacArthur requested that Colwell prepare a written report
concerning his investigation for headquarters’ review prior to defendant’s arrival at a decision regarding
a disciplinary action for plaintiff’s tape recording, Colwell did not prepare a written report; and (2) while
Colwell acknowledged his awareness that headquarters intended to rely on his investigation and report
before reaching a decision concerning an appropriate disciplinary sanction for plaintiff, he failed to
inform headquarters of sexually negative comments directed at plaintiff and of plaintiff’s several
complaints about the receiving area employees.
We ascertain from these allegations no reasonable inference that defendant’s management acted
on a predisposition to discriminate against women when it suspended and demoted plaintiff. First,
nothing in the record relates Colwell’s conduct during the investigation to his alleged predisposition to
discriminate, rather than any other conceivable explanation for his conduct. MacArthur’s unrebutted
testimony revealed that both Hendricks and Colwell indicated during the course of the investigation that
they liked and supported plaintiff, attempted to work with her, and that she had never previously
complained to them that the workers sexually harassed or discriminated against her. Furthermore, to
the extent Colwell failed to apprise headquarters with respect to (1) the exact contents of the tape
plaintiff made, (2) plaintiff’s complaints regarding the warehouse workers, and (3) James Spears’13
alleged warning to plaintiff that she was being set up by the second shift receiving area employees, the
unrebutted testimony of MacArthur and Sanders establishes that the availability of this information
would not have altered the decision to demote plaintiff.
Because we find no evidence that would support a rational jury’s conclusion that gender played
any role, least of all a determining role, in plaintiff’s demotion, we conclude that a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination was not established. Meagher, supra at 709-710.
D
A pretextual claim
The parties do not dispute that plaintiff represents a member of a protected class, or that plaintiff
experienced an adverse employment action when defendant demoted her. Defendant contends that it is
entitled to JNOV with respect to plaintiff’s pretextual sex discrimination claim on the basis that plaintiff
absolutely failed to establish her qualifications for her receiving leader position. Viewing the conflicting
13
Spears worked as assistant manager of the Canton distribution center’s second shift.
-6
testimony regarding plaintiff’s qualifications in the light most favorable to plaintiff, however, we find that
a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff was qualified for her position. Central Cartage, supra.
Defendant also avers that plaintiff failed to create an inference of discrimination by showing her
differential treatment from another, similarly situated Kmart employee. “To create an inference of
disparate treatment, [a plaintiff] must prove that . . . ‘all of the relevant aspects’ [of her employment
situation] were ‘nearly identical’ to those of [a differently treated person].” Wilcoxon, supra at 370,
quoting Town, supra at 699-700.
Plaintiff sought to compare herself with Tom Demers, claiming that the fact that plaintiff lost her
position and Demers did not, even receiving a subsequent promotion, when both plaintiff and Demers
violated the same Kmart policy creates an inference of gender discrimination. First, we note that
plaintiff and Demers held different positions at the time of the taping incident and defendant’s subsequent
disciplinary actions. Plaintiff worked as a second shift receiving group leader. Demers labored as a
general receiving area employee, who occasionally substituted for plaintiff’s coleader Randall Flynn
when he was absent. It is undisputed that at the time the taping occurred plaintiff was acting as Demers’
supervisor.
Second, we observe that while plaintiff suggests that she and Demers violated the same Kmart
policy that employees should treat each other with mutual respect, plaintiff and Demers did not engage
in the same conduct. Plaintiff tape recorded her subordinate employees. The unrebutted testimony of
management level employees and other employee witnesses concluded that plaintiff’s tape recording of
a subordinate employee destroyed plaintiff’s credibility and effectiveness as a leader. Demers swore
and directed name calling at plaintiff, his supervisor. The record reflects that defendant’s management
meted out different punishments (plaintiff’s demotion, and Demers’ written record of his conduct, the
first level in defendant’s formal discipline policy) because it considered that differences existed between
plaintiff’s and Demers’ positions and conduct.14
14
While plaintiff suggests that the fact that Demers in November 1993 received a promotion to an
accelerated flow through (AFT) group leadership position further illustrates Kmart’s disparate treatment
of its male and female employees, no inference of discrimination arises from the fact of this subsequent
promotion because plaintiff and Demers were not similarly situated. Moreover, Colwell’s and
MacArthur’s uncontradicted testimony explained that Demers received the promotion only after
management received Demers’ apology and expression of remorse and also warned Demers that
another instance of conduct similar to that plaintiff recorded would result in his termination.
Plaintiff then submits that while management r
eceived two employee complaints concerning
Demers after Demers was promoted, defendant still failed to demote or terminate him. No employees
complained, however, that Demers engaged in conduct similar to that for which plaintiff was demoted
(i.e., tape recording). Furthermore, the subsequent complaints concerning Demers did not involve
allegations of his harassment similar to that plaintiff recorded, and for which Kmart management had
informed Demers that it would terminate his employment.
-7
Plaintiff also attempts to draw a comparison between defendant’s treatment of herself and
Canton distribution center employee Joseph Morgan, noting that both she and Morgan engaged in
recording activities at the distribution center, but that plaintiff was demoted and Morgan was not. No
inference of disparate treatment may arise from any comparison of plaintiff and Morgan, however,
because they were not similarly situated. As mentioned, plaintiff was a leader at the time she recorded
conversations with her subordinates, while Morgan represented a general warehouse worker when he
was observed engaging in his “recording” activity. Additionally, Morgan did not tape record coworker
conversations, but simply took photographs inside the distribution center.
We conclude that plaintiff was not similarly situated to Demers or Morgan. Wilcoxon, supra.
Furthermore, contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion, we detect no inference of discrimination arising from any
of the following circumstances.
1.
Management’s alleged application of different standards of conduct with respect to plaintiff and
male leaders
Plaintiff averred that unlike male warehouse leaders, management required that she secure the
presence of a management level employee to witness her efforts to write up employees for their
misconduct. Brian Javor, who worked with plaintiff as a checking leader up to and including part of
1993, also agreed that unlike other leaders plaintiff had to have a witness present. Unanimous testimony
concerning defendant’s written disciplinary procedure revealed, however, that the written record of
verbal discussion constituted the first step within defendant’s formal disciplinary policy, and that before
any write up could occur a management level employee had to be present. Javor himself testified that
on the occasions that he issued written warnings he was required to have present someone from
management. Colwell testified that all leaders followed the same guidelines, and Sara Rockentine, a
Canton distribution center merchandising leader, likewise stated that no leader could issue a written
record of verbal discussion outside the presence of a management level employee. Thus, the record
does not substantiate plaintiff’s argument that defendant treated her differently than it treated male
leaders who wished to write up other employees.
Plaintiff also alleged that management singled her out for reprisal after two 1991 letters
concerning plaintiff had been mailed to defendant’s Troy headquarters.15 Plaintiff suggested at trial that
15
Sometime in 1
991, several second shift general warehouse employees mailed to Kmart’s Troy,
Michigan headquarters a letter concerning plaintiff’s performance as a temporary receiving leader.
Though the letter was not produced at trial, the employees apparently complained that plaintiff lacked
leadership abilities. Plaintiff alleged that she “went to everybody in management at the warehouse and
nobody would do anything about anything.” Therefore, she responded by sending her own letter to
Troy. In the letter she complained of “a lax attitude by the employees” regarding their obedience of
orders, “absolutely no support from some of [her] fellow Leaders and Management,” and noted her
sensations at being singled out in the following fashions: “Special leader instructions written only for me,
special meetings where I’m singled out, and a cutback in responsibilities, which I know I’ve fulfilled are
all examples of the continuing harassment which are totally unfair.”
-8
after the employees’ 1991 letter to Troy had stripped her of her status as the temporary substitute
receiving leader, she experienced an incident in which she was treated differently with respect to her
checking duties than other employees. Plaintiff left some unfinished parcels for the next shift to finish
checking, which she testified was customarily done in instances of unfinished business, but was
reprimanded the next day by Dennis Rons, the first shift receiving manager, who told her that it “was
[her] responsibility and no other shift’s responsibility now.” Plaintiff further opined that “after the first
letter was sent to Troy, I was called in the office on a daily basis about checking errors, just petty stuff.”
Rons explained, however, that he had discussed several times a recurring deficiency in plaintiff’s
performance, and that ultimately it became necessary to prepare a written report of her conduct. Even
assuming arguendo that a reasonable jury could infer from these facts that defendant’s management
unfairly singled out plaintiff, we find no indication that management so acted on the basis of plaintiff’s
gender.
2.
Management’s alleged failure to document and conscious avoidance of plaintiff’s complaints that
receiving area employees refused to follow her orders and mistreated her
a.
Plaintiff’s 1991 letter to headquarters
Plaintiff argues that defendant’s headquarters ignored the complaints contained within the 1991
letter she mailed to Troy in response to a disparaging letter earlier mailed by warehouse employees. In
the letter, plaintiff complained of “a lax attitude by the employees” and a lack of management and
coleader support, but did not indicate that she experienced gender-based differential treatment.
Moreover, while headquarters itself did not conduct an investigation concerning plaintiff’s 1991 letter,
uncontradicted testimony indicates that the local level of Kmart management did address plaintiff’s
concerns.
b.
The receiving area employees’ October 6, 1993 letter to headquarters
Plaintiff also suggests that defendant’s headquarters failed to make any effort to investigate the
veracity of the second shift employees’ allegations against her contained within their 1993 letter to
headquarters, citing the testimony of Waddups that headquarters never contacted him concerning the
1993 letter. Testimony showed, however, that by October 1993 Waddups had left his position as
second shift manager. Moreover, MacArthur’s uncontradicted testimony indicated generally that letters
to headquarters were taken seriously and required investigation, and that after being apprised of the
1993 letter regarding plaintiff he spoke with its alleged author, then spoke with Hendricks and Colwell,
and directed Colwell to investigate the letter’s allegations. MacArthur further indicated that Colwell
returned verbal reports updating MacArthur regarding his discussions with warehouse employees, and
that headquarters had reached no definitive determination how to handle the letter before discovering
that plaintiff tape recorded Demers.
c.
Offensive writing on the bathroom walls concerning plaintiff
-9
Plaintiff also implies that defendant’s management consciously ignored the presence of
derogatory statements and drawings concerning plaintiff that often appeared on the walls of a
warehouse men’s restroom. Plaintiff cites John L. Lester’s16 statement that after observing some
disparaging graffiti, he informed plaintiff, who advised Spears, who then replied that while the graffiti
could be wiped off someone would only replace it. Further testimony from Colwell revealed, however,
that plaintiff did not represent the exclusive target of bathroom graffiti, but that graffiti regarding both
male leaders and managers and general employees likewise appeared on the bathroom’s walls.
Moreover, the testimony of several employees established that management quickly obliviated graffiti,
whether it concerned males or females, by painting over it.
d.
Plaintiff’s repeated complaints regarding employee insubordination and misconduct
Plaintiff emphasizes the testimony of Javor, Lester, Ihnen and others to the effect that they never
observed management respond to plaintiff’s many complaints that employees disobeyed her orders, and
that they never observed plaintiff’s situation improve despite management’s knowledge that certain
employees had problems responding to a woman’s orders. Our review of the record reveals, however,
that none of these cited witnesses possessed personal knowledge concerning the actual extent of
management’s investigative activities, and that the following unrebutted testimony establishes that
management in fact responded to plaintiff’s complaints.
Waddups testified that with respect to plaintiff’s approximately ten complaints to him concerning
the employees as well as the complaints he received from other employees regarding plaintiff, he
investigated every one by speaking with the employees involved in each complaint and anyone who
worked nearby. Because his investigations of plaintiff’s complaints did not produce collaboration of her
allegations, Waddups stated that he did not know who to believe, but concluded that a personality
conflict unrelated to plaintiff’s gender existed.
Spears also generally recalled receiving several complaints from plaintiff that certain employees
would not perform requested work. Spears testified that he responded by speaking with these
employees and directing them to cooperate with plaintiff, and that the employees responded that they
would do so. Spears likewise denied that his investigations indicated that plaintiff experienced gender
based discrimination.
Colwell further testified generally that after plaintiff advised him of her complaints, he spoke with
the employees mentioned by plaintiff attempting to obtain their sides of the story. Plaintiff observed that
on one or two occasions after she made complaints employees returned well-behaved from speaking
with Colwell, but plaintiff denied that the good behavior endured for more than one or two days.
Colwell also recalled after receiving employee complaints regarding plaintiff that he spoke with plaintiff
and attempted to counsel her regarding proper management skills.
16
During the early 1990s, prior to 1993, Lester worked for approximately one year as a second shift
receiving department employee.
-10
Regarding management’s responses to specific incidents of plaintiff’s complaint, the record also
contains the following information.
1.
Morgan, who acknowledged prior difficulties with male supervisors, testified that on at
least one occasion after plaintiff had complained about him to Spears, Spears instructed him to “just go
back and do what she tells you to do and try to get along and work with her.”
2.
In July 1993, plaintiff complained to Colwell that Michael Stokey, who worked in the
Canton distribution center during the early 1990s and who dated plaintiff for approximately one year,
had made sexual remarks concerning her. Colwell spoke with Stokey and discovered that Stokey had
in fact made the complained of remarks. Colwell then prepared a written record of the event and
placed it in Stokey’s employee file, and instructed Stokey to “keep his remarks to himself and to do his
job.” Plaintiff’s and Colwell’s trial testimony agreed that Colwell advised plaintiff of the outcome of his
investigation, and that plaintiff indicated her satisfaction of Colwell’s handling of the complaint. Plaintiff
indicated that she had no further difficulties with Stokey.
3.
With respect to a complaint from plaintiff that second shift Canton distribution center
employee Bob Andering refused to obey her orders, Colwell testified that he discussed the complaint
with Andering and concluded that Andering had in fact done what plaintiff requested, but had not
responded immediately to plaintiff’s order. Colwell also apprised plaintiff of his conclusion, and plaintiff
indicated “it was okay with her.”
4.
In September 1993, a meeting of many receiving employees occurred, at which several
employees complained that plaintiff screamed and swore at them and showed them no respect. Colwell
testified that he instructed the employees “to do their job, that they had to listen to [plaintiff],” and that
“[t]hey weren’t real happy with it but they said they would try.” Plaintiff testified that after this meeting,
which occurred while she was on vacation, she requested that Colwell speak with several employees to
obtain their more favorable appraisals concerning plaintiff, and stated that Colwell spoke with these
individuals.
5.
Plaintiff recalled a specific incident when Demers failed to unload some freight in the
manner she had instructed. Plaintiff indicated that Demers refused to correct his mistake, and that
arguing and fighting ensued between plaintiff and Demers and another employee. According to plaintiff,
Waddups arrived and directed Demers to do his job.
6.
Plaintiff remembered another specific incident involving Morgan’s refusal to perform an
order. Plaintiff testified that Morgan indicated over the warehouse’s public address system that he
would do what plaintiff requested if she asked nicely. She informed Colwell and Spears of Morgan’s
behavior, and did not deny that Colwell followed up on this complaint.
-11
7.
Flynn, plaintiff’s coleader in receiving, testified that while working together with plaintiff,
she occasionally informed him that she had problems with an employee. Flynn stated that he never
ignored any complaint plaintiff shared with him, and offered plaintiff advice in dealing with employees.
In conclusion, we fail to detect any circumstances or occurrences within the instant record that
“give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Wilcoxon, supra at 361. Because no reasonable
jury could have found that plaintiff was suspended and demoted on the basis of her gender, the trial
court erred in denying defendant’s motion for JNOV regarding plaintiff’s disparate treatment claims.
Meagher, supra at 709-710.
III
Defendant next argues that the evidence presented at trial did not support the jury’s
determination that plaintiff worked within a hostile work environment, and that therefore it likewise was
entitled to JNOV concerning this claim.
A
An examination of the ELCRA, MCL 37.2103(i), 37.2202(1)(a); MSA 3.548(103)(i),
3.548(202)(1)(a), reveals five necessary elements to establish a prima facie hostile work environment
claim:
(1)
the employee belonged to a protected group;
(2)
the employee was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis
of sex;
(3)
the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or
communication;
(4)
the unwelcome sexual conduct or communication was intended to or in
fact did substantially interfere with the employee’s employment or created an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and
(5)
respondeat superior. [Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 382-383;
501 NW2d 155 (1993).]
Plaintiff’s gender satisfies the first required element of a hostile work environment claim; thus the
question becomes whether plaintiff experienced unwelcome communication or conduct on the basis of
her gender.
B
The record reflects several arguably offensive, arguably sex-based occurrences concerning
plaintiff within the Canton distribution center during the period of plaintiff’s employment (1979-1993).
-12
Plaintiff also testified that Colwell and Hendricks informed her that the male warehouse employees who
would not respond to her orders had a problem taking orders from women. 17
The record is unclear concerning exactly how many of these remarks and occurrences plaintiff
heard or observed, or of which she became aware. Frank Pongranz did not specify whether the
derogatory remarks he heard were directed at plaintiff, or that plaintiff had knowledge of these
remarks.18 No indication exists in the record that plaintiff had knowledge of a rumor that she performed
sexual favors inside the warehouse. Plaintiff had knowledge that some drawings or comments appeared
on the men’s restroom wall because Lester informed her of these. The extent of the information Lester
provided cannot be ascertained from the record—whether, for example, Lester advised plaintiff of a
single comment or drawing, several writings that appeared on the walls on one occasion, or whether
Lester informed plaintiff on more than one occasion what derogatory writings he may have witnessed
inside the restroom. Plaintiff denied that she actually saw the bathroom writings, and denied that she
otherwise observed written pictures or comments anyplace else inside the warehouse, except on one
occasion in the early to mid 1980’s when someone left on her desk an unspecified comic or hand
17
This statement of purported fact certainly was not intended to interfere with plaintiff’s employment in
any respect, but could arguably have been perceived by plaintiff as unwelcome or offensive. Several
further remarks mentioned within various portions of plaintiff’s brief, while referring to gender, do not
represent unwelcome conduct or communications directed toward plaintiff on the basis of her
gender: Javor’s and Lester’ observations that some receiving area employees disliked taking orders
from a woman, and Javor’s recounting of employee statements about “getting rid of plaintiff;” Spears’
nonspecific observance of an employee’s attempt to induce plaintiff to discipline him in front of others
and his opinion on this basis that some employees were attempting to set up plaintiff; and Demers’
acknowledgment that he told plaintiff that he would not accept her orders without a second opinion.
Furthermore, while Jane Brabyn and Donna Smith, two Canton distribution center employees circa
1993 who did not work directly with plaintiff but allegedly had difficulties with warehouse workers
Demers and Larry James, opined that Demers and James contributed to a work environment hostile
toward female employees, they testified that they had never directly observed Demers’ and James’
belittlement, harassment or verbal abuse of women employees. While they complained about Demers,
the record does not substantiate any specific, gender-related complaints. With respect to Ihnen’s
testimony that Colwell told her that plaintiff “should expect this [treatment]. We were a minority in the
warehouse, women were, and that we should expect to get ridiculed and harassed to some point
because we were the minority,” this comment occurred during a nonbusiness-related phone call by
Colwell to Ihnen’s home. No indication exists that Colwell phoned from the distribution center, or that
plaintiff had knowledge of this statement.
18
Pongranz worked the second shift under plaintiff’s supervision after her 1993 promotion. Pongranz’
testimony that he did not recall witnessing any employees’ outright refusal to perform plaintiff’s orders,
together with plaintiff’s own testimony that no employee ever explicitly refused to follow an order on the
basis of her gender creates an inference that plaintiff was not within earshot when Pongranz heard the
disparaging remarks.
-13
drawing. No indication exists that plaintiff became aware of the remarks and comments overheard by
Ihnen, which Ihnen testified were made behind plaintiff’s back. Stokey testified that Demers’ “skinny”
remark occurred outside plaintiff’s presence. Plaintiff certainly heard Morgan’s statement, however,
concerning PMS and Demers’ tape recorded remark that she was a “big tough chick.”
Under these circumstances, the jury reasonably could have concluded that plaintiff had
awareness of at least some offensive, gender-related comments. Central Cartage, supra.
C
The next element of the prima facie case requires that these remarks were “intended to or in fact
did substantially interfere with the employee’s employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment.” Grow v W A Thomas Co, 236 Mich App 696, 706; 601 NW2d 426
(1999). A hostile work environment claim is actionable when the work environment is so tainted that, in
the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have perceived the
conduct at issue as substantially interfering with employment or having the purpose or effect of creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment. Radtke, supra at 372. For any sexual
harassment to be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive. Chambers v Trettco,
Inc, 232 Mich App 560, 563; 591 NW2d 413 (1998).
We note that workplace hostilities or tensions arising from personality conflicts generally do not
support a finding of an actionable, discriminatory hostile work environment under Title VII.19 Valdez v
Mercy Hosp, 961 F2d 1401, 1403 (CA 8, 1992). In light of the abundant record of Canton
distribution center employee complaints concerning plaintiff’s management style and mistreatment of
coworkers, much of the alleged mistreatment plaintiff endured appears to represent the product of
personality conflicts. We further note that the record is unclear concerning the frequency or
pervasiveness with which plaintiff endured or became aware of the gender-based comments concerning
her.
Viewing in the light most favorable to plaintiff, however, the facts that some Canton distribution
center workers (1) reportedly expressed distaste for working subordinate to a woman and (2) uttered
at least some gender-based, offensive comments concerning plaintiff, the jury reasonably could have
concluded that plaintiff was subjected to hostility on the basis of her gender. Moreover, we will assume
that plaintiff was aware of all the remarks and statements concerning her, and that these remarks
occurred with such frequency as to constitute pervasive hostility. Chambers, supra.
19
As noted by the Michigan Supreme Court, “[w]hile this Court is not compelled to follow federal
precedent or guidelines in interpreting Michigan law, this Court may, ‘as we have done in the past in
discrimination cases, turn to federal precedent for guidance in reaching our decision.’” Radtke, supra
at 381-382, quoting Sumner v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505, 525; 398 NW2d 368
(1986).
-14
D
Even assuming the existence of a hostile working environment, however, the instant record does
not support a reasonable jury’s conclusion that defendant negligently failed to address the alleged sexual
harassment. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish the fifth element, defendant’s culpability, necessary to
her hostile work environment claim. Radtke, supra at 383.
Where the employer himself is not accused of engaging in sexual harassment and the
complainant’s allegations involve the conduct of a coworker, the doctrine of respondeat superior must
be considered to determine whether the employer may be held liable for his employee’s actions.
Radtke, supra at 396-397. Under the ELCRA, an employer may avoid liability if it adequately
investigated and took prompt and appropriate remedial action on notice of the alleged hostile working
environment. Radtke, supra at 396; Downer v Detroit Receiving Hosp, 191 Mich App 232, 234;
477 NW2d 146 (1991). An employer must have actual or constructive notice of alleged harassment
before being held liable for not implementing action. Radtke, supra at 396-397; Downer, supra at
235. Thus, in coworker harassment cases, the employer is liable when it “knew or should have known
of the charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action.”
Blankenship v Parke Care Centers, Inc, 123 F3d 868, 872 (CA 6, 1997).20
1
Before defendant may be held liable for the second shift receiving employees’ alleged sexual
harassment of plaintiff, it must have known, or reasonably should have known, of the charged sexual
harassment. The record does not support that plaintiff ever complained to any management personnel
that she had experienced harassment on the basis of her gender, except for the single occasion on which
she complained of Stokey’s comments of a sexual nature. Plaintiff acknowledged that no one ever
specifically refused to follow her orders on the basis of her gender. Furthermore, according to
MacArthur’s testimony, Colwell and Hendricks never heard plaintiff complain specifically of any sexual
harassment. Plaintiff described the harassment she received in the following manner
[Defense counsel] As a matter of fact, the incidents of harassment that you
talked about during the time that you were receiving leader were essentially, mainly
refusal to do work, standing around on the docks talking and not working while they’re
talking and taking off early. Isn’t that right?
[Plaintiff] That and calling me names, drawings on the walls. Basically the
way I was treated. If it were a male leader, and they told these guys to do something,
20
The Sixth Circuit in Blankenship noted that when the complainant alleges sexual harassment by
coworkers, the “respondeat superior” label inaccurately characterizes the employer’s liability, which
represents direct liability on the basis of negligence. Id. See also Chambers, supra at 563 (“[A]n
employer can be liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment where the employer’s own negligence is a
cause of the harassment. An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or
should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.”).
-15
they would do it, no arguing, no refusal—But when I did it—So I have to say yes, it
was due to the fact that I was a female.
In discussing all the specific complaints she could recall, however, plaintiff never indicated that she
relayed to management a complaint that she experienced any coworker conduct of a sexual nature,
except for the instance in which she accused Stokey.21 Limiting the analysis to this testimony concerning
plaintiff’s complaints to management, absolutely no reasonable inference arises that plaintiff ever
addressed to management a concern that she had experienced sexual harassment, except for her
complaint concerning Stokey.
While no hint of gender-based discrimination or sexual harassment appears within plaintiff’s
complaints to management documented within the instant record, plaintiff testified that Colwell and
Hendricks both indicated to her that some male warehouse employees disliked taking a woman’s
orders.22 Thus, despite both management’s and plaintiff’s testimony illustrating that plaintiff never
21
A review of the specific complaints recalled by plaintiff at trial reveals the following: (1) on the day
management posted that plaintiff had won the receiving leader promotion, she complained to Colwell
that Demers and Morgan had told her that she did not deserve the promotion and that “they were
getting [plaintiff’s] job;” (2) plaintiff complained to Colwell that after she had given Morgan an order
over the public address system, he responded over the public address system that he would “do it if you
ask me nicely;” (3) other, unspecified instances when Morgan would not follow plaintiff’s order to move
freight, or would refuse to unload a truck because he “didn’t like the load;” (4) unspecified instances
when James refused to unload trucks or move freight; (5) unspecified instances when Andering refused
to follow orders; (6) while unloading a truck on one occasion, second shift warehouse employee Dale
Zarone began yelling and screaming at plaintiff; (7) problems with Ed Skulley “not completing his
paperwork, refusing to check trucks,” on one occasion asserting that “he didn’t have the time;” (8) one
occasion on which Andering “told me to stop watching him, my job was too [sic] pass out trucks
nothing else and if he wanted to get on a tug he would and I was not going to tell him he couldn’t.”
22
Plaintiff responded affirmatively to her counsel’s inquiry whether she “talk[ed] with Mr. Colwell or
Mr. Hendricks about your concerns about being treated differently because you were a woman?”
Plaintiff then explained,
Well, the problems I would go to [Colwell] with about being harassed and these
guys telling me not, that they weren’t going to do what I told them. I think the f
irst
incident I remember was when they actually posted that I received the receiving leader’s
job and Joe Morgan and Tom Demers made the statement. . . . something about not
doing what I was going to tell them and they weren’t going to listen to me or whatever.
I’m not sure. But I went to Tom Colwell and he said he already knew because Joe
Morgan had already been in there to tell him that he would be in there everyday to
complain about me and he also told me that one of the problems that these guys had
was taking orders from a female.
Plaintiff similarly testified with respect to Hendricks,
(continued…)
-16
specifically complained to management concerning sexual harassment, from the fact that Colwell and
Hendricks apparently knew that certain employees resented taking orders from a woman the jury might
reasonably have concluded that defendant’s management knew of or should have been aware that some
potential existed for warehouse disharmony on the basis of plaintiff’s gender.
2
Even assuming that a hostile work environment existed and that defendant should have known
of its existence, the instant record does not support the jury’s conclusion that defendant’s management
failed to adequately investigate and take prompt, appropriate remedial action concerning the alleged
hostile working environment. Radtke, supra at 396; Central Cartage, supra. With respect to
plaintiff’s only complaint of explicitly sexual behavior to which she was subjected, management
investigated the complaint by discussing the matter with Stokey, ascertained Stokey’s guilt of the alleged
conduct, and disciplined him by placing a written report of the incident within Stokey’s personnel file.
Plaintiff conceded her satisfaction that management had properly handled this complaint, and that she
experienced no further problems from Stokey. Also as previously discussed, at pages 15 through 17,
supra, the unrebutted testimony of defendant’s managerial employees indicated that they acknowledged
and addressed each and every complaint plaintiff brought them. Regarding the writing on the bathroom
walls, testimony indicated that management on at least one occasion immediately, and otherwise quickly
or at least periodically painted over the graffiti.
In light of this undisputed testimony regarding management’s attention to plaintiff’s complaints,
we find that defendant cannot reasonably be considered negligent with respect to its responses to the
complaints. Radtke, supra at 396-397; Chambers, supra. Given that the proofs at trial, viewing all
the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, were deficient with respect to at least one required
element of plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying
defendant JNOV regarding this claim. Central Cartage, supra; Pontiac Sch Dist, supra.
In light of our dispositive conclusions concerning the merits of plaintiff’s disparate treatment and
sexual harassment claims, we need not address the remaining appellate issues defendant raises.
(…continued)
Well, I went to him with complaints about the guys not doing what I told them,
giving me a hard time and we talked and he made that very same comment, that these
guys had a problem with taking orders from a female and it was basically accepted.
That’s just the way it is.
-17
Reversed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
-18
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