WILLIAM KNAPP V DOUGLAS A KLAHN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM KNAPP,
UNPUBLISHED
August 22, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
DOUGLAS A. KLAHN, individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of FREDERICK
KLAHN,
No. 217179
Ionia Circuit Court
LC No. 97-018517-PD
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Neff and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a court order granting to plaintiff possession and clear title to
a truck and trailer in a suit for claim and delivery. Defendant had removed the vehicles from plaintiff ’s
possession, alleging that they belonged to his father’s estate. We affirm.
Plaintiff had been in possession of the vehicles for several years before this dispute arose.
Frederick Klahn, who owned them, signed and mailed the vehicles’ certificates of title to plaintiff, who
ran a trucking business. Defendant asserts that his father, Frederick Klahn, never effectively transferred
titles to the vehicles because he did not follow the steps required by the Motor Vehicle Code, and that
the law requires strict compliance with the statute or the transfer is void. Defendant does not dispute
that plaintiff had both the vehicles and their certificates of title at the time defendant took the vehicles.
We review questions of law de novo. Oakland Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs v Michigan Property &
Casualty Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich 590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). The trial court’s findings of
fact are reviewed for clear error. Christiansen v Gerrish Twp, 239 Mich App 380, 387; 608 NW2d
83 (2000), lv pending.
Plaintiff had possession and use of the vehicles for several years under a lease agreement with
Klahn. Klahn did not write anything about liens on the certificates when he signed over the titles,
although there was notice of a lien printed on the certificates. The lien on the vehicles was held by
Klahn’s bank, which had security interests in the vehicles as part of a blanket loan which was used to
finance Klahn’s farm operations and was secured by many different pieces of farm equipment. Klahn
-1
did not clear the lien from the titles before he signed them over to plaintiff, and he died soon afterward.
Plaintiff attempted to complete the registration in his own name, but was unable because of the
outstanding lien. Neither the creditor bank nor defendant would give him information about how to pay
off or clear the lien. In addition, defendant told the Secretary of State’s office that he had lost the titles
and got new ones issued in the name of the farm and himself.
The title transfer section of the Motor Vehicle Code describes a valid title transfer as one in
which
[t]he owner shall indorse on the back of the certificate of title an assignment of the title
with warranty of title in the form printed on the certificate with a statement of all security
interests in the vehicle or in accessories on the vehicle and deliver or cause the
certificate to be mailed or delivered to the purchaser or transferee at the time of the
delivery to the purchaser or transferee of the vehicle. The certificate shall show the
payment or satisfaction of any security interest as shown on the original title. [MCL
257.233(8); MSA 9.1933(8).]
The statute requires that the certificates of title be signed and delivered to the transferee. The
certificates must show any outstanding liens, and if there are liens which have been satisfied. The
vehicles themselves must also be delivered to the transferee. Once this is accomplished, the statutory
requirements are met. Defendant notes that case law extending back some seventy years states that
failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements results in a void transfer. Endres v MaraRickenbacker, 243 Mich 5, 9; 219 NW 719 (1928); Drettmann v Marchand, 337 Mich 1, 6; 59
NW2d 56 (1953); Bayer v Jackson Bank & Trust, 335 Mich 99, 105; 55 NW2d 746 (1952);
Michigan Mut Auto Ins Co v Reddig, 129 Mich App 631, 635; 341 NW2d 847 (1983); Messer v
Averill, 28 Mich App 62, 66; 183 NW2d 802 (1970); Waldron v Drury’s Van Lines, Inc, 1 Mich
App 601, 608; 137 NW2d 743 (1965). However, in each of the cases there was no delivery of the
certificate of title, and the rule that can be drawn from these cases is that the transferee must receive
delivery of both the vehicles and valid certificates of title in order for the transfer to be valid. These
cases, cited by defendant, therefore do not apply to the facts here because delivery of both the vehicles
and the certificates of title had occurred.
Klahn signed and delivered the certificates. The lien was printed on the certificates, and its
satisfaction was not shown. Plaintiff had possession of the vehicles. The only reason he could not
complete the transaction according to the statute was defendant’s withholding information about the lien.
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in finding that Klahn’s attempt to transfer the titles
did not follow the letter of the statute, but was sufficiently in compliance to be effective.
The trial court also found that the facts supported plaintiff ’s receiving titles clear of the lien. The
evidence showed that the lien did not finance the purchase of the vehicles but provided capital for
defendant’s farm operations. The lien was secured by other farm equipment as well as the vehicles.
The creditor was not a party to the suit, and its interest was not substantially affected by the disposition
of the two vehicles. The loan was not delinquent. The trial court properly held that because of these
-2
facts, the farm, which had received the benefit of the loan, should retain liability for the payment and
security of the loan. We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff should receive the
vehicles free of the lien.
Finally, defendant attempts to argue that this is a contract case, and that the trial court
erroneously applied the equitable remedy of specific performance – delivery of the vehicles – rather than
money damages. However, plaintiff brought the case as a claim and delivery action, for which the
statute specifically provides recovery of the disputed property. MCL 600.2920(1); MSA
27A.2920(1) states:
A civil action may be brought to recover possession of any goods or chattels
which have been unlawfully taken or unlawfully detained and to recover damages
sustained by the unlawful taking or unlawful detention, subject to the following
conditions:
(a) An action may not be maintained under this section to recover possession
of or damages for goods or chattels taken by virtue of a warrant for the collection of a
tax, assessment, or fine in pursuance of a statute of this state.
(b) An action may not be maintained under this section to recover possession
of or damages for goods or chattels seized by virtue of an execution or attachment at
the suit of the defendant in the execution or attachment unless the goods or chattels are
exempted by law from execution or attachment.
(c) An action may not be maintained under this section by a person who, at the
time the action is commenced, does not have a right to possession of the goods or
chattels taken or detained.
(d) A writ, order, or process for delivery of goods or chattels before judgment
may not be issued unless the court, after notice and a hearing and under procedures
provided by rules of the supreme court, determines that the claim for recovery is
probably valid and unless the party claiming a right to recover possession of the goods
or chattels files a sufficient bond.
The language is clear that recovery is the proper remedy for this kind of claim. Defendant brought no
counterclaims on a contract theory, and any issues relating to whether there was a valid contract, and if
so what its terms were, was not litigated at trial and cannot now be raised.
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.