PEOPLE OF MI V CAROL LYNN GILES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 22, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 213401
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-158326-FC
CAROL LYNN GILES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316; MSA 28.548, and was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. She appeals
as of right. We affirm.
This case arises from the death of Jesse Giles, a five-hundred pound invalid who had a history
of medical problems including obesity, hypoglycemia, diabetes, hypertension, heart attack, stroke, and
high blood pressure. Giles was injected with a mixture of insulin and a lethal dose of heroin. The heroin
immediately converted into morphine upon entering Giles’ body and he died of respiratory failure after
acute morphine intoxication. Defendant testified at trial that she and her boyfriend came up with the idea
to mix heroin with insulin and to inject it into Giles to kill him. She explained that she and Giles often
fought and were not getting along, and that she thought killing him was the only way she could get out of
the relationship. Defendant further testified that her boyfriend bought the heroin and told her how to mix
it with the insulin. Defendant indicated that she mixed the heroin and insulin and injected Giles with it on
September 28, 1997. Defendant admitted that she planned the murder two days beforehand, that she
intended to kill Giles, that she knew it was wrong to kill, but that she did not think about “getting
caught.”
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence two photographs of
Giles’ body because the photographs were irrelevant. This Court reviews a trial court’s admission of
photographs for an abuse of discretion. People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 187; 585 NW2d 357
(1998).
-1
Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” MRE 401. Photographic evidence is generally admissible if it is “substantially necessary
or instructive to show material facts or conditions.” People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 536; 531
NW2d 780 (1995). The two photographs show Giles’ body lying on the floor next to a bed. His arms
are spread, knees bent and his shirt is pulled up, showing EKG leads on his chest. The photographs
show no blunt trauma or outward physical harm.
The photographs were admitted to aid the jury in visualizing the events described by various
witnesses and the circumstances of the killing itself. People v Coddington, 188 Mich App 584, 598
599; 470 NW2d 478 (1991). The photos do not depict any blood, trauma, or grisly detail. The
photographs are merely standard Polaroid snapshots of the body, depicting nothing that “could lead the
jury to abdicate its truth-finding function and convict on passion alone.” Anderson, supra at 536. We
find no error in the trial court’s admission of the photographs into evidence.1
Defendant next asserts several instances of ineffective counsel. In reviewing a defendant's claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court determines “(1) whether counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable and (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s defective
performance.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). To establish a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that counsel made an error so serious that counsel was not functioning as an attorney as
guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. People v Lloyd, 459 Mich 433, 445-446; 590 NW2d 738
(1999). To prevail, the defendant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action was sound
trial strategy. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). In addition, the
defendant must show that the claimed deficiency was prejudicial to him. Lloyd, supra at 450.
First, defendant asserts that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel failed to object to the admission of the photographs. Because we have concluded that there
was no error in the admission of the photographs, defendant can demonstrate no prejudice as a result of
counsel’s failure to object to admission of the photographs.
Defendant next contends she was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel failed to move for a Walker2 hearing to suppress her confession to police. However, defendant
does not articulate any factor at issue during the police interview that would suggest coercion or
involuntariness. Rather, defendant’s argument rests on the mere possibility that some fact might have
been revealed during a Walker hearing that could lead to the suppression of the statement.
Consequently, this Court has “no basis to conclude that any motion by defendant’s counsel to suppress
the statement would have had merit.” People v Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 356; 578 NW2d 692
(1998).
1
Further, in light of defendant’s in-court admission to every element of the crime, as well as her out-of
court confession to police, the photographs played little or no role in defendant’s conviction.
2
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
-2
Finally, defendant contends she was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel failed to introduce expert testimony regarding battered spouse syndrome. The admissibility of
syndrome evidence is “limited to a description of the uniqueness of a specific behavior brought out at
trial.” People v Christel, 449 Mich 578, 591; 537 NW2d 194 (1995). Accordingly, there must be
“necessary factual underpinnings for the admission of expert testimony” at trial. Id. at 597. Expert
testimony on battered spouse syndrome is generally offered by a defendant in a homicide case when the
defendant is claiming self-defense. Id. at 589. Homicide “is justified under the theory of self-defense if
the defendant ‘honestly and reasonably believes that his life is in imminent danger or that there is a threat
of serious bodily harm.’” People v Wilson, 194 Mich App 599, 602; 487 NW2d 822 (1992).
While defendant testified that she had physical fights with Giles in the past, the record does not
establish that defendant honestly or reasonably believed there was imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm to establish a claim of self-defense. There was nothing unique about defendant’s specific
behavior that was brought at trial that necessitated expert testimony. Nothing in defendant’s testimony
suggested that she killed Giles because she feared for her life or that defendant’s state of mind was so
warped by systematic spousal abuse that she, even irrationally, feared some imminent harm by
defendant. Indeed, on the day of the killing Giles planned to stay in bed all day and defendant had the
opportunity to leave the house if she feared physical harm. H
ence, on this record expert testimony
regarding battered spouse syndrome would not have been relevant because the facts do not suggest that
defendant killed Giles in self-defense.3 Moreover, expert testimony was not required to “explain things
not readily comprehensible to an average juror.” Christel, supra at 597. Therefore, testimony about
the syndrome would not have been relevant even if offered by defense counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
3
Indeed, defendant admitted at trial that she deliberated about how to kill Giles days before she finally
did so.
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.