MARTHA SCHOENACH V JACKSON CO ROAD COMM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARTHA SCHOENACH,
UNPUBLISHED
August 11, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
ALLAN A. SMITH, JEFF IVES, DAVID DUNLAP,
and MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
No. 219331
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 96-074778-NO
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Kelly and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment of no cause of action and a previous order granting
the motion for summary disposition filed by defendants. We affirm. This appeal is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The individual defendants, employees of the Jackson County Road Commission (JCRC), were
operating tractor mowers in an area approximately two hundred feet from a traveled portion of I-94.
The JCRC mowed the area pursuant to a contract with defendant Michigan Department of
Transportation (MDOT). As plaintiff drove through the area an object broke her windshield, struck her
on the shoulder, and exited the vehicle through the rear window. Plaintiff stated that the object was
thrown over the roadway by one of the mowers. A witness stated that he did not see an object strike
plaintiff’s vehicle, and did not see an object thrown from the mowers.
Plaintiff filed suit against the JCRC and its employees in circuit court, and against MDOT in the
Court of Claims. The cases were consolidated in circuit court. Defendants moved for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10). The trial court granted the JCRC’s motion for
summary disposition based on MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), the highway exception to
governmental immunity, but denied the motion based on MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105), the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity. The trial court granted
MDOT’s motion based on MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), and found that the individual defendants
were entitled to summary disposition for the reason that plaintiff could not establish that an issue of fact
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existed as to whether they acted in a grossly negligent manner. MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA
3.996(107)(2)(c). The claims remaining against the JCRC were tried to a jury, which returned a verdict
of no cause of action.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Harrison v
Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 605; 572 NW2d 679 (1997).
MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) provides in pertinent part:
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain the
highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public
travel. …. The duty of the state and county road commissions to repair and maintain
highways, and the liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the
highway designated for vehicular travel and does not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or
any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for
vehicular travel….
A governmental agency is not liable for injury or damage caused by a defective highway unless the
agency knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the defect and had a
reasonable time to repair the defect. MCL 691.1403; MSA 3.996(103). Liability under the highway
exception extends only to the traveled portion of a roadbed, paved or unpaved, that is actually designed
for public vehicular travel, Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619, 623; 456 NW2d
66 (1990), and to factors which are not physically within the improved portion of the roadway but
which present points of hazard to reasonably safe vehicular travel. To be a point of hazard, a condition
must uniquely affect vehicular travel on the improved portion of the roadway, as opposed to a condition
that generally affects the roadway and the surrounding environment. Pick v Szymczak, 451 Mich 607,
623-624; 548 NW2d 603 (1996).
We affirm the judgment of no cause of action and the earlier order granting summary disposition
in favor of MDOT and the individual defendants. Plaintiff does not assert that a defect existed in the
surface of the roadway itself. Her position is that MDOT, through its agents the individual defendants,
propelled an object onto the roadway, and thus failed to keep the roadway on which she traveled in a
reasonably safe condition. Plaintiff’s argument that the object was a point of hazard is without merit.
Even assuming arguendo that the object that hit plaintiff’s vehicle was thrown from one of the mowers
operated by the individual defendants, the resulting dangerous condition was an isolated incident which
could not be predicted and which defendant had no opportunity to correct. Such an object does not
meet the definition of a point of hazard. Id.; MCL 691.1403; MSA 3.996(103). Cf. Miller v
Oakland County Road Comm, 43 Mich App 215; 204 NW2d 141 (1972) (allegations that the
defendant failed to remove dead trees from roadside notwithstanding actual knowledge that trees
presented a hazard stated cause of action under highway exception).
Furthermore, plaintiff’s reliance on MCL 257.676b(1); MSA 9.2376(2)(1), which prohibits the
blocking of or interfering with the normal flow of traffic on a public highway, is misplaced. Even if one
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of the mowers propelled the object that struck plaintiff’s vehicle, the individual defendants did not place
an object onto the roadway for the purpose of blocking or obstructing the normal flow of traffic.
Finally, plaintiff has not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
individual defendants acted in a grossly negligent manner. Plaintiff points to no evidence which, taken in
a light most favorable to her, could establish that the conduct of the individual defendants was “so
reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury [resulted].” MCL
691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107)(2)(c).
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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