LINDA L BURNETT V NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSUR CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LINDA L. BURNETT,
UNPUBLISHED
July 7, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY, NATIONWIDE LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, NATIONWIDE
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
NATIONWIDE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
COMPANY, NATIONWIDE VARIABLE LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, and COLONIAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,
No. 212413
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-626674-CK
Defendants-Appellees,
and
EDWARD MALINKOWSKI, d/b/a EDWARD
MALINKOWSKI INSURANCE,
Defendant
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Doctoroff and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Linda Burnett appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendants (collectively, “Nationwide”) in this contract action. She claims that
Nationwide wrongfully terminated her position as an insurance sales agent in part because of its desire
to remove its products from certain geographical areas, namely, Wayne County and Detroit. We affirm.
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Factual Background
In 1990, plaintiff’s father, Algie Prato, considered retiring from his position as a career
Nationwide insurance agent. In April 1991, plaintiff entered Nationwide’s New Agent Development
Program (“NADP”), allegedly in anticipation of assuming her father’s business. Pursuant to the NADP
agreement, plaintiff agreed to obtain certain licenses in order to be able to sell all lines of insurance
available through Nationwide.
On January 27, 1995, plaintiff signed a Performance Agreement for Servicing Portfolios
(“PASPORT”) memorandum setting forth the terms of the transfer of Prato’s business to plaintiff’s new
agency. That same day, plaintiff also signed a Nationwide Agent Agreement. The PASPORT
memorandum expressly stated, “PASPORT is comprised of two parts – a memorandum of the
expected standards to be met by the new agent (this memo) and a Nationwide Agent Agreement.” If
plaintiff successfully satisfied the terms of the agreement, including obtaining her NASD Series 6 and 63
securities licenses no later than December 31, 1995, she would receive 60-70% of Prato’s business
book.
From April 1995 through July 1995, 60-70% of Prato’s business was transferred to plaintiff’s
agency. However, she failed to obtain her NASD securities licenses as required and her agency was
terminated on January 24, 1996, less than five years from the time she entered the NADP and less than
one year from the time she signed the agent’s agreement. Under the Agent’s agreement, Nationwide
was not required to give a reason for the termination, though plaintiff testified at deposition that she was
terminated for failing to obtain her securities licenses. Plaintiff thereafter filed a twelve-count complaint
seeking damages under theories in tort, contract, public policy and promissory estoppel. She sought to
amend the complaint to add claims for emotional and punitive damages, asserting that she had evidence
that Nationwide segregated insurance claims based on race and residential zip code. The trial court
denied the motion based on Kerwin v Massachusetts Mutual, 409 Mich 401; 295 NW2d 50 (1980),
which bars non-economic damages in breach of contract claims, and also on the basis that discovery
was closed, the case had already been mediated, and Nationwide would suffer prejudice if the
amendment were allowed. Nationwide filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), which the trial court granted in a fifteen-page opinion. We affirm.
Standards of Review
This Court reviews the trial court's decision granting Nationwide’s motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) de novo to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact
exists that would prevent entry of judgment in favor of defendant as a matter of law. Morales v AutoOwners Ins Co, 458 Mich 288, 294; 582 NW2d 776 (1998). We review the entire record, viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, to decide if there exists a relevant factual
issue about which reasonable minds might differ Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362;
547 NW2d 314 (1996). If the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, that party must
provide documentary evidence showing the existence of a disputable issue in order to avoid summary
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disposition. Id. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is also reviewed de novo. Yaldo v
North Pointe Ins Co, 457 Mich 341, 344; 578 NW2d 274 (1998).
Fraudulent and Innocent Misrepresentation and Business Compulsion1
First, plaintiff claims that she was induced to enter into the agent’s agreement and the
PASPORT memorandum by Nationwide’s representations that the only way for her to become a
career agent was for Prato to retire and pass his agency to plaintiff, that 100% of the accounts serviced
by Prato would be transferred t plaintiff’s new agency, and that plaintiff would receive by way of
o
transfer many of Prato’s former accounts.
The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are (1) the defendant made a material
representation, (2) the representation was false, (3) when making the representation, the defendant
knew or should have known it was false, (4) the defendant made the representation with the intention
that the plaintiff would act upon it, and (5) the plaintiff acted upon it and (6) suffered damages as a
result. M&D, Inc v WB McConkey, 231 Mich App 22, 27; 585 NW2d 33 (1998). A claim of
innocent misrepresentation is shown if a party detrimentally relies upon a false representation in such a
manner that the injury suffered by that party inures to the benefit of the party who made the
representation. Id., citing United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Black, 412 Mich 99, 118; 313
NW2d 77 (1981).
Beside the fact that we find no evidence that any of the alleged statements were made to
plaintiff, she acknowledged in her deposition that there was more than one way for her to become a
career agent. Her unequivocal deposition testimony established that she knew before signing the
agreements that she would only be receiving 60-70% of Prato’s business. She failed to show that she
reasonably relied on the alleged statements. Also, her claims relating to the transfer of her father’s
business pertain to future promises. An action for fraudulent representation must be predicated on a
statement relating to a past or an existing fact. Baker v Arbor Drugs, Inc, 215 Mich App 198, 208
209; 544 NW2d 727 (1996). Future promises are contractual and cannot constitute actionable fraud.
Id. at 209.
Plaintiff argues that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation can be made if she can prove that a
promise of future action was made in bad faith and without any intention of performing. Plaintiff asserts
that she provided the trial court with evidence that Nationwide was engaged in a national scheme of
redlining2, and that her claim falls under the “bad faith exception” to the rule that future promises cannot
provide a basis for fraudulent misrepresentation claims. We are unable to find evidence from which it
could reasonably be inferred either that any Nationwide representative made promises without intention
1
We agree with the trial court that any claim for “business compulsion” belonged to Prato and that
plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim of forced retirement on behalf of her father, who was the real
party in interest. MCR 2.201(B)(1).
2
“Redlining” refers to the practice in the insurance business in which insurers either decline to write
insurance or charge higher rates for people who live in particular areas, especially those with large or
growing minority populations. 36A Words and Phrases (1999 Cum Supp), Redlining, p 91.
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of performance or that Nationwide misrepresented a past or present fact. Plaintiff stated in her
deposition that she had no information that when statements were made concerning the transfer of the
Prato business that they were not true. To the contrary, she stated that she was sure the statements
were made with the belief that they were true. Further, plaintiff’s admission that she wrote all eligible
business, never refused to write an eligible piece of business from Detroit, and that she knew of no
policy that was canceled because of geographic location or factors unrelated to insurability, belies her
position that Nationwide’s alleged redlining scheme supports her allegations of fraud.
Breach of Contract and Breach of Reasonable and Legitimate Expectations
Next, plaintiff argues that Nationwide breached its agency agreement by terminating her
contract based on her conclusion that the agency relationship was not terminable at will. She basis this
argument on the terms of the written agreements, as well as alleged oral representations. She also
argues that she was entitled to commissions and deferred compensation benefits.
Termination of Agency Relationship
The agent’s agreement signed by plaintiff contained the following provision: “This Agreement
shall be in force until canceled by either party . . . . Further, due to the personal nature of our
relationship you or the Companies have the right to cancel this Agreement at any time after written
notice . . . .” This unambiguous provision clearly supports the presumption that the agency relationship
was terminable at will. Patillo v Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 199 Mich
App 450, 453; 502 NW2d 696 (1993). By signing the agreement, plaintiff assented to an at-will
relationship and she cannot now establish the converse by asserting that she had an expectation of
termination for cause only. Clement-Rowe v Michigan Health Care Corp, 212 Mich App 503, 507;
538 NW2d 20 (1995). See also 44 CJS Insurance, § 190 (1993).
Plaintiff’s reliance on the Agency Administration Handbook, which was not part of the
PASPORT agreement, is not persuasive. As the trial court correctly found, the handbook set forth
guidelines concerning how agents were to treat their own employees, not how Nationwide would treat
its independent contractors. Consequently, the handbook was not “reasonably capable of instilling a
legitimate expectation of just-cause employment.” Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153,
166; 579 NW2d 906 (1998).3
We agree with the trial court that the statement that “as long as the sales were where they
needed to be, that everything else was negotiable and could be worked out” was too vague to create a
promise of job security. Verbal assurances of just-cause employment must be clear and unequivocal,
Id. at 171, citing Rowe v Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc, 437 Mich 627, 636; 473 NW2d 268
(1991).
3
The plaintiff in Lytle was an employee claiming a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment.
Though the relationship here was an agency, we nonetheless find the Lytle analysis applicable.
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Plaintiff also argues that she had a reasonable and legitimate expectation that she would not be
terminated “on the basis of discriminatory reasons . . . in light of both company policy and her own
subjective belief.” Plaintiff has failed to cite any authority in support of this argument and this issue is
deemed waived on appeal. A party may not leave it to this Court to search for authority to support her
position. Schadewald v Brule, 225 Mich App 26, 34; 570 NW2d 788 (1997). Moreover, plaintiff
relies on Nationwide’s Agency Office Administration Guide, which directed agents not to terminate their
employees for “discriminatory reasons,” and Marketing Policies, which stated Nationwide’s “relative
policy for agents.” Neither of these documents formed part of plaintiff’s agent’s agreement.
Commission and Deferred Compensation
Plaintiff also asserts that a letter written by Nationwide enumerating earnings she would receive
upon departure acted as a modification of the agent’s agreement and that she was entitled to receive
deferred compensation and extended earnings upon her termination. We are not persuaded by
plaintiff’s argument. First, the letter was sent as the result of a clerical error as was evidenced by the
uncontroverted affidavit of Nationwide’s director of agency services. Second, under the terms of the
agent’s agreement, any modification had to be in a writing signed by both plaintiff and Nationwide.
There was no such writing. Third, plaintiff forfeited her agency security compensation benefits by
violating the non-competition clause contained in the agent’s agreement. The terms of the clause, which
prohibited plaintiff from competing with Nationwide within a twenty-five mile radius and one year of
termination, were reasonable. MCL 445.774a; MSA 28.70(4a)(1). See Hamilton Ins Services, Inc
v Nationwide Ins Companies, 86 Ohio St 3d 270, 275; 714 NE2d 898 (1999). The evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that there was no question of fact whether plaintiff breached the terms
of the non-competition clause of the agent’s agreement.
Plaintiff also claims that Nationwide breached the implied contractual covenant of good faith and
fair dealing as it relates to her breach of contract claim, specifically alleging that Nationwide failed to
prepare the paperwork necessary for her to sit for the licensing examination a third time. The record
shows, however, that plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claim for breach of covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and, consequently, this issue is not properly before this Court.
Violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act
Initially, we note that this Court recently recognized the split of authority concerning whether
insurance redlining is actionable under the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 USC 3601 et seq.
Novak v Nationwide Mut Ins Co, 235 Mich App 675, 691; 599 NW2d 546 (1999). We again need
not decide the issue because plaintiff’s deposition testimony established that at no time while she was
serving as a Nationwide agent was she restricted from writing insurance in Wayne County or from
writing eligible policies for any insured, regardless of race.
Nationwide submitted evidence showing that it continues to do business in all of Wayne County.
The trial court directed plaintiff to submit evidence that former insureds were actually canceled as a
result of a redlining scheme. Specifically, the trial court ordered p
laintiff to submit a list of former
insureds to rebut the “cancellation list” prepared by Nationwide, which plaintiff failed to do. Plaintiff
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had no proof that the termination of her agency resulted in the withdrawal of insurance products from
predominantly minority areas that she serviced, and she submitted no evidence that any of the policy
cancellations was racially motivated. Thus, plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing the existence
of a disputable issue and summary disposition was proper.
Violation of the Michigan Insurance Code
The Michigan Insurance Code precludes termination of an agent’s contract for certain specified
reasons, including the location of the agent’s business, the loss experience of the business as it relates to
the location of that business, or the performance of the agent’s obligations under the chapter dealing
with home and auto insurance. MCL 500.1209(4); MSA 24.11209(4). Plaintiff claims that there was
a question of fact whether Nationwide terminated her contractual relationship because of the loss history
and geographic location of her office in violation of the insurance code’s anti-redlining provision, which
states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(3) As a condition of maintaining its authority to transact insurance in this state, an
insurer transacting automobile insurance or home insurance in this state shall not cancel
an agent's contract . . . except for 1 or more of the following reasons:
(a) Malfeasance.
(b) Breach of fiduciary duty or trust.
(c) A violation of this act.
(d) Failure to perform as provided by the contract between the parties.
(e) Submission of less than 25 applications for home insurance and automobile
insurance within the immediately preceding 12-month period.
(4) Subsection (3) shall not be construed as permitting a termination of an agent's
authority based primarily upon any of the following:
(a) The geographic location of the agent's home insurance or automobile
insurance business.
(b) The actual or expected loss experience of the agent's automobile or home
insurance business, related in whole or in part to the geographical location of that
business.
***
(5) Application of law. Subsection (3) and the written notice requirement prescribed in
subsection (1) shall not apply with respect to an agent who is an employee of an insurer
or to an agent who by contractual agreement represents only 1 insurer or group of
affiliated insurers, if the property rights in the renewal are owned by the insurer or group
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of affiliated insurers and the cancellation or termination of the agent's contract does not
result in the cancellation or nonrenewal of any home or automobile insurance policy.
[MCL 500.1209; MSA 24.1209.]
Plaintiff argues that she presented the trial court with sufficient evidence to support her claim that
her contract was terminated as a result of an alleged redlining scheme. Relying on the unreported case
of Redman Agency, Inc v Allstate Ins Co, 1991 WL 526300; 125 Lab Cas P 57,420 (WD Mich,
1991), she claims her termination was prohibited because Nationwide’s intent was based on geographic
location, loss ratio, and on the agent’s obligation to sell to all qualified individuals. We find that
Redman, which denied retroactive application of the statute and allowed termination of the plaintiff’s at
will agent’s agreement, is not applicable to this case.
The trial court ruled that the relationship between the parties was governed by subsection (5),
which required a showing of a causal connection between the termination of plaintiff’s contract and
policy cancellations, a connection plaintiff failed to establish even when ordered by the court to present
documentation doing so. The court based its ruling on the fact that plaintiff was an agent who by
contractual agreement represented only Nationwide, and also on the fact that no evidence was
presented to support a finding that policies were canceled or not renewed because of plaintiff’s
termination.
This Court addressed this very issue in Novak and held that the plaintiff had an obligation to
show that at least one home or auto policy cancellation resulted from his termination as an agent and not
from a legitimate reason. Novak, supra at 684. The Novak Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that
some policies were constructively canceled where Nationwide made the servicing of the policies
difficult, a claim also presented by plaintiff here. The Novak Court ruled that inefficient servicing of an
account cannot be equated with a policy cancellation under the unambiguous language of subsection (5).
Because plaintiff was a captive agent, because Nationwide retained ownership of the policies, and
because plaintiff failed to produce evidence of even one cancellation as a result of her termination, she
did not enjoy the protection of subsection (3). Id. at 685.
Like Terry Novak, plaintiff argues that subsection (4) precludes canceling an agent’s agreement
based on her obligation to sell to all qualified individuals. The Novak Court ruled that subsection (4),
by its plain wording, merely construes subsection (3) and does not stand alone. If subsection (3) is
inapplicable, then subsection (4) is inapplicable, also. Id. Because plaintiff fell within the exclusion of
subsection (5), she was not protected by subsection (4). Id. at 686.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in its analysis of the Uniform Trade Practices Act
(“UTPA”), MCL 500.2019; MSA 24.12019, and in holding that plaintiff could not make a claim,
arguing that the trial court examined the wrong statute and should have reviewed § 1209(4)(c). Plaintiff
clearly asserted in paragraph 60 her complaint that Nationwide violated § 2019 of the insurance code.
The trial court addressed that argument and correctly ruled that the UTPA does not create a private
right of action. Isagholian v Transamerica Ins Corp, 208 Mich App 9, 17; 527 NW2d 13 (1994);
Young v Mich Mutual Ins Co, 139 Mich App 600, 604-606; 362 NW2d 844 (1984).
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Violation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act
The question of plaintiff’s status as an employee or as an independent contractor was one of law
for the court and not one of fact for the jury because the evidence and facts were susceptible of one
inference only: plaintiff was an independent contractor. Kidder v Miller-Davis Co, 455 Mich 25, 37;
564 NW2d 872 (1997). As such, she had no claim under §202 of the Civil Rights Act, MCL
37.2101 et seq., MSA 3.548(101) et seq., which applies only to employees.
Plaintiff argues, nevertheless, that she had a claim under §302, which prohibits conspiring to
prevent compliance with the act, and § 701, which prohibits denying public accommodations or services
based on such factors as age, race and sex. The Novak Court specifically held that the Act does not
confer standing on insurance agents for claims under § 302, stating, “Section 302 of the Civil Rights Act
protects the persons who are being denied goods and services, not the persons who are attempting to
provide the goods and services.” Novak, supra at 693. Moreover, plaintiff’s claim that Nationwide
violated § 701 of the Act is not supported by the evidence.
Promissory Estoppel
Plaintiff argues that she had a viable claim based on promissory estoppel because of her
reasonable reliance on “oral promises and on the long-standing oral and written policies of the
companies.” Again, we find nothing in the record to support plaintiff’s allegations.
The elements of promissory estoppel are (1) a promise, (2) that the promisor should reasonably
have expected to induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, and
(3) that in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature in circumstances such that the promise
must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided. Marrero v McDonnell Douglas Capital Corp, 200
Mich App 438, 442; 505 NW2d 275 (1993). In determining whether a requisite promise existed, this
Court objectively examines the words and actions surrounding the transaction in question as well as the
nature of the relationship between the parties and the circumstances surrounding their actions. Novak,
supra at 687; State Bank of Standish v Curry, 442 Mich 76, 86; 500 NW2d 104 (1993). This
Court exercises caution in evaluating an estoppel claim and applies the doctrine only where the facts are
unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented undoubted. Marrero, supra at 442-443.
As noted above, the agency relationship was terminable at will. The signed written contract,
with its integration clause, expressly contradicted any alleged oral representation to the contrary.
Novak, supra at 687. Moreover, as the trial court observed, alleged promises regarding the transfer of
the Prato book of business appear to have been made prior to plaintiff signing the agent agreement and
the PASPORT memo. If the promises were made after the agreements were signed, then they failed to
satisfy the modification requirements set forth in the agreement. The trial court properly dismissed
plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim.
Motion to Amend the Complaint
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Plaintiff next claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to amend the
complaint to add a claim for emotional damages. Leave to amend a complaint should be freely given
when justice so requires. MCR 2.118(A)(2). Hakari v Ski Brule, Inc, 230 Mich App 352, 355; 584
NW2d 345 (1998). This Court will reverse a trial court's decision on a motion to amend a complaint
only where the trial court abused its discretion. Id.
Leave to amend a complaint may be denied for particularized reasons, such as undue delay, bad
faith, or dilatory motive on the movant's part, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or where amendment would be futile. Jenks
v Brown, 219 Mich App 415, 420; 557 NW2d 114 (1996). "An amendment is futile where, ignoring
the substantive merits of the claim, it is legally insufficient on its face." Gonyea v Motor Parts Federal
Credit Union, 192 Mich App 74, 78; 480 NW2d 297 (1991).
The recovery of damages for the breach of a contract is limited to those damages that are a
natural result of the breach or those that are contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was
made. Kewin, supra at 414. Therefore, it is generally held that damages for emotional distress cannot
be recovered for the breach of a commercial contract. Id. Consequently, an amendment to add a claim
for emotional damages would have been futile since such damages are not recoverable in a breach of
contract action. Similarly, amendment to add a claim for punitive damages under the FHA would have
been futile since plaintiff testified at her deposition that she had no evidence to support a viable claim
under the act.
Conclusion
Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient documentary evidence of the existence of a factual issue to
avoid summary disposition. Her own deposition testimony was fatal to her claim that her contractual
relationship was terminable only for cause, that she had a reasonable and legitimate expectation that she
would receive 100% of her father’s business, and that she was entitled to compensation upon
termination of the agreement. The written agreements set forth that the relationship was at-will, that
plaintiff had to obtain her securities licenses, that she would receive 60-70% of her father’s business,
and that she had to complete five years of service before she would be entitled to extended earnings.
Additionally, the unrefuted documentation and other evidence presented by Nationwide dispelled
plaintiff’s claim of redlining.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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