SUZANN HOPE BEDORE V LUKE PAUL BEDORE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SUZANN HOPE BEDORE,
UNPUBLISHED
June 9, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 221098
Houghton Circuit Court
LC No. 97-010118-DM
LUKE PAUL BEDORE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Saad and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from that portion of the parties’ judgment of divorce denying her sole
physical custody of the parties’ two daughters, Ashton (born 12/29/95) and Vanessa (born 1/23/97).
The trial court found that an established custodial environment existed in plaintiff ’s care, but that, the
parties were equal under the best interests of the child factors set forth at MCL 722.23; MSA
25.312(3). Accordingly, the parties were granted joint legal and joint physical custody of the children.
We affirm.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have precluded
her from producing evidence about her mental and/or physical condition. The decision whether to admit
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear
abuse of discretion. Fletcher v Fletcher (After Remand), 229 Mich App 19, 24; 581 NW2d 11
(1998). We find no abuse of discretion on the facts of this case. More than a year before trial,
defendant filed a motion to compel plaintiff to provide him with releases regarding plaintiff and her
medical and psychiatric history. When plaintiff refused defendant access to her medical records, the
trial court ruled that, pursuant to MCR 2.314(B)(2), plaintiff could not present any evidence at trial
regarding her mental or physical condition. In a pretrial motion twelve days before the scheduled start
of trial, however, plaintiff, now represented by different counsel, offered defendant signed medical
releases and again requested to be allowed to present evidence at trial regarding her mental or physical
condition. The trial court affirmed its earlier holding.
MCR 2.314(B)(2) provides:
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Unless the court orders otherwise, if a party asserts that the medical information
is subject to a privilege and the assertion has the effect of preventing discovery of
medical information otherwise discoverable under MCR 2.302(B), the party may not
thereafter present or introduce any physical, documentary, or testimonial evidence
relating to the party’s medical history or mental or physical condition.
The trial court’s ruling is consistent with this Court rule. Further, the trial court’s decision did not
unfairly hamper the court’s ability to reflect on the mental and physical health of the parties pursuant to
the best interest of the child factors contained in MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3). Clearly, the court
considered plaintiff ’s mental and physical condition through the testimony of the court-appointed
evaluator who had access to plaintiff ’s privileged medical information.
Plaintiff also says that the trial court contravened the public policy of integrating the handicapped
into family life when, in its evaluation of the factors under MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3), it weighed
factor (g), the mental and physical health of the parties involved, in favor of defendant. We do not
decide whether plaintiff is, in fact, handicapped, but we evaluate plaintiff ’s claim while keeping in mind
the need to integrate the handicapped into family life. Bednarski v Bednarski, 141 Mich App 15, 27;
366 NW2d 69 (1985). We find that the trial court’s holding did not violate that public policy.
Plaintiff ’s alleged physical ailment was not the sole factor in the court’s determination. Plaintiff ’s
emotional problems were also considered. The evidence did not clearly preponderate in favor of
plaintiff so factor (g) was properly not weighed in her favor. Ireland v Smith, 214 Mich App 235,
242; 542 NW2d 344 (1995), aff’d 451 Mich 457 (1996).
Additionally, plaintiff avers that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow her to
present rebuttal evidence relative to her mental and physical condition. Again, the trial court correctly
disallowed plaintiff from presenting any medical evidence on her behalf. MCR 2.314(B)(2).
Furthermore, decisions regarding the presentation of evidence are discretionary, MRE 611, and a court
may disallow redirect examination that exceeds the scope of direct examination. People v Stevens,
230 Mich App 502, 507; 584 NW2d 369 (1998). The rebuttal testimony sought to be introduced by
plaintiff exceeded the scope of direct examination; it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude it on that
ground.
Plaintiff also argues that it was against the great weight of the evidence to conclude that
defendant was more willing to encourage a parent-child relationship between the other parent and the
child, as contemplated under best interests of the child factor (j). A trial court’s findings as to each
custody factor should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.
Ireland, supra, 214 Mich App 242. Discretionary rulings are reviewed under a “palpable abuse of
discretion” standard. MCL 722.8; MSA 25.312(8).
We conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that plaintiff unfairly, and without
legal justification, denied defendant his visitation rights. We recognize that plaintiff was entitled to
withhold visitation for a short interval after the allegations of criminal sexual conduct arose in September
1998. However, it is inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial to claim that each of the many times
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plaintiff was uncooperative about visitation, she was only doing so under compelling circumstances or at
the direction of an attorney, social worker, or other professional. For example, she would not allow
defendant an unsupervised visit with the children on July 20, 1997 because the prior weekend he fed
Vanessa a bottle instead of solid food. In fact, plaintiff acknowledged that she was told by the friend of
the court that unless the children had a doctor’s excuse, withholding visitation because of alleged illness
was not permissible. Plaintiff repeatedly violated this policy and she did not corroborate many of the
children’s alleged illnesses with proper documentation from a doctor. Accordingly, the trial court
correctly found that factor (j) favored defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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