IN RE JACKSON/MOSLEY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SHARNICE LATRICE JACKSON
and JHONELL ROOSEVELT MOSLEY, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 23, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 217685
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-351530
DEBORAH DYLONA MOSLEY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ROOSEVELT
NICHOLAS,
JACKSON
and
MICHAEL
Respondents.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Gage and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant (hereinafter respondent) appeals as of right from the family court order
terminating her parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j);
MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We reverse and remand.
Respondent contends that the court lacked jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights because
she did not receive sufficient notice of the permanent custody proceedings. A failure to provide notice
of a termination hearing as required by statute, MCL 712A.12, 712A.19b(2); MSA 27.3178(598.12),
27.3178(598.19b)(2), constitutes a jurisdictional defect that renders void all family court proceedings.
In re Adair, 191 Mich App 710, 713-714; 478 NW2d 667 (1991); In re Brown, 149 Mich App
529, 534-542; 386 NW2d 577 (1986).
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The family court found in its termination order that respondent was served with notice of the
termination hearing “by personal service to her sister and through verbal notice by the [case] worker,”
and further that “[p]ublication was effectuated.” Because statutes requiring notice to parents must be
strictly construed, service upon respondent’s sister cannot be deemed a proper substitute for personal
service on respondent. In re Atkins, 237 Mich App 249, 251; 602 NW2d 594 (1999); In re Kozak,
92 Mich App 579, 582; 285 NW2d 378 (1979). Moreover, verbal notice by the caseworker is not a
recognized manner of service. In re Mayfield, 198 Mich App 226, 231; 497 NW2d 578 (1993)
(Lack of service is not cured even though a noncustodial parent is represented by counsel at the hearing
and has received actual notice of the time and place of the hearing.); In re Brown, supra at 541-542.
With respect to service by publication, MCL 712A.13; MSA 27.3178(598.13) provides
“[t]hat if the judge is satisfied that it is impracticable to serve personally such summons or the notice
provided for in the preceding section, he may order service . . . by publication thereof.” Service by
publication is “sufficient to confer jurisdiction if . . . publication is made once in some newspaper printed
and circulated in the county in which said court is located at least 1 week before the time fixed in the
summons or notice for the hearing.” [Emphasis added.] In this case, notice by publication occurred on
October 22, 1998, eight days after the termination hearing commenced on October 14, 1998. Thus,
notice by publication was untimely.1
Petitioner argues that further service on respondent was excused under MCR 5.920(F) because
respondent was personally served with a summons for the initial temporary custody hearing. After the
adjudication hearing, a dispositional order was entered placing the children in the court’s temporary
custody. Under MCL 712A.20; MSA 27.3178(598.20), the court could not subsequently proceed to
termination without issuance and service of a fresh summons. MCR 5.920(F) does not apply to excuse
initial service of a summons for a termination hearing, but instead only excuses subsequent, repetitive
service after an initial summons for a termination hearing has been properly served and the proceedings
are subsequently adjourned to a future date. In re Atkins, supra.
Because statutes requiring notice to parents must be strictly construed, and because respondent
was not properly served with a summons and copy of the permanent custody petition, reversal is
required. In light of our disposition of the notice issue, we need not reach respondent’s contention that
the family court erroneously concluded that clear and convincing evidence warranted termination of
respondent’s parental rights.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
The termination hearing was scheduled to continue on November 4, 1998, although at the close of the
October 14, 1998 hearing the court indicated that “I will not be taking any additional testimony at the
next hearing.” While the October 22, 1998 published notice occurred thirteen days prior to the
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continued hearing on November 4, 1998, it cannot be considered sufficient to confer the family court
with jurisdiction when it occurred after the termination hearing’s evidentiary phase. In re Atkins, supra
(Statutes requiring notice to parents must be strictly construed.).
The family court adjourned the November 4, 1998 hearing until December 2, 1998 to
accommodate attempts to serve respondent personally and by certified mail at her most recent address,
as provided by respondent’s counsel at the November 4 hearing. Personal service was unsuccessful
because the address was a vacant home. An unsigned return of service indicated that certified mail was
sent to this vacant home on November 9, 1998, but that the mail was returned undelivered. Although in
some circumstances a certified mailing to a last known address is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
family court, MCL 712A.13; MSA 27.3178(598.13), we cannot conclude that the instant mailing
constituted sufficient notice to respondent when she did not otherwise receive proper notice of the initial,
evidentiary phase of the termination hearing.
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