IN RE RAVEN LA SHAWN OWENS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of Raven LaShawn Owens, Minor
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 19, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 221580
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-361425
MONIQUE MERCER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Gribbs and Griffin, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the family court order terminating her parental rights to the
minor child (DOB: 5-10-97) under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b) (c)
(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.
The minor child in this case was born prematurely and weighed less than one and one-half
pounds at birth. She has never lived with respondent. The child was brought to the attention of
petitioner Family Independence Agency (FIA) when, months after her birth, she was ready to be
released from the hospital and could not be released to respondent because respondent had not visited
regularly or learned to care for her. The minor child remains medically fragile and requires twenty-four
hour monitoring. She requires special care and frequent assessment by a variety of medical specialists.
The child has an apnea monitor and a tracheotomy and could die in a matter of minutes if her airway
becomes either too dry or too full of mucous. Someone needs to listen to her every breath, and,
because of the tracheotomy, she cannot make sounds and must be visually observed at all times. The
child needs to be in a near-sterile environment and cannot be exposed to cigarette smoke.
On appeal, respondent contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant trial counsel’s
request for an adjournment. We do not agree. On the day of trial, the social worker assigned to the
case received an anonymous telephone message that respondent was in the hospital. The social worker
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telephoned the five local hospitals and respondent’s physician. Respondent was not registered at any of
the hospitals and her physician knew nothing about a hospitalization. Because respondent had been
untruthful about a variety of matters during the pendency of this case, the trial court declined an
adjournment. The trial court set the matter aside for two days, however, and gave trial counsel the
opportunity to provide documentation of respondent’s claimed hospitalization. There is no evidence
that any such documentation was provided. We find no abuse of discretion. In re King, 186 Mich
App 458, 466; 465 NW2d 1 (1990.
Respondent also argues that termination was not warranted because respondent had
substantially complied with the treatment plan. There is no merit to this claim. Contrary to respondent’s
argument on appeal, there was evidence that respondent’s home was not suitable for a child with the
medical needs at issue here, and there was no indication that respondent had done anything to make the
home more suitable. There was also evidence in respondent’s home of smoking. Respondent never
availed herself of counseling services. Most significantly, respondent never progressed to the point
where she could do the child’s most difficult medical care. Respondent had not, in fact, learned to
properly care for the child’s tracheotomy or to suction the mucous that could kill her, and had never in
the child’s life been able to have unsupervised visitation. Although respondent complied with some
parts of the treatment plan, she was inconsistent throughout. Even after the social worker stressed the
need for respondent’s compliance, respondent failed to be home for six of ten scheduled home visits.
Respondent attended only nine of the child’s fourteen doctor appointments, and she was late for many
of those. Respondent argues on appeal that transportation was a problem, but the record shows that
she was offered taxi transportation and provided bus tickets, and that she had a car.
The family court did not clearly err in finding that statutory grounds for termination were
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593
NW2d 520 (1999); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further, respondent
failed to show that termination of her parental rights was not in the best interest of the child. MCL
712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.10b)(5); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564
NW2d 156 (1997). The family court did not err in terminating her parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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