PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES EUGENE LUDINGTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 12, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 211907
Mecosta Circuit Court
LC No. 97-004041-FH
JAMES EUGENE LUDINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Meter and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this case involving the break-in of a Michigan convenience store, defendant appeals by right
from his conviction by a jury of breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny, MCL 750.110;
MSA 28.305. The trial court, applying a second-offense habitual offender enhancement under MCL
769.10; MSA 28.1082, sentenced him to forty months’ to fifteen years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant, who was initially arrested for the instant charge on a fugitive warrant in Indiana, first
argues that the prosecutor violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), MCL 780.601;
MSA 4.147(1), by failing to ensure that defendant, while in Indiana, was advised of his right under the
IAD to request a final disposition of the charge against him. Defendant contends that the alleged
violation of the IAD entitles him to sentence credit beginning on the day he was arrested in Indiana. This
issue involves the interpretation of MCL 780.601; MSA 4.147(1). We review issues of statutory
interpretation de novo. People v Riggs, 237 Mich App 584, 587; 604 NW2d 68 (1999). We
disagree that defendant is entitled to relief, for two separate reasons. First, defendant waived this IAD
based argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. See People v Browning (On Rehearing), 108
Mich App 281, 294; 310 NW2d 365 (1981). Second, the IAD was inapplicable to defendant’s
situation, since defendant, while in Indiana, was not serving “a term of imprisonment” under the act but
was merely awaiting the disposition of pending charges.1 See MCL 780.601; MSA 4.147(1) and
Browning, supra at 292. See also Christian v United States, 394 A2d 1, 39-41 (DC App, 1978).
Next, defendant argues that the trial court should have excluded the testimony of Robert Ray
Rogers, a prosecution witness who testified that defendant told him in August 1996 that he obtained
money, cigarettes, and lighters in a break-in of a Michigan gas station. Defendant contends that the
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testimony was irrelevant – or, at a minimum, that its probative value was substantially outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice – because Rogers could not state with specificity when or where the
break-in occurred. We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.
People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 289; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). An abuse of discretion occurred if an
unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would find no justification for
the ruling made. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996).
We find no abuse of discretion on this record. Rogers’ testimony went to a central issue in the
case and was therefore relevant. MRE 401. Furthermore, the relevance of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403. While, as defendant points out,
Rogers could not testify with specificity regarding the time or place of the break-in, that lack of clarity
went to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Defendant additionally suggests that the
trial court made no findings regarding the potential prejudice associated with Rogers’ testimony under
MRE 403 and that this oversight warrants reversal. We disagree. First, the court’s ruling implicitly
recognized that the testimony’s potential for prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value.
Second, any lack of specific findings under MRE 403 by the trial court was harmless. Indeed, given the
highly probative nature of the evidence and its non-inflammatory character, there simply existed no basis
for exclusion under MRE 403; any specific “findings” by the trial court regarding prejudice would not
have changed this result.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court imposed a disproportionately long sentence. We
review a trial court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich
630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). A sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion if it violates the principle
of proportionality, which mandates that a sentence be proportionate to the seriousness of the
circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. Id.; People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336,
344-345; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). The offense in this case was serious. The damage done to the
interior and exterior of the affected store was substantial, a safe had been opened, and the value of the
items taken from the store was significant. Furthermore, defendant, aged twenty-three at the time of the
crime, had a prior conviction for breaking and entering, the sentence for which was apparently
completed less than four months before the instant offense took place. Under these circumstances, we
conclude that defendant’s sentence was proportionate and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Defendant additionally suggests that the trial court erred by considering only punishment and the
protection of society – and not deterrence or, more significantly, rehabilitation – when sentencing
defendant. As stated in People v Adams, 430 Mich 679, 686; 425 NW2d 437 (1988), a court may
properly consider rehabilitation, societal protection, punishment, and deterrence during sentencing.
Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, however, there is no requirement that a court explicitly set forth its
findings with regard to each of these factors or that a court give great
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deference to the goal of rehabilitation when a serious crime has been committed. See People v Turner,
123 Mich App 600, 603; 332 NW2d 626 (1983). In light of the proportionality of defendant’s
sentence, we find no error requiring resentencing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Daniel S. Owens
1
On a related topic, we note that defendant moved below for a personal recognizance bond (“PR
bond”) under MCR 6.004(C), which protects a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial by
requiring that a defendant who has been incarcerated for over six months for a felony be given a PR
bond. Defendant contended that the six-month period under MCR 6.004(C) should have been
computed starting on August 5, 1997, when he was arrested in Indiana on Indiana charges unrelated to
the instant offense and after which he was apparently held for both the Indiana charges and for the
instant charge. The trial court ruled that the six-month period commenced on September 2, 1997, when
the Indiana authorities released defendant on a PR bond and defendant was transported to Michigan to
face the instant charge. Although defendant mentions MCR 6.004(C) in his appellate brief, he does not
explicitly argue on appeal that the trial court erred in its application of MCR 6.004(C). For the sake of
completeness, however, we note that the trial court’s ruling was correct, since defendant’s incarceration
in Indiana beginning on August 5, 1997, was independently based on additional, unrelated charges in
Indiana and therefore fell within the exclusions from the six-month period listed in MCR 6.004(C)(1)
and (6). We further note that the period during which defendant was initially incarcerated in Indiana
for the instant offense – April 4, 1997, to June 27, 1997 – was appropriately excluded by the trial court
from the six-month computation because (1) defendant did not argue that it should be included, and (2)
it resulted from defendant’s own resistance to extradition.
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