RJ SULLIVAN V DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
R. J. SULLIVAN, d/b/a SULLIVAN &
COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 5, 2000
Plaintiff,
and
TEXAS WESTERN RESERVES OIL COMPANY,
INC., d/b/a WESTERN RESERVES OIL
COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 209842
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 94-078255 AV
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
R. J. SULLIVAN, d/b/a SULLIVAN &
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
TEXAS WESTERN RESERVES OIL COMPANY,
INC., d/b/a WESTERN RESERVES OIL
COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v
No. 210106
-1
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 94-078255 AV
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Gage and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs Texas Western Reserve Oil Company (Texas Western)
and R. J. Sullivan (Sullivan) appeal as of right from a circuit court opinion and order dismissing their
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, superintending control and mandamus. We affirm.
Plaintiffs are named on drilling permit 36115 for State Blue Lake 1 oil and gas well in
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Kalkaska County. They initiated this action after defendant refused to transfer the drilling permit in their
names to Trinity Exploration Company and placed them on the “hold permits list.” These actions
effectively prohibited plaintiffs from conducting business in Michigan until they cleaned up an oil spill at
the well that occurred while Trinity was operating it.
I
We first address plaintiffs’ arguments that the circuit court erred in concluding that plaintiffs
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Administrative Procedures Act (APA), MCL
24.201 et seq.; MSA 3.560(101) et seq., requires parties to seek redress through an available
administrative process before seeking judicial review of an agency action. MCL 24.301; MSA
3.560(201); Michigan Supervisors Union OPEIU Local 512 v Dep’t of Civil Service, 209 Mich
App 573, 576-577; 531 NW2d 790 (1995) (noting that the exhaustion requirement is premised on the
separation of powers doctrine).
Plaintiffs claim that because any appeal to the Supervisor of Wells on the basis of the same
uncontested facts would have been futile, they were excused them from appealing the Assistant
Supervisor of Wells’ decision to the Supervisor or the Natural Resources Commission, as 1979 AC, R
299.2001 et seq. then permitted. A plaintiff may seek judicial review before obtaining a final agency
order or decision when “it is clear that appeal to an administrative body is an exercise in futility and
nothing more than a formal step on the way to the courthouse,” Turner v Lansing Twp, 108 Mich App
103, 108; 310 NW2d 287 (1981), for example when a case does not require the agency’s extensive
findings of fact or technical expertise and the involved issue is clearly framed for the court as one of law.
Huggett v DNR, 232 Mich App 188, 193; 590 NW2d 747 (1998).
In the instant case, the facts are not significantly in dispute, and defendant’s technical expertise is
not crucial to resolving any issue. Plaintiffs present purely legal questions, including whether defendant
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had the authority to promulgate 1979 AC, R 299.1105 and whether defendant could act against
plaintiffs because they “owned” the well. Consequently, the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs
had to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review. The trial court nevertheless
reached the correct result in this case.
II
Plaintiffs next claim that the trial court erred by refusing to force defendant to transfer permit
36115 to Trinity and to remove plaintiff’s names from the “hold permits list.” According to plaintiffs,
defendant lacked any authority to act against them under the former statutory chapter concerning oil, gas
and minerals, MCL 319.1 et seq.; MSA 13.139(1) et seq. (Chapter 319), or the administrative rules
that applied to oil and gas well drilling permits, 1979 AC, R 299.1101 et seq.1 Whether the oil, gas
and mineral statutes and defendant’s administrative rules allow it to sanction plaintiffs for an oil spill that
occurred during Trinity’s tenure as the well’s operator represents a question of law that we review de
novo. Aaronson v Lindsay & Hauer Int’l Ltd, 235 Mich App 259, 270; 597 NW2d 227 (1999).
The primary rule of statutory construction is to determine and effectuate the intent of the
Legislature. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611
(1998). When the Legislature enacted Chapter 319, it explicitly identified the statutory purposes.
It has long been the declared policy of this state to foster conservation of natural
resources to the end that our citizens may continue to enjoy the fruits and profits thereof.
...
. . . The interests of the people demand that exploitation and waste of oil and
gas be prevented. . . .
It is accordingly the declared policy of the state to protect the interests of its
citizens and landowners from unwarranted waste of gas and oil and foster the
development of the industry along the most favorable conditions and with a view to the
ultimate recovery of the maximum production of these natural products. To that end this
act is to be construed liberally in order that effect may be given to sound policies of
conservation and the prevention of waste and exploitation. [MCL 319.1; MSA
13.139(1).]
Accordingly, the Legislature enacted a specific provision prohibiting the commission of “waste in the
exploration for or in the development, production, or handling or use of oil or gas; or in the handling of
any product thereof.” MCL 319.4; MSA 13.139(4).
The Legislature charged defendant, acting as the Supervisor of Wells, with administering and
enforcing the regulation of oil and gas wells to prevent waste and conserve these natural resources.
MCL 319.5; MSA 13.139(5). To that end, it granted defendant broad authority to promulgate rules
under the APA, “to enforce such rules and to do whatever may be necessary with respect to the subject
matter herein to carry out the purposes of this act, whether or not indicated, specified, or enumerated in
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this or any other section thereof.” See MCL 319.6(a); MSA 13.139(6)(a). If a well owner or
operator failed to comply with the statutes or any rules promulgated under the Supervisor’s authority,
defendant could hold hearings, issue orders or institute an action in the circuit court. See MCL 319.7,
319.18; MSA 13.139(7), 13.139(18). See also MCL 319.2(g); MSA 13.139(2)(g) (“‘Owner’ means
the person who has the right to drill into and produce from any pool, and to appropriate the production
either for himself or for himself and another or others.”).
Defendant promulgated a number of rules to govern the drilling and operating of wells. 1979
AC, R 299.1101 et seq.2 At issue in this case are 1979 AC, R 299.1104 (“Rule 104”), R 299.1105
(“Rule 105”) and R 299.1105a (“Rule 105a”).
Rule 104 conditioned drilling permit eligibility on compliance with Chapter 319, the rules
promulgated thereunder and the Supervisor’s orders. This rule specifically allowed defendant to
withhold drilling permits as an enforcement technique. Rule 105 governed the process of transferring a
drilling permit issued under 1979 AC, 299.1101 (“Rule 101”), and stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
(2) Should the person who has obtained a permit to drill dispose of his interest
in the well to a new owner before drilling is commenced, while the well is being drilled,
or after the well has been completed, a notice of the change of ownership and a request
for the transfer of the permit to the new owner shall be submitted to the supervisor . . .
(3) Should the owner of record or the acquiring operator fail, neglect or refuse
to file a notice of change of ownership and request the transfer of a permit for a
producible well, the supervisor may require suspension of production from the well until
the request for transfer has been filed and approved.
(4) Should the owner of record be under notice because of unsatisfactory
conditions on the lease involved with the transfer of a permit, the supervisor may require
suspension of production from the well on said lease until:
(a) The owner of record has corrected said unsatisfactory conditions and the
permit has been transferred to the new owner; or until
(b) The acquiring operator by written agreement with the supervisor has
corrected said unsatisfactory conditions and the permit has been transferred as provided
herein.
Rule 105a represented an additional enforcement provision that permitted defendant to suspend a well’s
oil or gas production to ensure compliance with subrule 105(2)’s change of ownership/ permit transfer
requirements.
In February 1993, defendant informed Texas Western that it had violated Rule 105 by failing to
seek a transfer of its drilling permit to Trinity, and that defendant was prepared to take action under
Rule 105a. Subsequent letters to Texas Western and Sullivan advised that defendant found them to be
in violation of substantive rules prohibiting oil and gas waste.
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We conclude that Rule 105 authorized defendant’s specific actions in this case. Both Rules 105
and 105a applied under the facts of this case because Sullivan and Texas Western, each of whom
constitutes an “owner of record” or “person who obtained a drilling permit,” in 1992 transferred
ownership of the well to Trinity. 1979 AC, R 299.1105(2), (3), R 299.1105a. There is no doubt that
plaintiffs are the last owners of record for the well. Both plaintiffs’ names appear on the 1987 transfer
of permit form within a space labeled “Name(s) of Acquiring Owner(s).” Plaintiffs not only fail to
challenge defendant’s assertion that they transferred ownership of the well to Trinity, they rely on that
fact to support their argument that they cannot be penalized because they no longer “own” the well.
Sullivan contends, however, that no unsatisfactory condition in the operation of the lease existed
that would have permitted defendant to sanction plaintiffs under subrule 105(4). Even absent brine or
salt contamination, water contamination, or Sullivan’s inexcusable failure to report a spill, as defendant
alleged in the final noncompliance letter, plaintiffs acknowledge that there was an oil spill at the well.
This spill appears to have violated 1979 AC, 299.1906, which demanded that “[e]very precaution shall
be taken to prevent the escape of oil.” Consequently, if Trinity, the acquiring owner, was unwilling to
agree to clean up the spill as contemplated by subrule 105(4)(b), then defendant had the authority shut
down the well pursuant to subrule 105(3) and require the “owner[s] of record,” plaintiffs, to bring the
well into compliance pursuant to subrule 105(4)(a). The existence of the oil spill also supported
defendant’s withholding of other drilling permits under Rule 104.
III
Sullivan also argues that defendant lacked authority to promulgate Rule 105 because MCL
319.23; MSA 13.139(23) referred only to the issuance of permits to drill wells, while Rule 105
expands defendant’s authority over permits to cover drilling and operating wells. Defendant had broad
authority to promulgate rules under Chapter 319. MCL 319.6; MSA 13.139(6). In Dykstra v DNR,
198 Mich App 482, 484; 499 NW2d 367 (1993), this Court explained that when
an agency is empowered to make rules, the validity of those rules is to be determined by
a three-part test: (1) whether the rule is within the subject matter of the enabling statute;
(2) whether it complies with the legislative intent underlying the enabling statute; and (3)
whether it is arbitrary or capricious.
Rule 105 satisfies each element of this test.
First, Sullivan assumes, without explanation or authority, that the relevant enabling statute is
specifically MCL 319.23; MSA 13.139(23), which governed drilling permits, instead of Chapter 319
as a whole or any other section of the act. MCL 319.6; MSA 13.139(6) very broadly defined the
scope of the rules that defendant could promulgate under Chapter 319. Defendant’s authority extended
to promulgating rules that aided in the identification of well owners, which Rule 105 attempted to do by
requiring that well owners notify the Supervisor of Wells when well ownership changed. MCL
319.6(n); MSA 13.139(6)(n). It makes no difference whatsoever in the context of this appeal that
drilling permit 36115 expired before ownership transferred or that no new drilling could occur under its
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auspices because the permit serves a second regulatory purpose by officially recording the past and
current well owners. We conclude that Rule 105 fell within the scope of Chapter 319.
The second part of the three-part test articulated in Dykstra, supra, looks at whether the rule
serves the purpose of the enabling statute. The Legislature in MCL 319.1; MSA 13.139(1), explicitly
stated that Chapter 319 intended to “protect the interests of [Michigan] citizens and land owners from
unwarranted waste of gas and oil and foster the development of the industry along the most favorable
conditions and with a view to the ultimate recovery of the maximum production of these natural
products.” Rule 105 carried out this legislative purpose by tracking a well’s owner of record and
limiting the transfer of ownership until the well complied with Chapter 319 standards. Rule 105 appears
intended to prevent the very circumstances that exist in the present case, in which all parties related to
the polluting well disclaim responsibility for the pollution.
Finally, Sullivan does not explicitly argue that Rule 105 is arbitrary or capricious. See Bundo v
City of Walled Lake, 395 Mich 679, 703, n 17; 238 NW2d 154 (1976) (defining “arbitrary” as
“[f]ixed or arrived at through an exercise of will . . . without consideration or adjustment with reference
to principles, circumstances, or significance,” and “capricious” as “apt to change suddenly; freakish;
whimsical”); Dykstra, supra. We assume that Sullivan believes that it is arbitrarily being held
responsible for the spill, having already transferred its ownership interest in the well. As defendant
argues, however, Rule 105 was necessary to prevent individuals and entities from transferring their
ownership interests in wells merely to avoid their statutory duty to prevent or remedy waste.
Furthermore, Rule 105 is unambiguous on its face and was in effect as far back as the time when
Sullivan purportedly lost its interest in the well to Finders, and at every ownership transfer thereafter.
We see nothing unanticipated or unprincipled in holding plaintiffs accountable for what amounts to a
continuing violation of the duty to apprise the state of the well’s ownership. Bundo, supra.
IV
Lastly, plaintiffs argue that defendant could not take action against them under Rule 105
because they did not own the well during the period when the spill occurred, and contend that the circuit
court erred by refusing to grant them equitable relief from defendant’s continuing sanctions. Plaintiffs
rely on the punctuation between the names on the drilling permit, the joint operating agreement, the
ordinary distinction between an owner and operator of a well, the definition of an owner in Chapter
319, MCL 319.2(g); MSA 13.139(2)(g), the statutory provision of an owner’s liability under what is
now the remediation chapter of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL
324.20126(1); MSA 13A.20126(1), and general property law concepts.
Rules 105 and 105a specifically referred to “owner[s] of record” and a “person to whom a
permit has been issued.” Chapter 319 did not define these terms, even though it defined the term
“owner.” MCL 319.2(g); MSA 13.139(2)(g). The term “person to whom a permit has been issued”
is unambiguous. Heinz v Chicago Rd Investment Co, 216 Mich App 289, 295; 549 NW2d 47
(1996) (“If the plain and ordinary meaning of a [rule]’s language is clear, judicial construction is
normally neither necessary nor permitted.”). Furthermore, the only logical meaning of an “owner of
record,” as used in Rules 105 and 105a in the context of drilling permit transfers, is the person or entity
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listed as an owner on a drilling permit. Plaintiffs are both clearly listed as “owners” on the form
approving the last transfer of permit 36115, and are precisely the individuals or entities defendant may
take action against under Rules 105 and 105a.
Therefore, the lower court did not err when it refused to issue an injunction, declaratory
judgment, writ of mandamus, or order of superintending control compelling defendant to transfer permit
36115 to Trinity and remove plaintiffs’ names from the “hold permits” list.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
1
Chapter 319 was repealed and superseded by Article III, Chapter 3, subchapter 2 of the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.61501 et seq.; MSA 13A.61501
et seq., after plaintiffs commenced this action. We address the merits of plaintiffs’ claims under Chapter
319, which applied in 1993 and 1994 when defendant took action against plaintiffs.
2
Although amended after plaintiffs brought this action in the circuit court, these rules were in force
through 1994, when defendant commenced its enforcement actions against plaintiffs.
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