PEOPLE OF MI V ALLEN J NEWMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 21, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 206649
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-146686-FH
ALLEN J. NEWMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Sawyer and Saad, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a jury conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC), MCL 750.520d(1)(b); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(b), for which he was sentenced as a second
habitual offender, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to a term of 2 to 22-1/2 years in prison. We affirm.
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict and that the verdict
was against the great weight of the evidence. Defendant failed to preserve the latter issue because he
did not move for a new trial on that basis, People v Patterson, 428 Mich 502, 514-515; 410 NW2d
733 (1987); People v Johnson, 168 Mich App 581, 585; 425 NW2d 187 (1988), and, therefore, we
will confine our analysis to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, this Court must review the record
de novo and, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, determine whether a
rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997); People v Hammons,
210 Mich App 554, 556; 534 NW2d 183 (1995). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of the crime. People v Gould, 225 Mich App
79, 86; 570 NW2d 140 (1997). All conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the
prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
A person is guilty of third-degree CSC if he engages in sexual penetration with another person
and force or coercion is used to accomplish the sexual penetration. MCL 750.520d(1)(b); MSA
28.788(4)(1)(b). Force or coercion includes, but is not limited to, circumstances in which the actor
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overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical violence. MCL
750.520b(1)(f)(i); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(f)(i); MCL 750.520d(1)(b); MSA 28.788 (4)(1)(b). Force
includes the exertion of strength or power on another person. People v Premo, 213 Mich App 406,
409; 540 NW2d 715 (1995). “The existence of force or coercion is to be determined in light of all the
circumstances and is not limited to acts of physical violence.” People v Malkowski, 198 Mich App
610, 613; 499 NW2d 450 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds in People v Edgett, 220 Mich
App 686; 560 NW2d 360 (1996).
The complainant testified that defendant grabbed her by the arms and placed her on the bed,
pinned her leg and her hands, and penetrated her with his penis. By lifting the complainant and moving
her body, defendant exerted strength or power over her, as he did when he pinned her leg and hands.
The testimony further indicated that those acts were used to accomplish the penetration. The victim was
not required to resist and her testimony need not be corroborated. MCL 750.520h; MSA 28.788(8);
MCL 750.520i; MSA 28.788(9). The foregoing evidence, viewed most favorably to the prosecution,
was sufficient to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant also contends that the trial judge’s conduct denied him a fair and impartial trial. We
review the record as a whole to determine whether the trial judge’s conduct or comments were of such
a nature as to unduly influence the jury and thereby deprive defendant of his right to a fair and impartial
trial. People v Collier, 168 Mich App 687, 697-698; 425 NW2d 118 (1988).
A criminal defendant is entitled to both a neutral and detached magistrate and to an attorney
who is treated with the consideration due an officer of the court. People v McIntire, 232 Mich App
71, 104; 591 NW2d 231 (1998), rev’d on other grounds 461 Mich 147 (1999); People v Ross, 181
Mich App 89, 91; 449 NW2d 107 (1989). “A jury trial demands the fact and appearance of judicial
impartiality, neither of which should ever be compromised by comments that unfairly belittle defense
counsel.” People v Wigfall, 160 Mich App 765, 773; 408 NW2d 551 (1987). Belittling observations
aimed at defense counsel are injurious to his client. Ross, supra at 91. Trial judges who berate, scold,
and demean an attorney so as to hold him up to contempt in the eyes of the jury destroy the balance of
impartiality necessary for a fair hearing. Id.; People v Anderson, 166 Mich App 455, 462; 421
NW2d 200 (1988). While unfair criticism of defense counsel in front of the jury is always improper,
judges are only human and expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and anger that are
fully within the bounds of what imperfect men and women sometimes display are not necessarily
grounds for reversal, which is mandated only if the court’s conduct unduly influenced the jury so as to
deny the defendant a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 462; McIntire, supra at 105; Wigfall, supra at 774.
Several of the judge’s remarks were made before jury selection began or outside the presence
of the jury and thus could not have affected defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial. See People v
Pauli, 138 Mich App 530, 544; 361 NW2d 359 (1984). The few comments made by the judge in the
jury’s presence were provoked by defense counsel’s quarrelsome behavior in refusing to accept the
court’s repeated rulings on the same issue and his persistent repetition of an argument previously
rejected. The judge also modified CJI2d 3.5(6) to impress upon the jury that it should not be influenced
by any irritation she expressed toward an attorney. Accordingly, we find that the challenged remarks
were not so egregious as to deny defendant a fair and impartial trial. See McIntire, supra at 105;
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Anderson, supra at 462. Although one juror submitted an affidavit indicating that her verdict was
influenced by the judge’s negative attitude, the affidavit was too generalized and vague to warrant relief.
People v Vettese, 195 Mich App 235, 244; 489 NW2d 514 (1992).
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to excuse certain jurors for cause.
This issue has not been preserved because defendant expressed satisfaction with the jury apart from its
composition and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges. People v Daniels, 192 Mich App 658,
667; 482 NW2d 176 (1992); see also People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 248-249; 537 NW2d 233
(1995).
Defendant also contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The general
rule is that effective assistance of counsel is presumed and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Eloby (After Remand), 215 Mich App 472, 476; 547 NW2d 48
(1996). To establish that a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel was so undermined that it
justifies reversal of an otherwise valid conviction, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the representation so prejudiced the
defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial. People v Price, 214 Mich App 538, 547; 543 NW2d 49
(1995). The defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s assistance constituted
sound trial strategy and show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521
NW2d 557 (1994).
Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective because he failed to call a witness who could
have testified that the bruise on the victim’s arm might have been caused by someone other than
defendant. This issue has not been preserved for appeal because defendant did not include it in his
statement of questions presented. City of Lansing v Hartsuff, 213 Mich App 338, 351; 539 NW2d
781 (1995). In any event, defendant’s claim is without merit. Counsel’s failure to call a particular
witness is a matter of trial strategy and does not constitute ineffective assistance unless the failure
deprives the defendant of a substantial defense, i.e., one the might have made a difference in the
outcome of the trial. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 508; 597 NW2d 864 (1999); People v
Bass (On Rehearing), 223 Mich App 241, 252-253; 565 NW2d 897 (1997), vacated in part on other
grounds, 457 Mich 866 (1998). Apart from the fact that the witness had no knowledge regarding when
or how the victim acquired the bruise on her arm, the evidence of the bruise was not determinative of
the issue of force, there being other evidence sufficient to establish that element as noted above.
Therefore, the witness’ testimony could not have affected the outcome of the trial.
Defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to exercise all of his peremptory
challenges to strike jurors who had initially expressed an inability to be fair because they considered
defendant’s conduct morally wrong. However, the failure to challenge one or more jurors is a matter of
trial strategy and does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Robinson, 154 Mich
App 92, 95; 397 NW2d 229 (1986).
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Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to introduce
evidence regarding the complainant’s past sexual conduct. The trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which “is found only if an unprejudiced person,
considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say there was no justification or excuse for
the ruling made.” Gould, supra at 88.
Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible to prove action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion except that in a prosecution for CSC, evidence of the
victim’s past s
exual conduct with the defendant and evidence of specific instances of sexual activity
showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease is admissible. MRE 404(a)(3); MCL
750.520j(1); MSA 28.788(10)(1). In certain limited situations, evidence that does not come within the
specific exceptions in the rape-shield statute1 “may not only be relevant, but its admission may be
required to preserve a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation.” People v Hackett, 421 Mich
338, 344, 348; 365 NW2d 120 (1984). For example, evidence of a victim’s past sexual conduct may
be admissible to show bias, to show an ulterior motive for making a false charge, or to show that the
complainant has made false accusations of rape in the past. Id. In addition, if “the prosecution
substantiates its case by demonstrating a physical condition of the complainant from which the jury might
infer the occurrence of a sexual act, the defendant must be permitted to meet that evidence with proof of
the complainant’s prior sexual activity tending to show that another person might have been responsible
for her condition.” People v Mikula, 84 Mich App 108, 114; 269 NW2d 195 (1978). The defendant
must make an offer of proof showing the existence of the proposed evidence and its relevance to the
purpose for which it is sought to be admitted. Hackett, supra at 349-350; People v Arenda, 416
Mich 1, 14; 330 NW2d 814 (1982). If the defendant makes such a showing, the court must conduct
an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of such evidence. Hackett, supra at 350. Absent
such a showing, the motion must be denied. Id.
Defendant sought to offer evidence that the complainant had sexual relations with her boyfriend
to prove that (1) he could have caused the bruise to her arm, and (2) the complainant falsely accused
defendant of raping her. However, defendant failed to offer any evidence to show that the boyfriend did
anything to cause a bruise to the complainant’s arm. Moreover, as noted above, the existence of the
bruise was not determinative of the issue of force. Defendant also failed to offer any evidence of any
precipitating events that would have caused the complainant to fabricate a claim of rape. Because
defendant’s arguments were purely theoretical and he had no proof to support either supposition, the
trial court properly excluded the evidence. See Arenda, supra; People v Morse, 231 Mich App 424,
431; 586 NW2d 555 (1998).
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred when it precluded his attorney f
rom cross
examining the complainant about inconsistencies in her testimony at trial and that provided at prior
hearings. The scope of cross-examination of a witness is a matter within the trial court’s discretion,
People v Jensen, 162 Mich App 171, 180; 412 NW2d 681 (1987), and the court’s limitation of
cross-examination is thus reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Crawford, 232 Mich App
608, 620; 591 NW2d 669 (1998). The court did not prevent defense counsel from cross-examining
the witness. Rather, it prevented counsel from reading to the jury from transcripts of the prior hearings.
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Moreover, any error was undoubtedly harmless because defense counsel was able to elicit admissions
from the complainant about the discrepancies in her testimony and used them to argue that she was not
credible.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Henry William Saad
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MCL 750.520j(1); MSA 28.788(10)(1).
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