AROZE ALI V LORRAINE CAB CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
AROZE ALI,
UNPUBLISHED
March 10, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 211022
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-621687 NO
LORRAINE CAB CO., JOHN CLARK and
CADILLAC PLASTIC & CHEMICAL CO.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the order entered by the trial court granting summary disposition in
favor of defendants Lorraine Cab Co. and John Clark,1 and denying plaintiff’s motion to amend the
complaint in this negligence action. We affirm.
I.
Plaintiff was a taxicab driver with nine years of experience. He entered into an agreement with
Clark, the sole proprietor of Lorraine Cab, which agreement provided that plaintiff would rent a
Lorraine cab licensed to operate in Dearborn and Detroit. The agreement clearly set forth that plaintiff
would be driving the cab as an independent contractor, not as an employee. In accordance with Detroit
Ordinances, § 58-2-3922, the taxicab was equipped with a partition across the back of the front seat
dividing the driver’s compartment from the passenger compartment. On August 25, 1995, plaintiff
picked up a fare in Detroit, and the passenger brandished a gun. Plaintiff immediately locked the small
window in the partition for passing fares and attempted to drive to a more populated area a few blocks
away. The passenger fired through the partition, striking plaintiff in the right side of his face.
Plaintiff brought this action claiming that defendants breached the duty owed lessee drivers to
protect them from criminal acts of third parties. In short, plaintiff alleged that defendants were obligated
to equip their cabs with bulletproof partitions. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), arguing that they had no duty to protect lessees from third-party criminal acts.
Plaintiff responded to the motion arguing that the lessor-lessee relationship was a special relationship
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that imposed a duty on defendants because plaintiff had lost the ability to protect himself, and that
defendants had a duty to warn that the partition in the cab was not bulletproof. Plaintiff also sought
leave to amend the complaint to specifically allege a breach of common law duty to warn.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion ruling that defendants were under no legal duty to
protect plaintiff from the criminal acts of unknown third parties. Additionally, the court ruled that
defendants were under no duty to warn that the partition in the cab was not bulletproof. We agree.
II.
This Court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep't of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). The trial court did not indicate under
which subrule it was granting summary disposition. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal
sufficiency based on the pleadings alone. Id.. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
support for a claim and requires consideration of proofs submitted or filed in the action to determine if a
genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial. Id. In this case, the trial court looked beyond the
pleadings in rendering its decision. For purposes of our review, we will treat the motion as having been
decided under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Swan v Wedgwood Christian Youth and Family Services, Inc,
230 Mich App 190, 194; 583 NW2d 719 (1998).
III.
In determining whether to impose a duty, this Court evaluates factors such as: the relationship
of the parties, the foreseeability of the harm, the burden on the defendant, and the nature of the risk
presented. Murdock v Higgins, 454 Mich 46, 53; 559 NW2d 639 (1997). Generally, an individual
has no duty to protect another who is endangered by a third person's conduct. Id. at 54. An exception
has developed where a special relationship exists between the persons. Williams v Cunningham Drug
Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495, 499; 418 NW2d 381 (1988).
The relationship of an independent contractor is not a “special relationship” triggering liability for
passive negligence or "nonfeasance." Madley v The Evening News Ass'n, 167 Mich App 338, 341;
421 NW2d 682 (1988). Plaintiff has not shown the existence of any other recognized special
relationship that would impose a duty on defendants to protect its cab drivers from criminal acts of third
persons.
Plaintiff's complaint did not allege that defendants created or maintained the criminal activity, or
that defendant failed to act to end criminal activity that took place in its presence. Gouch v Grand
Trunk WR Co, 187 Mich App 413, 416-417; 468 NW2d 68 (1991). Absent a any grounds for
imposing a duty, summary disposition was appropriate.
IV.
The decision whether to grant or deny leave to amend is within the trial court's discretion.
Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 654; 563 NW2d 647 (1997); Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich
App 513, 523; 564 NW2d 532 (1997). Ordinarily, leave to amend a complaint should be "freely given
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when justice so requires." MCR 2.118(A)(2). Leave to amend may be denied when amendment
would be futile. Weymers, supra at 658. An amendment is futile where, ignoring the substantive merits
of the claim, it is legally insufficient on its face. Hakari v Ski Brule, Inc, 230 Mich App 352, 355; 584
NW2d 345 (1998).
Plaintiff argued in support of his motion for leave to amend that one of defendants’
representatives had expressed the opinion that the partitions should have protected drivers from gun
shots. The representative admitted, however, that she was not responsible for ordering the partitions
and she did not know whether the partitions were made of safety glass. The trial court concluded that,
although interesting, the fact that the representative may have thought the partition was bulletproof was
insufficient to support plaintiff’s belief that the partitions were bulletproof.
The trial court also concluded that plaintiff would not be successful under a failure to warn
theory because there was still no evidence supporting the imposition of a duty. We agree. The partition
satisfied the requirements of the city ordinance, which required a partition that would prohibit
passengers from reaching the driver, not from shooting him. There was no evidence that the partition
was defective. Plaintiff having failed to present any basis for the imposition of a duty to warn that the
partition was not bulletproof, we agree that amendment to add such a count to the complaint would
have been futile. There was no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
1
Defendant Cadillac Plastic & Chemical Co. was dismissed from this action, and a default judgment
was entered against defendant Secure Partitions. Neither of those defendants is participating in this
appeal.
2
The ordinance provides in part: “Such partition shall be of such material and shall be installed so as to
prevent any passenger from reaching the driver . . . from . . . the rear seat.”
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