IN RE CRYSTAL TYLER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CRYSTAL TYLER, a Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 29, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 218978
Iosco Circuit Court
LC No. 95-012905-NA
AMY ANNE TYLER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ROBERT TYLER,
Respondent.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Hoekstra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant (“respondent”) appeals as of right from the order of the Family Division
of the Iosco Circuit Court terminating her parental rights to the minor child under MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (c)(i), (g) and (m); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i), (c)(i), (g) and (m). We
affirm.
Respondent’s two daughters, Crystal, age five months, and Cathy, age twelve years, were
placed in foster care in December 1995 in response to allegations that respondent had attempted to
drown five-month-old Crystal and herself in the bathtub “in an apparent covenant with God.” In
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addition, the petition alleged that respondent was admitted the next day to the University of Michigan
Psychiatric Hospital for a bi-polar disorder and that she had a history of psychiatric problems with two
known prior hospitalizations.
At the pre-trial hearing on March 27, 1996 (which apparently had been delayed due to
respondent’s psychiatric hospitalization) respondent entered a plea to an amended petition. The Court
accepted her plea to having Crystal “in the bathtub in a position of endangerment with respect to her
mental state at the time” and being admitted the next day to the University of Michigan Psychiatric
Hospital for a bi-polar disorder. A dispositional hearing was held immediately and respondent was
ordered to comply with the Parent/Agency Agreement which had been prepared. Review hearings
were held and the dispositional order amended from time to time in an apparent attempt by the Court to
improve the chances for a reunification of the respondent and her children.
At the review hearing of June 28, 1996, the Court ordered an assessment of the respondent’s
ability to parent and ordered the Family Independence Agency (“FIA”) to assist her in finding housing.
At the December 23, 1996 reviewing hearing, the Court ordered homemaker services for respondent
and expanded visitation with the child. A permanency planning hearing was commenced April 25, 1997
at which the Court ordered a psychological evaluation of respondent. It appears the parties waived the
completion of the permanency planning hearing on that date as well as at the subsequent review hearings
in July, October, January and April.
A permanency planning hearing was commenced May 8, 1998, at which time the Court
received testimony from five witnesses. The hearing was continued until May 14, 1998 for the
testimony of an additional six witnesses, including the respondent and her daughter Cathy. The judge
found that there was a risk of harm to Crystal in spite of the fact that respondent had complied
substantially with the treatment plan. Even though the judge found that there was a risk of harm to the
child if returned to respondent, the judge wished to give respondent additional time to demonstrate her
ability to safely care for the child. Therefore, the judge ordered a psychological evaluation of
respondent, ordered her to take medication and participate in counseling, and ordered visits with
Crystal to be greatly expanded. He continued the permanency planning hearing to June 25, 1998 to
observe the respondent’s progress. The judge also ordered a termination of parental rights petition to
be filed with regard to Cathy. On August 27, 1998, the respondent voluntarily released her parental
rights to Cathy and Cathy’s father’s rights were involuntarily terminated.1
Following the continued permanency planning hearing on June 25, 1998, the permanency
planning hearing was continued to September 25, 1998. At that time, the judge found that even though
the respondent had substantially complied with the treatment plan and had greatly improved her self
esteem, personal hygiene, and living arrangement, there remained a substantial risk of harm to Crystal
due to “inappropriate language, inappropriate hitting, inappropriate parenting, poor hygiene, and
marginal health care,” among other things. As a result, pursuant to MCL 712A.19a; MSA
-2
27.3178(598.19a), the judge ordered the FIA to file a petition to terminate the parental rights of
Crystal’s parents. The petition was filed November 6, 1998 and the hearing on the petition was held
January 6 and 8, 1999. The judge issued an opinion and order making extensive findings of fact and
conclusions of law on April 1, 1999, in which he terminated the rights of respondent and Crystal’s
father. 2
With respect to the respondent, the petition alleged that respondent’s parental rights should be
terminated under the following provisions of MCL 712A.19b(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3):
(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical or sexual
abuse under either of the following circumstances:
(i) The parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court
finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse in
the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.
***
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or
more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the
court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time
considering the child’s age.
***
(i) Parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to serious
and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and prior attempts to rehabilitate the
parents have been unsuccessful. 3
***
(m) The parent’s rights to another child were voluntarily terminated following the
initiation of proceedings under section 2(b) of this chapter or a similar law of another
state.
I
Respondent’s first issue concerns not the termination of her parental rights, but the refusal of the
court to return Crystal to her at the conclusion of the permanency planning hearing held the year before.
She alleges that the court’s refusal to return the child at the conclusion of the permanency planning
hearing was clearly erroneous. We disagree.
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Respondent more specifically argues:
In this case, the court should have returned Crystal to Appellant at the conclusion of the
hearing in May 1998 because there was no evidence that the child would be at any
substantial risk of harm if returned to her mother and the court did not make such a
finding . . . .”
Respondent’s argument is based primarily on the fact that while the statute requires a “substantial risk of
harm,” the judge only found a “risk of harm” to the child if returned to the mother. While it is true that
the judge did not use the word “substantial” in describing the risk of harm, such a finding was not
required until the conclusion of the permanency planning hearing which did not occur until September
25, 1998. The permanency planning hearing was commenced on May 8, continued on May 14 and
June 25, and concluded on September 25, 1998. In addition, the court only speaks through its written
orders4 and in the opinion and order dated October 18, 1998, the judge clearly found a “substantial risk
of harm” to the child.
Therefore, respondent’s argument fails on at least two grounds: first, the permanency planning
hearing did not conclude on May 14, 1998, and second, following the conclusion of the permanency
planning hearing in September of 1998, the judge did find a substantial risk of harm to the child.
It is true that following the May 14, 1998 portion of the permanency planning hearing, the judge
signed an order entitled “Order Following Permanency Planning Hearing.” One might be tempted to
conclude from reading the title of the order that the permanency planning hearing had been concluded;
that it had not is shown by the final sentence of the order which clearly states: “IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED a continuation of this hearing is scheduled on 6/25/98 at 10:00 a.m.”
Respondent further alleges that because “the statute mandates that the court view a failure to
substantially comply with the terms and conditions of the parent agency agreement5 as evidence that the
child would be at substantial risk of harm if returned, the reverse should also be true, that evidence of
substantial compliance with the parent agency agreement should be taken as evidence that the child
would not be at substantial risk of harm if returned to the parent.” We find that the reverse is not
necessarily true. A parent may substantially comply with a case service plan (or parent agency
agreement) by physically attending parenting classes, by taking medication, and by cleaning up the
home, but may not have actually changed his or her child-raising techniques or personality or his or her
mental illness may not have been cured.
A parent’s compliance with the case service plan is certainly evidence to be considered and
weighed by the court; it does not rise to the level of a mandatory presumption absent a statutory
provision, however. Substantially complying with a case service plan is necessary, but not sufficient, to
demonstrate that a parent now possesses the skills to adequately and safely parent a child. The statute
merely sets out a circumstance which requires a finding of substantial risk absent sufficient evidence to
the contrary; that is, if a neglectful or abusive parent does not even comply with the case service plan,
how can there be any expectation that he or she has made substantial changes in his or her parenting
style?
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Finally, with regard to respondent’s allegations that there was “no evidence” that the child
would be at a substantial risk of harm if returned to her, we are guided by MCR 2.613(C) which
provides that “findings of fact by the trial court may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In the
application of this principle, regard should be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” While at the permanency planning hearing
there certainly was evidence favorable to respondent, including the progress she had made regarding her
own self-esteem and self-care, there was also evidence from which, if believed, the court could
conclude that there was still a substantial risk of harm to the child if returned to respondent’s custody.
As a result, we are unable to conclude that the judge’s finding of a substantial risk of harm to the child
was clearly erroneous.
II
For her second argument, respondent alleged that the court erred when it refused to allow
questioning of respondent’s apartment manager and the child’s foster mother regarding an alleged
telephone call from the foster mother to the apartment manager. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. People v
Brownridge, 459 Mich 456, 460; 591 NW2d 26 (1999). “An abuse of discretion exists only if an
unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no
justification or excuse for the ruling.” People v Laws, 218 Mich App 447, 455; 554 NW2d 586
(1996). A “decision on a close evidentiary question by definition ordinarily cannot be an abuse of
discretion.” People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 322; 319 NW2d 518 (1982).
For the apartment manager to testify to a telephone call from the foster mother for the purpose
of attacking the credibility of the foster mother is not permissible pursuant to MRE 608(b)6, because it
would constitute an attempt to attack a possible future witness’s credibility through extrinsic evidence of
a specific incident of conduct of the witness. It would have been permissible, however, to question the
foster mother regarding a telephone call that she made had the foster mother not been present during
other testimony in violation of the court’s sequestration order.
III
The remaining issues concern the termination of respondent’s parental rights to the child. In
order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for
termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50;
480 NW2d 293 (1991). This Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. MCR
5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). A finding is clearly erroneous if
the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. This
Court defers to the special ability of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
With regard to the termination of her parental rights, respondent first alleges that the termination
of her rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i) was clearly erroneous
because “there was no credible evidence that Appellant had ever caused physical injury to either of her
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children, nor was she responsible for any abuse of the children” and that “there was no reasonable
likelihood that the child would suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if she was returned to
Appellant.” We agree.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i) provides:
(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
***
(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical or sexual
abuse under either of the following circumstances:
(i) The parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court
finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse in
the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.
There is no evidence of sexual abuse of either of respondent’s children.
While it is true that evidence of how a parent treats one child is probative of how that parent
may treat other children, In the Matter of LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 392; 210 NW2d 482 (1973),
and while there was evidence in the record offered by Cathy Tyler of significant physical abuse by
respondent, the judge did not make findings of fact concerning that testimony.
Therefore, the question remains whether Crystal was physically injured or abused. While there
was some evidence that Crystal had occasional bruises and a cut lip, the only facts that the judge cited
in finding clear and convincing evidence warranting termination under this section of the code was that
“Crystal was the recipient of severe abuse at the hands of her mother on December 5, 1995.”
While the initial petition certainly alleged such physical abuse (there is no question that the child
was not injured on that date), that allegation was never substantiated. Instead, as part of a plea
agreement, respondent admitted to having Crystal “in the bathtub in a position of endangerment with
respect to her mental state at the time.” That ground for jurisdiction clearly sounds in neglect and not
abuse.
While the judge may have reasonably feared that the child could in the future suffer the sort of
abuse which had been alleged, though not proven, in the original petition if respondent went off her
medication and suffered from a psychotic episode, the statute requires not only a reasonable likelihood
of future abuse, but that past abuse of the child or a sibling has occurred. Such was never found in this
case with respect to the sibling and was erroneously found with respect to the child.
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As a result, we find clear error in the finding of the trial court that there were facts sufficient to
justify terminating respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i); MSA 27.3178
(598.19b)(3)(b)(i).
IV
Respondent next argues that termination of her parental rights under MCL 19b(3)(c)(i); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), was clearly erroneous because she never had another schizophrenic
episode after the incident which brought the children to the court’s attention. We agree, although for a
different reason.
MCL 712A.19(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178 (598.19b)(3)(c)(i) provides:
(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
***
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or
more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the
court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time
considering the age of the child.
It is true that Amy Tyler was a respondent in a proceeding brought under the juvenile code and
that 182 or more days had elapsed since the issuance of the initial dispositional order. The question is
whether the conditions that lead to the adjudication continued to exist and whether there was no
reasonable likelihood that they would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the age of the
child.
The condition that lead to the adjudication was the endangerment of the infant child as a result of
respondent’s mental illness. The child has not since been placed in similar situation by respondent, and
while respondent remains mentally ill, her mental illness is under control with medication. However, the
judge was clearly concerned about the potential for future harm to the child, stating that “as long as the
treatment is continued and monitored the chronic schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder will remain under
control. If treatment is ceased, the disorder will again take its toll on Amy.” Notwithstanding his
concern about possible future harm to the child, in his opinion the judge stated that “the mental health of
Amy is not the reason for termination.” The judge cited the remarkable progress she had made with
regard to her own self-care.
Therefore, we find that while the condition that led to the adjudication (mental illness which
caused the endangerment of the child in the bathtub) continues to exist in that the mental illness is under
control with medication but not cured, the judge acknowledged that the mental health of respondent was
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not the reason for termination. In addition, we believe there was insufficient evidence that would justify
a finding that there was “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the age of the child” in light of the long period of time respondent has remained on
medication.
Therefore, we find that there was clear error in the determination that respondent’s rights should
be terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i).
V
Respondent next alleges that the court’s decision to terminate her parental rights under MCL
712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) was clearly erroneous. We disagree.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) provides:
(3) The Court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, one or more of the following:
***
(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the
child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide
proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.
While it is clear from the evidence and the court’s findings that respondent’s self-care had
dramatically improved during the time the child was under the jurisdiction of the court, we find that there
was sufficient evidence from which, if believed, the court could conclude that there was clear and
convincing evidence that respondent had failed at the time of the incident leading to the adjudication, and
continued to fail throughout the period of court’s jurisdiction, to provide proper care and custody for
the child, and that, given respondent’s abilities, there was no reasonable expectation that she would be
able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the very young age of the
child and the fact that the child had been in foster care for most of her life. We acknowledge that the
evidence regarding this ground is not overwhelming and that the question is close. Were we the triers
of fact, we might even have come to a different conclusion. However, the issue is whether the judge’s
decision was clearly erroneous.
The judge made thoughtful and detailed findings of fact in his opinion. Many of the facts he
found were very much in respondent’s favor. For example, he found that respondent takes her
medicine; that she exhibits no signs of schizophrenia; that she keeps her appointments with her therapist;
that her affect has improved; that she has become a better housekeeper; that she was still working on
her weight control, hormonal balance, parenting skills, sleep apnea, and hygiene skills; that she pays her
bills and keeps her apartment clean; that she loves her child; and that she is generally cooperative,
among other things.
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However, being able to care for one’s self, especially with the help of medication and numerous
support services, is not the same as being able to care for a very young child. The issue in this case is
not whether respondent has improved in her own self-care, but whether she possesses those parenting
skills necessary to raise her young child Crystal in a non-neglectful and non-abusive way. The judge
gave her great credit for the progress she made and during the course of the case continually gave her
additional time and ordered additional visits in an aggressive attempt to help her succeed in achieving the
return of her child. It is clear from the record that the judge was working toward the return of her child
and did everything possible to help her achieve that end. Given the statutory preference, as expressed
in MCL 712A.19a, that in most cases children should either be returned home or termination
proceedings commenced approximately twelve months after the initial dispositional hearing, the judge
could be criticized for giving respondent too much time since he ordered the filing of the termination
petition approximately thirty months after the initial dispositional order. We do not, however, criticize
him for this delay, even though it has delayed the permanent placement of the child, because respondent
was making substantial progress and it was reasonable to hope that she would succeed in achieving the
return of her child Crystal.
Based on all of the evidence available to him, the judge concluded that notwithstanding her
personal progress, respondent, after two and one-half years of work, remained unable to parent her
child in a minimally adequate way. He found that respondent remained unable to anticipate the needs of
the child, especially dangers in the home to the child, such as the need for a towel or bath mat on a wet
bathroom floor when the child gets out of the tub. He further found that while respondent could (though
she did not always do so) follow directions regarding child care, she rarely initiated proper child care on
her own. He found that, despite all of the help, she did not comfort the child instinctively, did not have
natural eye contact with the child, did not initiate play with the child, did not keep the child adequately
clean, gave the child milk products even though the child was lactose intolerant (causing diarrhea on
numerous occasions), spoke to the child in a harsh voice, yelled at the child, slapped the child, did not
change the child’s clothing appropriately, did not provide adequate visual or auditory simulation to the
child, did not change the child’s diaper even when reminded to do so, did not discipline the child well,
touched the child very little, did not understand or have the ability to “process think” regarding the
child’s needs, did not nourish the child emotionally or educationally, caused or permitted the child to
receive injuries while in her care, cursed at the child, and did not empathize, sympathize, or understand
the needs of the child and lacked the understanding to even understand what a normal childhood
problem was.
While it is easy to be sympathetic with a mentally ill person who tries hard to improve, good
intentions are not sufficient to protect and care for a young child who cannot protect or care for herself.
Love is not enough. Children need minimally adequate care.
Based on all of the evidence, we cannot conclude that the judge’s finding that MCL
712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) was proven by clear and convincing evidence is
clearly erroneous. The judge was there, the judge observed respondent and the other witnesses, and
the judge assessed their credibility. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the judge absent a
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finding that his decision was clearly erroneous. In re Miller, supra at 337. We do not so find
regarding this ground for termination.
VI
Respondent alleges that the termination of her rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(m); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(m) was clearly erroneous because, although she had voluntarily terminated her
parental rights to another child following the initiation of protective proceedings, she had presented
evidence that the circumstances with regard to Crystal were different and termination would not be in
the child’s best interest. We disagree.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(m); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(m) provides:
(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, one or more of the following:
***
(m) The parent’s rights to another child were voluntarily terminated following the
initiation of proceedings under section 2(b) of this chapter or a similar law of another
state.
We note that this section does not require an adjudication that the other child, to whom parental
rights were voluntarily terminated, was ever abused or neglected. All that is required is that child
protection proceedings were initiated in this or another state concerning the other child and that parental
rights were thereafter voluntarily terminated. However, in this case, there was an adjudication of neglect
concerning the other child, although it did not involve direct neglect of the other child, Cathy, but
prospective neglect under the legal principle that “how a parent treats one child is certainly probative of
how that parent may treat other children.” In the Matter of LaFlure, supra at 392; see also In re
Dittrick, 80 Mich App 219, 222; 263 NW2d 37 (1977), citing LaFlure.
In this case, Cathy was not brought to the court’s attention as a result of her own abuse or
neglect, and her parent’s parental rights were not voluntarily or involuntarily terminated before the initial
petition regarding Crystal was filed, as would commonly be the case. However, there is nothing in the
statute that requires that the other child be brought to the court’s attention before the present child or
that parental rights to the other child be terminated before the present child is brought to the court’s
attention. Therefore, it is our opinion that as long as the voluntary termination of parental rights to the
other child preceded the filing (or amendment) of the termination petition regarding the present child, it
matters not that both children were brought to the court’s attention at the same time and for the same
reasons.
In the case before us, respondent concedes that the statutory ground has been met. She argues,
however, that the circumstances surrounding the voluntary release of Cathy were different then those
concerning Crystal. Her argument is without merit. There is nothing in the law which requires the
circumstances of the child who was voluntarily released and the child in question to be the same or even
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similar. All that is required is a voluntary termination following the initiation of child protective
proceedings concerning the prior child. The reasons may have been entirely different. As long as they
sound in abuse or neglect, the statute is satisfied.
Respondent further argues that termination would not be in the child’s best interest. As with the
previous ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b) (3)(g), the
court is required to terminate parental rights if the ground has been proven by clear and convincing
evidence unless the court finds termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in the child’s best
interest.
Respondent argues that her rights should not be terminated because she does not feel the foster
mother is capable of caring for Crystal by herself. This argument assumes that the foster mother will
adopt Crystal or will keep her as a foster child for an extended period of time. The case law is clear
that the court must concern itself only with the ability of the parent to properly care for his or her child; it
is not permissible to consider the ability of any other prospective caregiver, be it foster parent, Fritts v
Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 115; 92 NW2d 604 (1958), overruled on other grounds In re Hatcher, 443
Mich 426, 444 (1993), or prospective adoptive parent, In re Mathers, 371 Mich 516, 530; 124
NW2d 878 (1963), to care for the child.
Respondent finally argues that it would not be in Crystal’s best interest for her parental rights to
be terminated because:
I am a loving mother and I believe that a mother can take care of her child better than
anybody else and when she gets to be a teenager, what if she starts being rebellious and
that, there’d be a chance of her being thrown out of the home . . . I would never throw
my kids out of the home. They’ve always got a place to live.
These assertions are insufficient to establish that termination of respondent’s parental rights to Crystal
are clearly not in Crystal’s best interest.
Therefore, in the absence of any evidence beyond respondent’s belief that termination is not in
her daughter’s best interest, we find that the trial judge properly determined that there was insufficient
evidence that termination of respondent’s parental rights to the child was clearly not in the child’s best
interest7.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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1
Neither the respondent nor the father have appealed the termination of their rights to Cathy.
2
Crystal’s father has not appealed the termination of his rights.
3
It is unclear what happened to §19b(3)(i) and how §19b(3)(g) came to be substituted for it. The
petition contained §19b(3)(i) but did not contain §19b(3)(g). During closing arguments, the
respondent’s attorney did not argue §19b(3)(i) and, in fact, stated that “the petitioner has alleged that
there are three statutory provisions that would allow termination in this case,” when in fact there were
four. In his opinion and order following the termination hearing, the judge recited the four statutory
grounds alleged, which include §19b(3)(i), but found that the four sections that were proven included
§19b(3)(g). He did not mention what happened to subsection (i) or where subsection (g) came from.
However, in their briefs, none of the parties mentioned §19b(3)(i) and all argued concerning
§19b(3)(g). Since no parties ever objected to the court’s considering §19b(3)(g), any error arising
from a failure to amend the petition to allege §19b(3)(g) has been waived by the parties.
4
Tiedman v Tiedman, 400 Mich 571, 576; 255 NW2d 632 (1977).
5
The statute MCL 712A.19a(4), MSA 27.3178(19a)(4) actually refers to the “case service plan,” the
contents of which are specified in MCL 712A.18f(3); MSA 27.3178(18f)(3), not the “parent agency
agreement.” The parent agency agreement and case service plan may, or may not, be the same in a
particular case.
6
MRE 608(b) provides, in relevant part:
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in
Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court,
if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)
concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined
has testified.
7
In fact, the judge found to the contrary, that termination of respondent’s parental rights to Crystal was
in her best interest.
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