HOWARD STEPHENS V ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HOWARD STEPHENS,
UNPUBLISHED
February 25, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 210060
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-627977-CZ
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS
CORPORATION and STEVEN BLOMFIELD,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Griffin and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition
and dismissing plaintiff’s age discrimination claim in its entirety. We affirm.
On appeal, this Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a summary disposition
motion. Roberson v Occupational Health Centers of America, Inc, 220 Mich App 322, 324; 559
NW2d 86 (1996). A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis of a claim. In
reviewing such a motion, the test is set forth in Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547
NW2d 314 (1996):
In reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR
2.116(C)(10), a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties, MCR
2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. A trial court
may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the affidavits
or other documentary evidence show that there is no genuine issue in respect to any
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MCR
2.116(C)(10), (G)(4).
See also Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
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To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiff must show that (1) he was a
member of a protected class, (2) he was discharged, (3) he was qualified for the position, and (4) he
was replaced by a younger person. Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 177; 579 NW2d
906 (1998). A plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact that his position
would not have been eliminated but for his age. Id. An age discrimination claim can be based on two
theories: (1) disparate treatment, which requires a showing of either a pattern of intentional
discrimination against protected employees, e.g., employees aged forty to seventy years, or against an
individual plaintiff, or (2) disparate impact, which requires a showing that an otherwise facially neutral
employment policy has a discriminatory effect on members of a protected class. Meagher v Wayne
State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 708-709; 565 NW2d 401 (1997); Farmington Ed Ass'n v
Farmington School Dist, 133 Mich App 566; 351 NW2d 242 (1984). In this case, plaintiff has
presented competent evidence only of a disparate treatment claim because he has not identified any
EDS employment policy having a disparate impact on older workers.
To establish a claim for disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that he was treated differently
from similarly situated employees. Lytle, supra at 178. In Lytle, the Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff’s evidence, finding that the comparison to younger employees who were not terminated was
flawed for two reasons: first, because the other employees were not similarly situated to the plaintiff “in
terms of job qualifications and functions,” and second, because the individual responsible for eliminating
the plaintiff’s position did not take part in the decision to hire or retain the other employees. Id. at 179.
Thus, plaintiff’s statistical evidence encompassing all of the layoffs necessitated by the June 1993
reduction in force in EDS’ North American Operations is irrelevant because plaintiff’s supervisor,
Steven Blomfield, who was alone responsible for making the decision to terminate plaintiff’s
employment, had no input with regard to the terminations of other EDS employees outside his own
management unit.
In addition, plaintiff has not shown that the other employees involved in the reduction in force,
either in his own unit or in EDS’ North American Operations in general, were similarly situated to him
with regard to job functions and qualifications. Two under-forty employees with lower rankings who
were retained were not similarly situated to plaintiff because they were not supervisory personnel. Cf.
Featherly v Teledyne Industries, Inc, 194 Mich App 352, 360-361; 486 NW2d 361 (1992), in
which the statistical evidence found by this Court to be acceptable took into consideration only
comparably-situated supervisory personnel. Consequently, the trial court did not err in refusing to
consider plaintiff’s statistical evidence because the particular statistical evidence offered in this case did
not meet the necessary criteria for relevance.
The need for the group on which the statistical evidence is based to be similarly situated to the
plaintiff is demonstrated by the fact that, in the absence of such a rule, a plaintiff could use a completely
unrelated group sampling to support a claim that his own termination was because of unlawful
discrimination. In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever connecting the statistical pattern of
discharges in unrelated EDS divisions with plaintiff’s discharge. Plaintiff’s reliance on Town v Michigan
Bell Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688; 568 NW2d 64 (1997), for the proposition that he need only show
that other employees outside the protected class were unaffected by the employer’s conduct, is
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misplaced because plaintiff has failed to acknowledge that those employees must also be similarly
situated. See Lytle, supra at 179; Town, supra at 699-700.
Finally, even if plaintiff’s statistical evidence involved similarly situated employees, plaintiff’s
prima facie case fails because he has presented no evidence to show that he was replaced by a younger
person. Rather, it is undisputed that plaintiff’s duties were reassigned to existing employees to perform
in addition to their preexisting responsibilities. See Lytle, supra at 177-178, n 27, quoting Barnes v
Gencorp Inc, 896 F2d 1457, 1465 (CA 6, 1990) (“[a] person is not replaced when another employee
is assigned to perform the plaintiff’s duties in addition to other duties, or when the work is redistributed
among other existing employees already performing related work”). See also Sahadi v Reynolds
Chemical, 636 F2d 1116 (CA 6, 1980). Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.
Furthermore, even if the statistics calculated by plaintiff’s expert were sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of a corporate conspiracy to reduce the age of the EDS workforce in general, plaintiff
has not shown that age discrimination played a role in his own discharge. In this case, defendants
submitted undisputed evidence in their motion for summary disposition demonstrating that a reduction in
force was necessary due to economic concerns. “Once the defendant produces such evidence, . . . the
presumption [of discriminatory intent] drops away, and the burden of proof shifts back to plaintiff.”
Lytle, supra at 174. At this point, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer’s proffered reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 174, 180. “[D]isproof of
an employer’s articulated reason for an adverse employment decision defeats summary disposition only
if such disproof also raises a triable issue that discriminatory animus [based on age] was a motivating
factor underlying the employer’s adverse action.” Id. at 175. In other words, the plaintiff must
introduce evidence demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that discriminatory animus played
a role in his particular situation.
It is undisputed that all four of the persons who were initially recommended for termination in
Blomfield’s management unit were younger than two of the employees who were retained. Two non
supervisory employees under Blomfield were fifty-three and fifty-one years of age, respectively, at the
time of the reduction in force, and both scored highly under Blomfield’s evaluative criteria and were
retained. In fact, the fifty-three-year-old received the highest score of all Blomfield’s workers.
Consequently, even if plaintiff had established a prima facie case, he has not shown that Blomfield’s
decision to terminate him was motivated by a desire to eliminate older employees. Town, supra at 706;
see also Barnes, supra at 1469. Although plaintiff has presented evidence that tends to call into
question defendants’ reasons for his termination, the evidence does not demonstrate that age
discrimination was a motivating factor underlying the decision. The fact that Blomfield’s superiors
required him to make greater cuts in staffing than other managers merely calls into question defendants’
business judgment; it does not lead to an inference of age discrimination because there is no evidence
that Blomfield’s superiors knew that these additional cuts would result in plaintiff’s discharge.
Plaintiff does not dispute that Blomfield’s choice was between two equally qualified supervisory
employees, himself and Marie Kaufman. In a case involving an employer’s reduction in force, it is
insufficient for a plaintiff to show merely that the employer retained a younger employee while
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discharging an equally qualified older employee. Town, supra at 704; Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424
Mich 675, 684; 385 NW2d 586 (1986); Featherly, supra at 359. Although plaintiff claims that
Kaufman should have been laid off instead of him, he admits that her management duties had been
reassigned in January 1993 so that she could work on a special project, which she remained on
throughout the reduction in force. Thus, Kaufman cannot be compared to plaintiff because she and
plaintiff were not similarly situated where her job functions were different. Town, supra at 699-700.
With regard to plaintiff’s claim that he should have been placed on the list of employees eligible
for transfer to other departments rather than the list of employees who were to be laid off for
performance reasons, there is no evidence that Blomfield’s failure to place plaintiff on the transfer list
was motivated by age discrimination. Plaintiff has not shown that any of Blomfield’s employees were
placed on the transfer list. Furthermore, “[a]n employer is not required to inform former employees of
all openings which the former employee might be qualified to perform in order to avoid liability for an
age discrimination charge.” Barnes, supra at 1472. Consequently, plaintiff has not shown that
defendants’ failure to include him on the transfer list is actionable.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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