MARY C FAIRCHILD V HAROLD F WEISS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARY C. FAIRCHILD, Personal Representative of
the Estate of Paula Weiss, deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
January 11, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 213545
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 970729943 DO
HAROLD F. WEISS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and McDonald and Gage, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Defendant appeals by right the trial court’s order entering a judgment of divorce nunc pro tunc
after the death of Paula Weiss. We reverse. This appeal is being decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This appeal is being decided on stipulated facts. Paula Weiss filed this divorce action on
September 19, 1997. On December 15, 1997, both parties appeared with counsel before the trial
court and placed the terms of a settlement agreement on the record. The parties requested that a
judgment of divorce not be effective until after January 1, 1998, so that they would be eligible to file a
joint income tax return. The court accepted the settlement, and stated that a judgment of divorce would
enter after January 1, 1998, pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth on the record.
On January 7, 1998, Paula Weiss died before a judgment of divorce entered. Her personal
representative moved to intervene, and sought entry of a judgment of divorce nunc pro tunc. The trial
court granted plaintiff’s motion, and entered the judgment.
Where it is contemplated that a judge’s oral statement that a divorce will be granted, will be
followed by the signing of a judgment, the divorce and property settlement do not become effective until
the judgment is signed and cannot be made effective nunc pro tunc after one of the parties dies.
Tiedman v Tiedman, 400 Mich 571, 573; 255 NW2d 632 (1977). Tiedman recognized two
possible exceptions to this rule. The first exception occurs when a trial court reads all terms of the
judgment into the record, and declares that the judgment will take immediate effect without further
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action. This exception is clearly inapplicable here, where the court explicitly stated that the judgment
would not take effect until after January 1, 1998.
The second exception is based on footnote 1 of Tiedman, and is found where the parties have
relied in good faith on the court’s oral statement that a divorce is or will be granted. Ensman v
Ensman, 86 Mich App 91, 95-96; 272 NW2d 176 (1978). There was no evidentiary hearing, and
plaintiff’s motion presented no basis for finding any reliance on the oral indication that a divorce
judgment would be granted. Like Tiedman, and unlike Ersman, here the party’s death was
unanticipated. There is no showing that the parties took any action in reliance on the divorce judgment.
Reversed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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