RANDALL WAYNE DAVIS V SANDRA KAY DAVIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RANDALL WAYNE DAVIS,
UNPUBLISHED
November 23, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 212274
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 97-428 DM
SANDRA KAY DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Neff and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Sandra Kay Davis, appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce. We reverse and
remand.
The parties were married in 1971 and had two children, born in 1978 and 1983. Plaintiff filed a
complaint for divorce in 1997 and the trial court entered the judgment of divorce on May 20, 1998.1
As part of the judgment, the court awarded defendant spousal support “in gross” (sometimes referred
to herein as “alimony”) of $300 per week, limited to three years or until defendant’s death or
remarriage. The judgment further provided that the parties had joint legal custody of the parties fifteen
year-old minor child, with plaintiff having physical custody. At the time of trial, the parties’ nineteen
year-old adult child resided with plaintiff in the parties’ marital home, attended Southwestern
Community College on a full-time basis and was not employed.
In her first issue on appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in considering plaintiff’s
financial contribution to their adult child in deciding its award of alimony. We agree. Although findings
of fact in divorce cases are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, dispositional rulings such as
the award of alimony are reviewed de novo. Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 151-152; 485 NW2d
893 (1992); Ianitelli v Ianitelli, 199 Mich App 641, 642; 502 NW2d 691 (1993). If the findings of
fact are upheld, the appellate court must decide whether the dispositive ruling was fair and equitable in
light of those facts, and the trial court’s ruling should be affirmed unless the appellate court is left with the
firm conviction that the decision was inequitable. Sparks, supra, 440 Mich at 151-152. However,
when a trial court’s findings of fact are based on an erroneous view of the law, the clearly erroneous
standard is inapplicable. Beason v Beason, 435 Mich 791, 805-806; 460 NW2d 207 (1990).
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Questions of law are reviewed de novo. People v Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522; 562 NW2d 781
(1998).
The trial court has discretion to award alimony under MCL 552.23(1); MSA 25.103(1), which
provides:
Upon entry of a judgment of divorce or separate maintenance, if the estate and effects
awarded to either party are insufficient for the suitable support and maintenance of
either party and any children of the marriage as are committed to the care and custody
of either party, the court may further award to either party the part of the real and
personal estate of either party and alimony out of the estate real and personal, to be
paid to either party in gross or otherwise as the court considers just and reasonable,
after considering the ability of either party to pay and the character and situation of the
parties, and all the other circumstances of the case.
In determining whether to award alimony, the trial court should consider the
following relevant factors: 1) the past relations and conduct of the parties; 2) the length
of the marriage; 3) the ability of the parties to work; 4) the source and amount of
property awarded to the parties; 5) the age of the parties; 6) the ability of the parties to
pay alimony; 7) the present situation of the parties; 8) the needs of the parties; 9) the
health of the parties; 10) the prior standard of living of the parties and whether either is
responsible for the support of others; and 11) general principles of equity. Lee v Lee,
191 Mich App 73, 80; 477 NW2d 429 (1991); Parrish v Parrish, 138 Mich App
546, 554; 361 NW2d 366 (1984). See also Demman v Demman, 195 Mich App
109, 110-111; 489 NW2d 161 (1992) (a trial court may award alimony “as it
considers just and reasonable,” after considering the ability of either party to pay, the
character and situation of the parties and all other circumstances in the case). The trial
court should make specific findings of fact as to each factor relevant to the case.
Ianitelli, supra at 643.
During closing argument, plaintiff encouraged the trial court to fashion an alimony award which
accounted for the support he provided to both children, including payment for the adult child’s college
expenses:
Now, on the issue of alimony . . . He’s said he had bills to pay, he has paid these bills,
he has had two [d]aughters that he’s basically cared for – hasn’t gotten a dime in
support with respect to either child – is paying for one child to go to college, the other
child in school.
***
Now, we are here to seek and find the fairness of the Court and I would ask the Court
to review and consider the matter, that there are two children that are gonna have to –
one is gonna have to finish high school, one’s gonna be finishing college, they’re gonna
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be living with the Plaintiff – somebody’s got to pay these bills and I don’t think the
Court can expect this man to be working 12 hours a day, seven days a week . . . .
After the trial, the court made specific findings as to each of the eleven relevant factors used to
determine whether defendant was entitled to alimony. As to factor ten, the prior standard of living of the
parties and whether either is responsible for the support of others, the court stated:
I did take this into consideration in the determination of alimony. The Plaintiff is
obligated, because he is the custodial parent, to provide support for his [minor
daughter]. He is also providing support for another child, although he is not legally
obligated to pay for college, is assisting in that endeavor.
Given these findings by the trial court, we conclude that the court erroneously considered
plaintiff’s voluntary support of the parties’ adult child in awarding alimony. A trial court may not, as a
matter of law, consider the support voluntarily provided by one party to an adult child when awarding
alimony. Lesko v Lesko, 184 Mich App 395, 404-405; 457 NW2d 695 (1990). See, e.g., Kilbride
v Kilbride, 172 Mich App 421, 431; 432 NW2d 324 (1988), in which this Court held that the trial
court did not err when it failed to consider the defendant’s voluntary payment of college expenses in
setting alimony. If one party chooses to support an adult child living at home and attending college, the
other party should not be penalized. Fulton v Fulton, 143 Mich App 187, 191; 371 NW2d 522
(1985). Here, the trial court effectively required defendant to support her adult child by reducing the
alimony paid by plaintiff, and in so doing penalized defendant for plaintiff’s voluntary payment of support
and college expenses for their adult child.
Furthermore, we note that MCL 552.16a(2),(4); MSA 25.96a(2),(4) prohibits a court from
ordering post-majority child support after a child reaches nineteen years and six months of age unless
the parties agree to such an order. Here, MCL 552.16a(2), (4); MSA 25.96a(2), (4) prohibited the
trial court from ordering post-majority support for the parties’ adult child because that child was more
than nineteen years and six months of age and neither party presented an agreement to provide post
majority child support. We will not allow a court “to order support for adult children through the back
door by alimony where it cannot order it through the front door by child support.” Lesko, supra at
405. Accordingly, we direct the trial court on remand to redetermine the alimony award without any
consideration of plaintiff’s decision to support the parties’ adult child and assist in paying for the child’s
college education.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in awarding her alimony of $300 per week
for a maximum period of three years. We agree. As set forth above, the trial court erroneously
considered plaintiff’s support and payment of college expenses for the parties’ adult child in determining
the alimony award. In addition, the trial court’s alimony award was neither fair nor equitable in light of
the facts presented in this case. In the process of awarding alimony, the trial court must make an
attempt to balance the incomes, needs and abilities of each party “in a manner that will not impoverish
either party in the process.” Zecchin v Zecchin, 149 Mich App 723, 735; 386 NW2d 652 (1986).
Plaintiff earned approximately $137,000 in the year prior to trial, which is equivalent to a gross weekly
income of approximately $2,634, while defendant earned a gross weekly income of approximately
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$140. Given the parties’ 26-year marriage and the enormous disparity in the parties’ gross income, we
find that the alimony award of $300 per week for three years is grossly insufficient. In reaching our
conclusion, we observe that the trial court determined its alimony award without specific findings of fact
as to either defendant’s reasonable living expenses or the amount of plaintiff’s income. Accordingly, we
direct the trial court on remand to make additional findings of fact regarding defendant’s reasonable
living expenses and the amount of plaintiff’s income to be considered in the alimony award.
Finally, defendant contends that she is entitled to an award of attorney fees in the amount of
$3,000 for pursuing this appeal. This Court may award appellate attorney fees in a domestic relations
action on appeal from an alimony award. Wiley v Wiley, 214 Mich App 614, 616; 543 NW2d 64
(1995). An award of attorney fees in a domestic relations action is authorized when necessary to
enable the party to carry on or defend the action. MCL 552.13(1); MSA 25.93(1); MCR 3.206(C);
Maake v Maake, 200 Mich App 184, 189; 503 NW2d 664 (1993). However, because the amount
of alimony the trial court will award defendant wife on remand is unknown, we remand the issue of
appellate attorney fees to the trial court.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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We note that the judgment was not filed until May 21, 1998.
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