PEOPLE OF MI V STEPHEN CARL SCHUTT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 9, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214559
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 95-002092 FH
STEPHEN CARL SCHUTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Doctoroff and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals, by leave granted, his jury trial conviction of two counts of assault with the
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279. Defendant was
sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to concurrent terms of seven to
fifteen years’ imprisonment for the convictions. We affirm.
The prosecution alleged that defendant assaulted Richard Yeagley and Gerald Jefferson outside
a bar after closing time. Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it excluded Dr. Michael
Paul’s testimony regarding Jefferson’s blood alcohol level on the ground that it was not relevant. We
agree. A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). An abuse of discretion exists when an
unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would conclude that there was
no justification or excuse for the ruling made. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d
568 (1996).
According to MRE 401, evidence is relevant if it is material and if it has probative value.
People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). Evidence is material if it is related
to any fact that is of consequence to the action. MRE 401; Crawford, supra at 388. Evidence has
probative value if it tends “to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without evidence.” Id. at 389-390. The
party seeking admission of the evidence has the burden of showing its relevancy. People v Sabin (On
Remand), 236 Mich App 1, 8; __ NW2d __ (1999).
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Here, the evidence was material because it related to Jefferson’s credibility. Jefferson’s
credibility was an important issue at trial due to his identification of defendant as the man that hit him.
The evidence had probative value because evidence that Jefferson had a high blood alcohol content
made it more probable that he mistakenly identified defendant as the person that approached him on his
left side immediately before he was hit, whereas evidence that Jefferson had a low blood alcohol content
would have made it less probable that he mistakenly identified defendant. Thus, we conclude that
evidence of Jefferson’s blood alcohol content was relevant, and that the trial court abused its discretion
in excluding the evidence on the ground that it was not relevant.
The prosecutor argues that the proffered testimony was irrelevant because Jefferson already
admitted under oath that he had been drinking on the night of the assault. However, evidence is relevant
if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401; People v
Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). While relevant evidence may be inadmissible
under MRE 403 on the ground that its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations
such as the needless presentation of cumulative evidence, the fact that other, similar evidence was
admitted does not affect the determination of the whether the evidence at issue was relevant.
Although the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Paul’s testimony regarding
Jefferson’s blood alcohol level, we conclude that the error was harmless. Contrary to defendant’s
position, the error was not of constitutional magnitude. Because the error was a preserved, non
constitutional error, reversal is required only if the error was prejudicial. People v Lukity, 460 Mich
484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). “[T]he effect of the error is evaluated by assessing it in the context
of the untainted evidence to determine whether it is more probable than not that a different outcome
would have resulted without the error.” Id. In other words, the defendant has the burden to prove
more probable than not that the error is outcome determinative. Id. at 495-496. On this record, it was
not.
Patrick Essenmacher, the cab driver, testified that defendant was the man who hit Jefferson and
knocked him out. Essenmacher also testified that defendant was wearing red shorts on the night of the
assault. Jefferson testified that defendant was wearing red shorts and approached him on his left side
before he was assaulted. The jury could have concluded on the basis of Essenmacher’s testimony that
defendant was the man who assaulted Jefferson. Furthermore, although the trial court excluded
evidence of Jefferson’s blood alcohol content, Jefferson admitted that he had been drinking and was
intoxicated at the time of the assault. Therefore, defendant has not shown that it was more probable
than not that the results of the trial would have been different had the trial court not excluded Dr. Paul’s
testimony regarding Jefferson’s blood alcohol content. The error was harmless and does not require
reversal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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