PEOPLE OF MI V AUGUST JOSEPH GIORDANO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 9, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 209201
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 96-002981 FH
AUGUST JOSEPH GIORDANO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Murphy and J. B. Sullivan*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less
than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279. Defendant was sentenced as a third habitual offender, MCL
769.11; MSA 28.1083, to six to twenty years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
During an argument with his girlfriend, Carla McKinney, on October 19, 1996, defendant
allegedly threw a thick-bottomed beverage glass, hitting McKinney in the head and causing severe
injuries. The glass lacerated McKinney’s eyelid and eyeball and cracked the orbital bone. Eventually,
McKinney’s right eye had to be removed to prevent a loss of vision in her left eye. According to the
police, defendant stated that McKinney’s injury occurred when defendant swiped his hand across a
countertop in anger, and a glass flew and struck McKinney.
Defendant was initially bound over on a charge of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA
28.277. Following a remand to district court, defendant was charged with assault with intent to do
great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, and as a third-offense habitual
offender, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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II
Defendant first claims that he was denied his right to a fair trial when the prosecutor elicited
testimony that defendant had a violent relationship with a former girlfriend, worked only if he had to, did
not support his child, and was an alcoholic. We disagree.
The statement at issue was volunteered by McKinney’s mother when the prosecutor questioned
her on redirect concerning her cross-examination testimony that she did not approve of her daughter’s
relationship with defendant. Defendant objected to the testimony and the trial court sustained the
objection. Defendant did not move for a mistrial. We find no error.
Prejudice warranting a new trial is not established merely because some inappropriate subject
matter was mentioned before the jury. People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 36-37; 597 NW2d 176
(1999). The prosecutor’s question was proper because defendant raised the issue of the nature of
defendant’s relationship with McKinney on cross-examination and specifically asked whether there was
any violence during the relationship. Defendant does not argue on appeal that the prosecutor expected
McKinney to answer as she did. See id. at 37. Even if McKinney’s answer mentioned inappropriate
subjects, it did not have the effect of denying defendant a fair trial in light of the evidence presented.
III
Defendant also claims that his habitual offender sentence must be vacated because the
prosecutor failed to timely file the notice of sentence enhancement. We find defendant’s claim without
merit.
After defendant was bound over to circuit court on the charge of felonious assault, the
prosecutor moved to amend the information and remand to the district court for preliminary examination
on a charge of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. The court granted the
motion.
On May 19, 1997, a preliminary examination was held on the charge of assault with intent to do
great bodily harm less than murder. Defendant waived arraignment on the new charge. An information
charging assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder was filed on June 19, 1997. The
prosecutor filed a notice of intent to enhance defendant’s sentence on the basis of his status as a third
offense habitual offender on July 9, 1997.
Under MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085, the prosecutor was required to file the notice of sentence
enhancement within twenty-one days of filing the information on the underlying offense:
In a criminal action, the prosecuting attorney may seek to enhance the sentence
of the defendant as provided under section 10, 11, or 12 of this chapter, by filing a
written notice of his or her intent to do so within 21 days after the defendant's
arraignment on the information charging the underlying offense or, if arraignment is
waived, within 21 days after the filing of the information charging the underlying offense.
[MCL 769.13(1); MSA 28.1085(1).]
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The underlying offense in this case was the assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder, the offense of which defendant was convicted. Because the notice of sentence enhancement
was filed within twenty-one days of the information on the underlying offense, it was timely filed.
We find no merit in defendant’s argument that the notice of sentence enhancement should have
been filed within twenty-one days after filing the original information on the charge of felonious assault.
The circuit court had authority to remand for preliminary examination on the charge of assault with intent
to do great bodily harm less than murder. People v Dunham, 220 Mich App 268, 276; 559 NW2d
360 (1996). Following the preliminary examination on May 19, 1997, defendant was bound over to
circuit court on the new charge. The notice of intent of sentence enhancement was filed July 9, 1997,
within twenty-one days of the filing of the information on June 19, 1997, as required by MCL
769.13(1); MSA 28.1085(1). Defendant did not go to trial until nearly five months later. Defendant
had ample notice of the new charge and the habitual offender enhancement. See People v Ellis, 224
Mich App 752, 754-755; 569 NW2d 917 (1997); People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 363-364;
494 NW2d 873 (1992).
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
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