PEOPLE OF MI V CARL ENOCH WIDGER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 29, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 207598
Manistee Circuit Court
LC No. 93-002341 FC
CARL ENOCH WIDGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a) and MCL 750.520b(1)(b); MSA
28.788(2)(1)(b), and habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. Defendant was
originally sentenced to serve two terms of life imprisonment, and two terms of forty to eighty years’
imprisonment, all sentences to run concurrent. This Court affirmed defendant’s convictions, but
remanded for resentencing. On remand, the lower court reduced defendant’s two life terms to
consecutive prison terms of forty-seven to eighty-two years. Defendant’s other two sentences
remanded unchanged. We affirm.
Defendant contends that his new sentence is disproportionate. We disagree, but only because
we are compelled to do so by recent pronouncements from the Michigan Supreme Court. We review
sentences imposed for habitual offenders for an abuse of discretion. People v Cervantes, 448 Mich
620, 627; 532 NW2d 831 (1995). “[A] given sentence can be said to constitute an abuse of discretion
if that sentence violates the principle of proportionality, which requires sentences imposed by the trial
court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the
offender.” People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). See also Cervantes,
supra at 626-630.
In People v Hansford (After Remand), 454 Mich 320; 562 NW2d 460 (1997), the Supreme
Court w asked to review this Court’s determination that a 40 to 60 year sentence imposed for a
as
habitual offender, fourth offense, was disproportionate. The defendant in Hansford had been convicted
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of entering an occupied dwelling without the owner’s permission, MCL 750.115; MSA 28.310, and
receiving or concealing stolen property over $100, MCL 750.535; MSA 28.803. Id. at 322. The
defendant’s prior record consisted “exclusively of larcenies and stolen property offenses, and a
misdemeanor fleeing and eluding offense.” Id. at 323, n 4, quoting People v Hansford, unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 11, 1995 (Docket No. 165364). In reversing
this Court’s holding, the Supreme Court made the following sweeping pronouncement: “We believe
that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in giving a sentence within the statutory limits established
by the Legislature when an habitual offender’s underlying felony, in the context of his previous felonies,
evidences that the defendant has an inability to conform his conduct to the laws of society.” Hansford,
supra at 326.
In her Hansford dissent, Justice Kelly opined that in announcing this rule of law, the majority
had abandoned the Milbourn proportionality standard in favor of “a new standard of review for the
sentencing of habitual offenders.” Hansford, supra at 327. While we share Justice Kelly’s misgivings
about the Hansford standard, we disagree that it has replaced the Milbourn proportionality standard as
the touchstone of sentencing review for habitual offenders. Rather, we believe the Hansford standard
simply establishes that when it applies, the sentence at issue is by definition proportionate, and thus not
an abuse of discretion.1
Defendant’s sentence is within the limits authorized under MCL 769.12(1)(a); MSA
28.1084(1)(a). The presentence investigation report shows that defendant has an extensive criminal
record. It is clear from this record that all prior attempts to rehabilitate defendant have failed. We
believe that pursuant to Hansford, given the serious nature of the underlying crime and the clear
evidence of defendant’s inability to conform to the laws of society, defendant’s sentence is
proportionate.2 Thus, we see no abuse of discretion. Hansford, supra at 326; People v Nelson, 234
Mich App 454, 464; 594 NW2d 114 (1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
1
We note that given the breadth of the Hansford standard, there is a real danger that it will, in practice,
engulf the Milbourn proportionality standard, thereby rending the Milbourn standard all but
meaningless with respect to appellate review of sentencing of habitual offenders. We leave it to the
Supreme Court to clarify if this is the result intended.
2
We are also struck by defendant’s attitude toward his offenses. Even at this late date, defendant
continues to show a complete lack of remorse.
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