PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN GILBERT GOODLOE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 5, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 210534
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 96-005886 FH
JOHN GILBERT GOODLOE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of false pretenses over $100, MCL 750.218;
MSA 28.415, and was sentenced to one year imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
This case arises from defendant’s delivery of a TransAm to undercover FBI agents, knowing
the vehicle’s owner had reported it stolen in order to collect the insurance coverage. Defendant
contends that he was entrapped by the combined conduct of the FBI agents, an FBI informant, and his
parole officer. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s finding concerning entrapment under the clearly erroneous
standard. People v Connolly, 232 Mich App 425, 428-29; 591 NW2d 340 (1998). Entrapment
occurs when: 1) the police engage in impermissible conduct that would induce a person similarly
situated as the defendant, though otherwise law-abiding, to commit the crime, or 2) the police engage in
impermissible conduct so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated by this Court. People v Juillet, 439
Mich 34; 475 NW2d 786 (1991); People v Fabiano, 192 Mich App 523, 526; 482 NW2d 467
(1992).
The first prong of the entrapment test, on which defendant relies, requires the trial court to
decide whether the police conduct would have induced a person similarly situated to the defendant to
commit the crime, not whether it would have induced an average, law-abiding citizen to commit the
offense. Id. Merely presenting the defendant with the opportunity to commit the crime of which he was
convicted does not constitute entrapment. People v Butler, 444 Mich 965, 966; 512 NW2d 583
(1994).
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During an evidentiary hearing, the witnesses gave completely different versions of the events
leading up to defendant’s delivery of the TransAm to the FBI. Defendant portrayed himself as an
innocent bystander who was constantly pressured by police agents to provide stolen property and
vehicles. In contrast, the FBI agent and informant testified that defendant offered to provide stolen
vehicles and that he was ready and willing to commit criminal activities. They testified that defendant
was never induced to provide stolen property and that he was not pressured in any way. According to
their testimony, defendant was merely given the opportunity to engage in criminal activity he was already
willing to commit. The trial court found this testimony more credible than that of defendant. We will not
disturb the trial court’s credibility determination because it is not clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C).
Defendant next contends that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. While
defendant was incarcerated in federal prison in Pennsylvania, he requested extradition to Michigan to
stand trial on the instant charges. Plaintiff denied his request for extradition. Defendant claims this
denial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial because he did not stand trial on the state charges
until after his release from federal prison and he was prejudiced by that delay because two potential
witnesses died and the memories of other witnesses were not as fresh as they would have been earlier.
Whether a defendant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial is a mixed question of
fact and law. This Court will review the trial court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous
standard, and review constitutional questions de novo. People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 459;
564 NW2d 158 (1997). A defendant’s right to a speedy trial arises from US Const, Am VI and Const
1963, art 1, § 20. To decide whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated, the trial court
must consider the following factors: 1) the length of delay; 2) the reason for delay; 3) defendant’s
assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and 4) prejudice to the defendant. People v Grimmett, 388
Mich 590, 605-606; 202 NW2d 278 (1972); Gilmore, supra at 459. When the delay is less than
eighteen months, the burden is on the defendant to prove resulting prejudice. People v Daniel, 207
Mich App 47, 51; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). A delay of more than eighteen months is presumed to be
prejudicial and the burden is on the prosecution to prove lack of prejudice. Once prejudice is assumed,
the trial court inquires into the other balancing factors to be considered. Gilmore, supra at 459;
People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 563-564; 526 NW2d 33 (1994).
In this case, the trial court found the delay was only seventeen months, measured from the date
defendant notified plaintiff of his federal incarceration and requested extradition to the date defendant
was arrested. Therefore, the burden remained with defendant to prove prejudice resulting from the
delay. Daniel, supra at 51.
The second factor of the test is the reason for delay. The prosecution argues there was
adequate reason for the delay because defendant was incarcerated in federal prison. However, plaintiff
became aware of defendant’s federal incarceration in October 1994 and denied his request for
extradition in November 1994. In People v Rodriguez, 47 Mich App 483, 488; 209 NW2d 441
(1973), this Court held that a defendant’s incarceration in federal prison in another jurisdiction is not a
sufficient reason to justify delay in bringing a defendant to trial, absent an effort to extradite the
defendant. “If the state makes a reasonably timely effort to extradite an out-of-state prisoner and is
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unsuccessful, then the state has done what it can. However, where no effort is made, as in this case, the
requirements of the law have not been met.” Id.
The third factor of the test is whether defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial. The
defendant’s failure to assert his right does not necessarily constitute waiver. “However, a defendant’s
claim that his right to a speedy trial was violated is heavily offset if he does not assert his right.” People
v Lowenstein, 118 Mich App 475; 325 NW2d 462 (1982). In this case, defendant informally
requested extradition, but there was no evidence that defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial
between the November 1994 denial of his request for extradition and the May 1996 filing of his motion
to dismiss based on speedy trial violation.
The fourth factor of the test is prejudice to defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in light of
the interests which the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the
defense will be impaired. “Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Grimmett, supra at 606.
Plaintiff argues that defendant was not prejudiced by the delay in bringing him to trial. Defendant
submits that his mother and brother died in the fall of 1992 and that his father began to suffer from
Alzheimer’s before trial. Defendant likewise argues that the memory of other witnesses was generally
impaired by the delay in bringing his case to trial. However, defendant does n indicate how these
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witnesses would have helped his defense or indicate what they would have testified. Such general
allegations of prejudice are insufficient to establish that a defendant was denied his constitutional right to
a speedy trial. Gilmore, supra at 462.
In sum, because the delay of seventeen months is not presumed prejudicial to defendant, and
because defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the delay, we do not believe that
dismissal is warranted in this case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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