EMPIRE NATL BANK OF TRAVERSE CITY V LYNDON E GREELEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EMPIRE NATIONAL BANK OF TRAVERSE
CITY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 24, 1999
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
v
No. 209287
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 96-015523 CZ
LYNDON E. GREELEY and VIRGINIA M.
PATTEE,
Defendants/CounterplaintiffsAppellants,
and
KENNETH R. KOBMANN and ADVANCED
STAINLESS, INC.,
Defendants.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Markman and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal by leave granted from an order of judgment in favor of plaintiff in this action
to recover on a promissory note. We affirm.
During the summer of 1995, individual defendants started a business to manufacture and sell
stainless steel fixtures. The business was named Advanced Stainless, Inc., and the three individuals
were to become shareholders in the corporation. On May 24, 1996, Empire National Bank and
defendants entered into a group of agreements, including a promissory note, business purpose affidavit,
guaranty and security agreement. Pursuant to these agreements, Empire drew up a $50,000 line of
credit loan to individual defendants. The promissory note for the loan, dated May 24, 1996, was
executed by defendants in their individual capacities, and provided that the borrowers were “jointly and
severally” liable.
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The individual defendants subsequently defaulted on the promissory note and plaintiff filed suit
on November 25, 1996 against defendants. On March 19, 1997, defendants Pattee and Greeley filed
a countercomplaint against plaintiff, alleging that plaintiff “committed fraud in the execution through its
agent and/or agents by misrepresenting the nature of the document signed and [defendants’] liability
therein.” Summary disposition was granted in favor of plaintiff on its claims as well as on the
counterclaim.
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) on defendants' counterclaim. Specifically, defendants argue that there
were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether defendants signed a promissory note and other
documents as a result of the fraudulent misrepresentations of plaintiff’s agent. We review a trial court’s
grant or denial of summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331,
370; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
To establish a cause of action for fraud or misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) [T]he defendant made a material representation; (2) the representation was false;
(3) when the defendant made the representation, the defendant knew that it was false,
or made it recklessly, without knowledge of its truth as a positive assertion; (4) the
defendant made the representation with the intention that the plaintiff would act upon it;
(5) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon it; and (6) the plaintiff suffered damage. [M&D,
Inc v WB McConkey, 231 Mich App 22, 27; 585 NW2d 33 (1998).]
With regard to the fifth element, this Court recently clarified that an individual must show reasonable
reliance on the representation, as opposed to actual reliance. Novak v Nationwide Mut Ins Co, ___
Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 204162, issued 6/1/99), slip op, at 6. Here, the alleged
misrepresentation made by plaintiff’s agent to defendant Greeley was that Greeley was not responsible
for paying back the loan, and that only defendants Kobmann and Advanced Stainless would be liable in
the event of default.
Michigan courts have held that a party who executes a written agreement is charged with
knowledge of the contents of the agreement. Sponseller v Kimball, 246 Mich 255, 260; 224 NW
359 (1929); Stopczynski v Ford Motor Co, 200 Mich App 190, 193; 503 NW2d 912 (1993).
Similarly, this Court has held that where the terms of an agreement are readily ascertainable, a party
executing an agreement is charged with knowledge of its terms and therefore cannot rely on the alleged
representation in executing the agreement. See Draeger v Kent County Savings Ass’n, 242 Mich
486, 488-90; 219 NW 637 (1928); Nieves v Bell Industries Corp, 204 Mich App 459, 464-65; 517
NW2d 235 (1994).
In Webb v First of Michigan Corp, 195 Mich App 470, 474-75; 491 NW2d 851 (1992), the
plaintiffs pursued a fraudulent misrepresentation claim when a fund in which they had invested became
worthless. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant misrepresented that the investment was “risk free.”
Id., at 473-74. On appeal, the Court noted that “there can be no fraud where the means of knowledge
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regarding the truthfulness of the representation are available to the plaintiff and the degree of their
utilization has not been prohibited by the defendant.” Id., at 474. The Court further stated:
Here, plaintiffs acknowledged receipt of the . . . Fund prospectus and agreement to its
terms by signing the subscription agreement form before making their initial investment.
The subscription agreement and power of attorney form states that the person signing
"warrants, represents, covenants and agrees" that the "undersigned" "understands the
nature of the risks involved" in the investment and "the financial hazards involved in the
offering, including the speculative nature of the investment and the risk of losing the
undersigned's entire investment." Further, the front page of the prospectus states that
the investment involves special risks and that the reader should consult the risk factors
section. . . . Even a cursory review of any of these documents would have enlightened
plaintiffs that the investment was not “risk free” as represented by the broker.
Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs cannot claim to have been defrauded when they had
information available to them that they chose to ignore. [Id., at 474-475.]
In this case, the promissory note was clearly labeled a “promissory note” at the top of the
document, and stated in the opening paragraph:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, on the Due Date the undersigned, jointly and severally, if
more than one maker (“Borrower”), promise(s) to pay to the order of EMPIRE
NATIONAL BANK OF TRAVERSE CITY, (“Bank”), at its office set forth below,
or at such other place as Bank may designate in writing, the principal sum of [$50,000]
or such lesser sum as shall have been advanced by Bank to Borrower under the Loan
Account hereinafter provided . . . .
The specific details of the note are then set out in several paragraphs written in smaller print, at the
bottom of which its states that “[t]he liability of the Borrower shall be absolute and unconditional,
without regard to the liability of any other party thereto.” Defendant Greeley admitted that he knew he
was signing a loan and that he did not read the promissory note. Although defendant Greeley testified
that the papers were late in arriving, he did not contend that plaintiff’s agent denied him the opportunity
to read the documents or otherwise inhibited his ability to read the note prior to signing it. In fact,
Greeley testified that he signed it because he was “in a hurry” to leave the bank. We conclude, as in
Webb, supra, that since the promissory note plainly indicated that the obligation to repay the note was
joint and several, and since defendant Greeley had an opportunity to read the note before signing, no
fraud could be successfully alleged since the means of knowledge regarding the truthfulness of the
representation was fully available to Greeley. Id., at 474.
Defendant Pattee’s claim of misrepresentation is based on a claim that plaintiff’s agent told her
on three separate occasions that she was only legally responsible for twenty-five percent of the $50,000
due under the note. We conclude that defendant Pattee also failed to show that she reasonably relied
on the agent’s alleged representations. Again, the promissory note plainly indicated that defendants
would be jointly and severally liable for the full amount. Further, like Greeley, Pattee admitted that she
did not read the note before signing it. Nor is there evidence in the record that the agent prohibited or
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attempted to prevent her from reading the promissory note before signing. Thus, it would appear that
Pattee, like Greeley, had the opportunity to read the note, which would have revealed the joint and
several liability language. Since Pattee had information plainly available to her that she chose to ignore,
she cannot now claim to have been defrauded. Nieves, supra at 465.
We agree with the trial court that there were genuine issues of fact regarding the alleged
misrepresentations. Defendants Greeley and Pattee testified that plaintiff’s agent made certain
statements regarding liability to defendants. The agent denied making any statement to Greeley, and
there is no evidence on the record regarding how the agent responded to Pattee’s claims regarding the
three alleged conversations. However, as the trial court concluded, fact questions identified by
defendants here were not material to the dispositive legal claim. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v
Johnson, 187 Mich App 264, 267; 466 NW2d 287 (1990). Since defendants failed to show
reasonable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, summary disposition was properly granted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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