THOMAS LOWANDE V DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THOMAS LOWANDE,
UNPUBLISHED
September 17, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 210164
LC No. 96-085085 CZ
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant-Appellee
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Gage and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff, an employee of defendant, claimed that the conduct of his female
supervisor, violated the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., by
subjecting him to gender discrimination, hostile work environment sexual harassment, and retaliation.
Plaintiff appeals only with respect to the gender discrimination and sexual harassment claims. We affirm.
On appeal, this Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant or denial of summary disposition.
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). This Court must
review the record in the same manner as the trial court to determine whether the movant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 398; 541 NW2d 566 (1995).
Plaintiff first alleges that the trial court improperly considered defendant’s summary disposition
motion because the motion was not supported by an affidavit. The claim is without merit. Affidavits are
not required in support of MCR 2.116(C)(10) motions. Michigan National Bank-Oakland v
Wheeling, 165 Mich App 738, 742-743; 419 NW2d 746 (1988). Rather, MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b)
states only that affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence is required to support
the motion. Id. In the instant case, defendant supported its motion for summary disposition with the
pleadings and plaintiff’s deposition. In light of this “other documentary evidence,” the absence of a
supporting affidavit for defendant’s summary disposition motion does not require reversal.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims for failure to set forth a
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d
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668 (1973), because according to plaintiff, he was not required to establish a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas. We disagree. A plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case under the
McDonnell Douglas framework if he presents direct evidence of discrimination. Harrison v Olde
Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 609; 572 NW2d 679 (1997). Examples of direct evidence
include derogatory comments about race, id. at 610, and statements such as “‘If I have to, I will get rid
of the older guys – you older guys and replace you with younger ones.’” Downey v Charlevoix Co
Bd of Rd Comm’rs, 227 Mich App 621, 633; 576 NW2d 712 (1998).
In this case, plaintiff has not cited the specific portions of his deposition testimony and affidavit
that he alleges constitute the direct evidence of discriminatory animus. In reviewing plaintiff’s affidavit,
we note that he avers that his supervisor “specifically told [him] that the reason he wasn’t being allowed
to go [to an awards banquet] was because he was male. . . .” However, plaintiff’s deposition
contradicts this assertion and indicates that, in regard to the awards banquet, the supervisor told plaintiff
that she wanted to take a female coworker because “this was kind of a girl thing.” “Parties may not
create factual issues by merely asserting the contrary in an affidavit after giving damaging testimony in a
deposition.” Downer v Detroit Receiving Hospital, 191 Mich App 232, 234; 477 NW2d 146
(1991), citing Peterfish v Frantz, 168 Mich App 43, 54-55; 424 NW2d 25 (1988). Other than the
inaccurate allegation regarding the awards banquet, we could find no evidence of any statement or
action that constituted the type of direct evidence that has previously been cited as sufficient to take a
discrimination case out of the McDonnell Douglas framework. In the absence of such direct evidence
of discrimination, the trial court did not err in evaluating plaintiff’s claim under the McDonnell Douglas
framework.
Plaintiff alleges, nonetheless, that he established a prima facie case with regard to both his
gender discrimination and sexual harassment claims. An employee may establish a prima facie case of
gender discrimination by showing either disparate treatment or intentional discrimination. Hickman v
W-S Equipment Co, Inc, 176 Mich App 17, 20; 438 NW2d 872 (1989), citing Dixon v W W
Granger, Inc, 168 Mich App 107, 114; 423 NW2d 580 (1987).
Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to both forms of gender discrimination. His disparate
treatment claim is premised on allegations that defendant accorded a female lieutenant preferential
treatment with regard to discipline for department violations. Plaintiff also makes similar claims with
regard to the department’s response to violations by his supervisor.
To establish discrimination by showing disparate treatment, the plaintiff must show “that there
are similarly situated individuals who have been treated differently because of their sex.” Schultes v
Naylor, 195 Mich App 640, 645; 491 NW2d 240 (1992), citing Marsh v Dep’t of Civil Service
(After Remand), 173 Mich App 72, 79; 433 NW2d 820 (1988). In construing the “similarly situated”
requirement of a prima facie case of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 as amended, 29 USC 623(a), the court in Ercegovich v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 154
F3d 344, 352 (CA 6, 1998), explained that “similarly situated” does not require that the plaintiff be
identical in every single aspect of employment to the other employees the plaintiff alleges have been
more favorably treated. Rather, the plaintiff must simply prove “that all of the relevant aspects of his
employment situation were ‘nearly identical’ to those of [the females’] employment situation.” Id.,
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quoting Pierce v Commonwealth Life Ins Co, 40 F3d 796, 802 (CA 6, 1994). Thus, in the context
of alleged discriminatory disciplinary action, in order to be deemed “similarly situated,”
the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his/her treatment must have
dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have
engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that
would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it. [Mitchell v
Toledo Hospital, 964 F2d 577, 583 (CA 6, 1992).]
To the extent plaintiff argues that he was treated differently than his female supervisor, the
argument fails because she and plaintiff neither had the same supervisor, nor engaged in the same
conduct, and therefore were not similarly situated. Likewise, plaintiff and the female lieutenant, although
sharing the same supervisor and presumably subject to the same standards, did not engage in the same
conduct with differing results. Plaintiff has not shown that any of the conduct for which he claims he was
discriminatorily disciplined was the same as the conduct he alleges that the lieutenant engaged in without
repercussion. Because plaintiff and the female lieutenant were not similarly situated, plaintiff did not
establish a disparate treatment theory of gender discrimination.
Turning to plaintiff’s intentional discrimination claim, he argues that defendant intentionally
discriminated against him when his supervisor nstituted a shift change policy and allegedly did not
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require the female lieutenant to continue in the rotation after she rotated to plaintiff’s morning shift. A
prima facie case of intentional discrimination includes evidence of an adverse employment action. See
Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich App 347, 360; ___ NW2d ___ (1999). Thus,
the dispositive issue here is whether the shift change constituted an adverse employment action.
An adverse employment action includes actions such as “termination of employment, a
demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,
significantly diminished material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other
indices that might be unique to a particular situation.” Kocsis v Multi-Care Management, Inc, 97 F3d
876, 886 (CA 6, 1996), citing Crady v Liberty National Bank & Trust Co, 993 F2d 132, 136 (CA
7, 1993). Two concepts are integral to finding an adverse employment action:
(1) the action must be materially adverse in that it is more than “mere inconvenience or
an alteration of job responsibilities,” Crady, supra at 136, and (2) there must be some
objective basis for demonstrating that the change is adverse because “a plaintiff’s
‘subjective impressions as to the desirability of one position over another’ [are] not
controlling,” Kocsis, supra at 886, quoting Kelleher v Flawn, 761 F2d 1079, 1086
(CA 5, 1985). [Wilcoxon, supra at 364 (brackets in original; footnote omitted).]
Here, plaintiff neither alleges that the shift change altered his duties or status, nor that it resulted
in a decrease in pay. Other than interfering with plaintiff’s Knights of Columbus meetings, plaintiff cites
no adverse effect resulting from the shift change. Moreover, plaintiff testified that when he was moved
to the night shift when the second rotation of the shift change occurred in April 1997, he had no problem
with working this shift. We therefore conclude that plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment
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action. As such, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, and the trial
court did not err by summarily disposing of this claim.
The trial court also properly granted summary disposition to defendant on plaintiff’s hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim. The elements of a prima facie case of a hostile work environment
claim are:
(1) the employee belonged to a protected group;
(2) the employee was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of
sex;
(3) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or
communication;
(4) the unwelcome sexual conduct or communication was intended to or in fact
did substantially interfere with the employee’s employment or created an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment; and
(5) respondeat superior. [Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 382-383; 501
NW2d 155 (1993), citing MCL 37.2103(h), 37.2202(1)(a); MSA 3.548(103)(h),
3.548(202)(1)(a).]
Here, plaintiff alleged that his supervisor subjected him to hostile work environment sexual harassment
by posting a “Women Working” sign, making inquiries into plaintiff’s sex life, and asking plaintiff
whether a brassiere pictured in a catalog would enhance her cleavage.
Plaintiff failed to establish his prima facie case on two counts. First, he was required to show
that the questions posed to him created a hostile work environment. Id. at 380, citing MCL
37.2103(h); MSA 3.548 (103)(h). “The essence of a hostile work environment action is that ‘one or
more supervisors . . . create an atmosphere so infused with hostility toward members of one sex that
they alter the conditions of employment for them.’” Id. at 385, quoting Lipsett v University of Puerto
Rico, 864 F2d 881, 897 (CA 1, 1988). On this basis, this Court has held that a single incident, in
which a supervisor made lewd, suggestive comments to an eighteen-year-old female employee and then
briefly placed his hand on her breast and grabbed her buttocks, was not sufficient to show a hostile
work environment. Langlois v McDonald’s Restaurants of Michigan, Inc, 149 Mich App 309, 314;
385 NW2d 778 (1986). Similarly, in Ferguson v E I duPont de Nemours & Co, Inc, 560 F Supp
1172, 1181-1182 (D Del, 1983), the court concluded in dicta that the plaintiff had not shown conduct
pervasive enough to show a hostile work environment although the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor
smacked her buttocks once as she was leaving his office, called her into his office for “heart to breast”
talks, referred to her as his girlfriend in public, inquired about her sex life, opined on her promiscuity,
and made several lewd comments to her. Also, in Seep v Commercial Motor Freight, Inc, 575 F
Supp 1097 (SD Ohio, 1983), the court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a hostile work
environment based on her allegations that male employees made suggestive remarks to her, possessed
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and displayed pornographic material, and otherwise attempted to embarrass the company’s female
employees. Based on these cases, we conclude that the supervisor’s inquiries regarding plaintiff’s sex
life and the brassiere and the posting of the “Women Working” sign were not sufficiently severe or
pervasive so as to subject plaintiff to a hostile work environment.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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