PEOPLE OF MI V GAIL ANN GUZIKOWSKI
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 17, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 206947
Manistee Circuit Court
LC No. 97-002707 FC
GAIL ANN GUZIKOWSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Griffin and Talbot, JJ
GRIFFIN, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the trial judge abused his discretion by
striking the testimony of defendant’s expert witness psychiatrist Emanuel Tanay. I disagree and would
affirm.
Dr. Tanay is a professional expert witness well known to this Court for testifying in favor of
defendants claiming insanity. His infamous reputation for not recalling his opinions when not paid his
demanded fee is documented in People v McPeters, 181 Mich App 145; 448 NW2d 770 (1989).
His usually discredited opinions are chronicled in the following decisions: Gacioch v Stroh Brewery
Co, 426 Mich 612; 396 NW2d 1 (1986); People v Ramsey, 422 Mich 500; 375 NW2d 297 (1985);
People v Murphy, 416 Mich 453; 331 NW2d 152 (1982); People v McLeod, 407 Mich 632; 288
NW2d 909 (1980); People v Cramer, 201 Mich App 590; 507 N2d 447 (1993); People v Canter,
197 Mich App 550; 496 NW2d 336 (1992); Mirza v Maccabees Life & Annuity Co, 187 Mich App
76; 466 NW2d 340 (1991); Davis v Lhim, 124 Mich App 291; 335 NW2d 481 (1983); Warfield v
City of Wyandotte, 117 Mich App 83; 323 NW2d 603 (1982); People v Brand, 106 Mich App
574; 308 NW2d 288 (1981); People v Plummer, 65 Mich App 396; 237 NW2d 482 (1975);
People v Musser, 53 Mich App 683; 219 NW2d 781 (1974); People v Corsa, 50 Mich App 479;
213 NW2d 579 (1973); People v Stoddard, 48 Mich App 440; 210 NW2d 470 (1973); People v
Eldridge, 17 Mich App 306; 169 NW2d 497 (1969); People v Brocato, 17 Mich App 277; 169
NW2d 483 (1969).
Of particular interest are Musser, supra, and Stoddard, supra. In Stoddard, the only expert
to testify on the issue of insanity was Dr. Tanay, who testified that the “[d]efendant committed the act
-1
while in a state of mental disorganization – a dissociative state; he acted out of an uncontrollable rage
directed against his wife, but displaced without conscious control toward the victim.” Id. at 443.
Although the only rebuttal to Dr. Tanay’s testimony occurred during his own cross-examination, our
Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction holding that the trier of fact “was not bound to accept the
opinion of defendant’s expert.” Id. at 447.
In Musser, supra, Dr. Tanay testified that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or
defect, although Dr. Tanay’s report stated that the defendant did not suffer from any mental illness that
would impair his ability to know the nature and quality of his acts and that his acts were wrong. In
attempting to explain the discrepancy, Dr. Tanay tried to express his opinion regarding Supreme Court
decisions. Ultimately, the trial judge ruled that it was the function of the court, not the expert witness, to
decide the law.
In the present case, Dr. Tanay began his testimony by reciting the conclusion contained in his
report that defendant does not suffer “mental illness” as the term is statutorily defined:
. . . as I understand it, there is a definition of mental illness in Michigan –
statutory definition – that requires for insanity defense mental illness of such intensity and
proportions that it would require the presence of psychosis. And the mental illness
that she suffered, in my opinion, did not rise to the level required by, as I
understand it, by Michigan law. [Emphasis added.]
Nevertheless, Dr. Tanay opined:
Because there was the great deal of stress, there was the state of mind that
created excitement, that created – that she suffered from an adjustment disorder with
depressive features, which is a psychiatric illness, which does not rise to the level that
would justify insanity defense. That’s why I told you there was no basis for insanity
defense. But there was basis for, as I understand law, for insanity – for diminished
capacity.
The Honorable James M. Batzer struck the proposed testimony of Dr. Tanay because the
expert’s own testimony was that defendant’s alleged “adjustment disorder” did not constitute a mental
illness as defined by the Mental Health Code.1 The court ruled in pertinent part:
The Court: MRE 702 provides: If the Court determines that recognized
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.
Well, certainly Dr. Tanay is an expert in psychiatry, and forensic psychiatry.
The problem in this case is, and the reason the Court will strike his testimony, is that by
-2
his own testimony, her state does not rise – and I’m quoting him almost verbatim – does
not rise to the level of mental illness.
Additionally, Dr. Tanay testified that he had no opinion regarding whether defendant could have formed
an intent to commit a crime as the term “intent” is defined by the law:
Q (Mr. Callanan). Was there the capacity to form specific intent that evening?
A (Dr. Tanay). No.
***
The Court: You’re going to have to go back. You’re going to have to go
back. You got an answer – your question was: Was there a specific intent to do
anything that evening? I don’t know what you mean by that. Do you mean she couldn’t
intend to drive to – from Reed City to Manistee, to the apartment, she didn’t intend to
go to the apartment? Your question is too –
***
The Court: I’m saying “intent” has an everyday meaning. And that’s it’s
meaning in law.
The Witness: That was not my understanding to this moment, Your Honor.
The Court: Well, it is. It’s an everyday meaning.
The Witness: Then I have no opinion to offer then in this court, I am told; is
that right?
In my view, the trial judge correctly exercised his discretion in ruling that the proposed testimony
of Dr. Tanay would not be helpful because the expert’s definitions of “diminished capacity” and “intent”
were idiosyncratic definitions inconsistent with the law and therefore confusing to the jury. MRE 403.
Contrary to Dr. Tanay’s opinions, a defendant must suffer from “mental illness” or “mental retardation”
for the defense of diminished capacity to be invoked. As our Court stated in People v Mangiapane,
85 Mich App 379, 395; 271 NW2d 240 (1978):
The codified definition of legal insanity extends to persons lacking substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct or to conform their
conduct to the requirements of law, whether it results from mental illness or mental
retardation. [Emphasis in original.]
We find that the defense known as diminished capacity comes within this
codified definition of legal insanity. We further find that psychiatric testimony on the
-3
issue of defendant’s capacity to form the specific intent comes within the codified
definition of legal insanity. [Emphasis added.]
See also People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 331; 521 NW2d 797 (1994), “a necessary component of
the diminished capacity defense is that the defendant was mentally ill.”
Further, under the 1994 amendments to the insanity statute, the insanity defense, including
diminished capacity, is an affirmative defense that the defendant has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence. MCL 768.21a; MSA 28.1044(1). People v Carpenter, unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued 7/16/99 (Docket No. 204051).
MCL 768.21a(1); MSA 28.1044(1) provides:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a criminal offense that the
defendant was legally insane when he or she committed the acts constituting the offense.
An individual is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness as defined in section 400a of
the mental health code, Act No. 258 of the Public Acts of 1974, being section
330.1400a of the Michigan Compiled Laws, or as a result of being mentally retarded as
defined in section 500(h) of the mental health code, Act No. 258 of the Public Acts of
1974, being section 330.1500 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, that person lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his
or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law. Mental
illness or being mentally retarded does not otherwise constitute a defense of legal
insanity.2
The majority’s ultimate conclusion that “we think a properly instructed jury would have been
justified in finding that defendant suffered from a mental illness and was operating under a diminished
capacity when she entered the house” is contradicted by Dr. Tanay’s own testimony that pursuant to the
statutory definition of mental illness, defendant’s “disassociative state” did not constitute mental illness.
Under such circumstances, irrespective of Dr. Tanay’s personal definition of the term, there was
insufficient evidence of diminished capacity as defined by law to submit the issue to the jury. See also
MRE 103(a)(2).3 The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in so ruling.
I agree with the majority’s analysis regarding the photographic evidence4 and find no error
requiring reversal regarding the form of the information, particularly in light of the adjournment granted
by the trial court.
I would affirm.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
1
The Mental Health Code defines “mental illness” as follows:
-4
“Mental illness” means a substantial disorder of thought or mood that
significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope
with the ordinary demands of life. [MCL 330.1400(g); MSA 14.800(400)(g).]
2
Defendant does not claim that she was mentally retarded.
3
MRE 103(a)(2) provides:
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
***
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance
of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the
context within which questions were asked.
4
See also People v Zeitler, 183 Mich App 68; 454 NW2d 192 (1990).
-5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
