WEXFORD COUNTY V CITY OF CADILLAC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
COUNTY OF WEXFORD,
UNPUBLISHED
July 2, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 205933
Wexford Circuit Court
LC No. 96-011991 CK
CITY OF CADILLAC,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and McDonald and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this suit for specific performance of a wastewater treatment facility contract and for a
declaratory ruling, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s judgment that defendant is only required to
accept wastewater from plaintiff that emanates from specified service districts within three townships.
Defendant cross-appeals, asserting that it should not be required to accept sewage from districts other
than those initially targeted to benefit from a pollution control project. We affirm.
I
The instant suit arose following defendant’s refusal to accept wastewater from a proposed
development in Cherry Grove Township, on the basis that the development was not within the
boundaries of sewer service districts 1, 2 or 4.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in focusing its inquiry on the term
“county system,” without regard for key provisions of the parties’ 1977 agreement that address the
central issue of expansions and additions to the system. We disagree.
We review de novo claims for specific performance and rulings with regard to declaratory
judgments, and review findings of fact for clear error. Samuel D Begola Services, Inc v Wild Bros,
210 Mich App 636, 639; 534 NW2d 217 (1995); Auto-Owners Ins Co v Harvey, 219 Mich App
466, 469; 556 NW2d 517 (1996).
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The initial question whether contractual language is ambiguous is a question of law. Port Huron
Ed Ass’n v Port Huron Area School Dist, 452 Mich 309, 323; 550 NW2d 228 (1996). If the
contract language is unclear or susceptible to multiple meanings, interpretation becomes a question of
fact. Id.
The term “county system” is undefined in the contract. Without an understanding of that term’s
intended meaning, the contractual provisions that plaintiff argues expressly grant it the sole and exclusive
right to expand and add to the “county system” are themselves unclear and lacking in context. The trial
court recognized this dilemma and properly focused on the intended meaning of the term, as it was at
the heart of the instant dispute. The court properly set about ascertaining the parties’ intent, in order to
enforce the agreement according to that intent, SSC Associates Ltd Partnership v General
Retirement Systems of Detroit, 210 Mich App 449, 452; 534 NW2d 160 (1995), and it did not
ignore plain terms that would have dictated a contrary result.
II
Plaintiff next asserts that the trial court erred in considering parol evidence to interpret what
plaintiff argues were plain terms of the contract. We disagree.
In cases of contractual ambiguity, parol evidence is admissible to explain the terms of the
contract. Stefanac v Cranbrook Educational Community, 435 Mich 155, 171-172; 458 NW2d 56
(1990). The court may consider preliminary negotiations to a written contract, not to vary or contradict
the contract’s plain terms, but to aid the court in determining the intent with which such words were
used. Keller v Paulos Land Co, 5 Mich App 246; 146 NW2d 93 (1966), aff’d 381 Mich 355
(1968).
To ascertain the parties’ intent, the trial court found it necessary to consider the “entire history
and the purpose of the project” which consisted of items already admitted into evidence, including the
1975 Facilities Plan and the parties’ 1975 and 1977 agreements. The trial court properly construed the
contract against its drafter, in this case, plaintiff. Raska v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co of Michigan,
412 Mich 355, 362; 314 NW2d 440 (1982); Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co (On Remand),
207 Mich App 344, 350; 526 NW2d 183 (1994).
As noted above, the provisions that plaintiff argues clearly and unambiguously give it the right to
expand the county system, are not clear until the meaning of “county system” is ascertained. The trial
court’s determination that the parties intended “county system” to mean the service districts identified by
the 1975 Facilities Plan, which the parties jointly prepared, was well-supported by the record. The
parol evidence was properly admitted.
We do not agree with defendant’s argument on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in ruling
that defendant must accept sewage not only from districts 1, 2 and 4, but also from districts 3, 5, and
part of 11. The trial court’s determination was not clearly erroneous as there was ample evidence that
the 1975 Facilities Plan contemplated service to all the above mentioned districts. Moreover, it is
apparent from the record that plaintiff purchased future capacity in an amount based on projected
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service needs in those areas. A comparison of the final 1977 agreement and an earlier draft
demonstrate that the 360,000 gallon limit was purposefully negotiated into the contract, and testimony
from those representing both parties supports that the parties were aware that this figure was based on
projected flows from areas other than districts 1, 2 and 4. The trial court properly determined that in
order to effectuate the parties’ intent at the time the contract was made, defendant must accept
wastewater from all the districts listed above.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Griffin
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Helene N. White
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