PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES CHARLES BROWN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 29, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 206910
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 97-004617 FC
JAMES CHARLES BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Wilder and R. J. Danhof,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from his jury trial convictions of assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for the
felony-firearm conviction and, as a fourth habitual offender, to a consecutive term of eight to twenty
years’ imprisonment for assault with intent to do great bodily harm. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda1 rights, and
the trial court therefore erred by denying his motion to suppress a taped statement he made during
custodial police interrogation. We review the record de novo, but will not disturb a trial court's factual
findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights unless its ruling is clearly
erroneous. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30; 551 NW2d 355 (1996). A waiver “must have
been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences
of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421; 106 S Ct 1135, 1140-1141; 89
L Ed 2d 410 (1986). Whether a statement was made knowingly and intelligently depends “on the
totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s intelligence and capacity to understand the
warnings given.” People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 538; 575 NW2d 16 (1997).
A police officer testified that during a taped interview he advised defendant of his constitutional
rights by reading them from a pre-printed card, and that defendant appeared to understand the rights
and responded affirmatively when asked if he understood them. Although
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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defendant said that people in Grand Rapids do not have constitutional rights, the officer explained to
him when a person had to be advised of such rights, after which defendant proceeded to discuss the
matter at hand. Defendant yawned during the interview, but nothing in the record indicates that he was
sleep deprived or unable to comprehend what he was doing. Defendant was thirty-six years old,
appeared to understand the questions asked, and as a fourth habitual offender had had previous
interactions with the police. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that the trial court’s
determination that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights is not clearly
erroneous.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence a photograph
depicting the victim’s wound. To determine the admissibility of photographs, the first inquiry is whether
the evidence is relevant under MRE 401. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 66; 537 NW2d 909 (1995),
modified 450 Mich 1212 (1995). If relevant, it must be determined whether the evidence should be
excluded under MRE 403, which addresses whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. Whether to admit photographs is within the sole
discretion of the trial court. Id. at 76. Photographs are not excludable merely because they are
gruesome or because a witness can testify about what they depict. Id.
Although the victim and an emergency room physician testified about the nature and extent of
the wounds, the photograph was important to help the jury understand facts of consequence to the
determination of whether defendant committed assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83;
MSA 28.278, as charged. It shows the nature and extent of the injuries, relevant to the intent aspect of
the charge, and corroborates the victim’s testimony that he was shot while fleeing and the doctor’s
testimony about the injury. The photograph is relevant under MRE 401. Furthermore, it is more
probative than prejudicial under MRE 403 because it accurately depicts the victim’s injuries, illustrates
defendant’s intent and corroborates the witnesses’ testimony. We find that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting the photograph.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial
attorney failed to object to (1) testimony relating to on-the-scene identification procedures used by the
police, and (2) the alleged lack of foundation for the admission of the taped statement. “To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and that the representation so prejudiced [him] that it deprived
[him] of a fair trial.” People v McMillan, 213 Mich App 134, 141; 539 NW2d 553 (1995). Because
defendant failed to move for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. Id.
Defense counsel’s failure to object to on-the-scene identification testimony did not prejudice
defendant to the extent of depriving him of a fair trial because the victim and a witness identified
defendant in court as the individual who shot the victim. Because the record lacks sufficient detail to
address defendant’s argument regarding lack of foundation for admission of the taped statement, our
review is foreclosed.
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Defendant next maintains that resentencing is required because the trial court did not follow
MCL 769.13(6); MSA 28.1085(6), requiring the court to resolve challenges to the accuracy or
constitutional validity of prior convictions, nor make any findings that defendant was a fourth felony
offender, MCL 769.13(5); MSA 28.1085(5). Defendant did not challenge the accuracy or validity of
his prior convictions by written motion as required by MCL 769.13(4); MSA 28.1085(4) and did not
object at sentencing to being sentenced as a fourth habitual offender. Because defendant has not
preserved this issue for appeal, we need not address it. Vander Bossche v Valley Pub, 203 Mich App
632, 641; 513 NW2d 225 (1994); People v Jones, 83 Mich App 559, 568; 269 NW2d 224 (1978).
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced him as a fourth habitual
offender to eight to twenty years’ imprisonment for assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less
than murder. We disagree. An appellate court reviews a sentencing court’s imposition of a particular
sentence for an abuse of discretion, People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 525; 583 NW2d 199
(1998), which exists when “the sentence imposed does not reasonably reflect the seriousness of the
circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender,” People v Castillo, 230 Mich App 442, 447;
584 NW2d 606 (1998). This Court’s review of habitual offender sentences is limited to determining
whether the imposed sentence violates the principle of proportionality, without reference to sentencing
guidelines. People v Gatewood (On Remand), 216 Mich App 559, 560; 550 NW2d 265 (1996).
The principle of proportionality “requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the
seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” People v Milbourn, 435
Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Whether to impose an increased sentence as authorized by the
habitual offender act is discretionary with the sentencing court. People v Bewersdorf, 438 Mich 55,
66; 475 NW2d 231 (1991).
Based on the record and the circumstances in this case, we find that the sentence imposed
reasonably reflects the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and defendant, and thus
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced defendant as an habitual offender to eight to
twenty years’ incarceration.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Robert J. Danhof
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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