SCOTT WALLACE V GLAZERS LUMBER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
June 18, 1999
SCOTT WALLACE,
Plaintiff,
No. 209712
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 96-083186 NP
v
GLAZER’S LUMBER,
Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff,
and
IVACO, INC., and SNW QUEBEC,
Defendants/Cross-Defendants/
Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
KURT HANSON and KURCO CONSTRUCTION,
Third-Party Defendants-Appellees,
and
EYDE BUILDERS, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Hood and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
-1-
Third-party plaintiffs, distributors of nails who sought contribution from an injured worker’s
employer after paying the worker damages pursuant to a settlement agreement, appeal as of right from
an order granting the employer’s motion for summary disposition.1 The trial court held that the
employer had not committed an intentional tort and that third-party plaintiffs’ action was therefore
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA),
MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1). We affirm.
I
Third-party plaintiffs argue that third-party defendants Kurt Hanson and Kurco Construction
(Hanson) were not employers within the meaning of the WDCA and were therefore not entitled to
invoke the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA.2 We disagree.
The question of whether Hanson was the employer of Scott Wallace, the injured worker, turns
on the economic reality test. James v Commercial Carriers Inc, 230 Mich App 533, 536; 583
NW2d 913 (1998).
The test involves four basic factors: (1) control of the worker's duties;
(2) payment of wages; (3) the right to hire, fire, and discipline; and (4) performance of
the duties toward the accomplishment of a common goal. In applying these factors, the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the work must be examined, with no single
factor controlling. [Id., citation omitted.]
In the present case, Hanson hired, and could presumably fire, Wallace, and wholly controlled his duties
on the jobsite. We further note that Hanson maintained the policy of worker’s compensation insurance
under which Wallace recovered in connection with his injuries. In sum, the economic reality leads
inescapably to the conclusion that Hanson was Wallace’s employer, as that term is used in the WDCA.
II
Third-party plaintiffs next argue that Hanson committed an intentional tort against Wallace such
that this case is not governed by the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA, which provides as
follows:
The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the
employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational
disease. The only exception to this exclusive remedy is an intentional tort. An
intentional tort shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a
deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury.
An employer shall be deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had
actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded
that knowledge. The issue of whether an act was an intentional tort shall be a question
of law for the court. . . . [MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1) emphasis added.]
-2
Simply stated, third-party plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Wallace’s injury was the
result of an intentional tort. At best, third-party plaintiffs’ proofs established only that Hanson was
aware that some of the nails were defective, and thus should have known that the defective nails could
have caused an injury to someone. The evidence did not demonstrate that Hanson knew that nail heads
were flying off and hitting people; but rather, only that the nail heads sometimes fell off. No evidence
suggested that Hanson knew that the particular nail that injured Wallace was broken or that any of the
nails were certain to break. Indeed, no one had been injured by the nails before Wallace’s accident.
Moreover, the fact that Hanson was on the construction site and used the nails himself further suggests
that he did not know that an injury was certain to occur. Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich
149, 182; 551 NW2d 132 (1996).
Third-party plaintiffs were required to show more than mere knowledge by Hanson that an
injury was substantially certain to occur to someone, somewhere, sometime. Agee v Ford Motor Co,
208 Mich App 363, 367 n 3 (1995). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to third-party
plaintiffs, we cannot find that Hanson disregarded actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur.
Accordingly, we conclude, as did the trial court, that third-party plaintiffs’ action is barred by MCL
418.131(1)l MSA 17.237(131)(1), and that Hanson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
III
In their brief on appeal, third-party defendants allege that third-party plaintiffs failed to comply
with Michigan’s contribution statute, MCL 600.2925a(3); MSA 27A.2925(1)(3). Insofar as no cross
appeal has been filed, this issue is not properly before us. Bhama v Bhama, 169 Mich App 73, 83;
425 NW2d 733 (1988). Furthermore, our decision to affirm the trial court’s decision to grant third
party defendants’ motion for summary disposition renders this issue moot.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
1
Although third-party defendants Kurt Hansen and Kurco Construction brought their motion pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), we will treat the motion as being brought under the proper rule, MCR
2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction), because there is no indication that any of the parties
were prejudiced by the mislabeling of the motion. Bitar v Wakim, 211 Mich App 617, 619; 536
NW2d 583 (1995), rev’d on other grounds 456 Mich 428 NW2d 572 (1998).
2
We note that, prior to this appeal, third-party plaintiffs did not seriously contend that Hanson did not
employ Scott Wallace, the injured worker. Indeed, throughout these proceedings, third-party plaintiffs
referred to Hanson as Wallace’s employer.
-3
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