MELZINE WICKER V HOUSE OF LIQUOR & WINE INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MELZINE WICKER and FRED WICKER,
UNPUBLISHED
June 11, 1999
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 206386
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-645497 NO
HOUSE OF LIQUOR & WINE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Murphy and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff1 brought this negligence action on allegations that she suffered injury caused by a
defective sidewalk on defendant’s premises. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), holding that the condition of the sidewalk was open and
obvious. Plaintiff appeals as of right, and we affirm.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo as a
matter of law. Miller v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co, 218 Mich App 221, 233; 553 NW2d 371
(1996). When considering an appeal of an order granting summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), a reviewing court must examine all relevant documentary evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on which
reasonable minds could differ. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co v Stark, 437 Mich 175, 184-185; 468
NW2d 498 (1991); Shirilla v Detroit, 208 Mich App 434, 437; 528 NW2d 763 (1995).
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition because genuine
factual issues exist regarding whether the alleged defects constituted an open and obvious condition.
We disagree.
In Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 610-611; 537 NW2d 185 (1995), our
Supreme Court expounded on the open and obvious doctrine as it relates to the standard of care to
which possessors of land are held with respect to invitees:
-1
[I]f the particular activity or condition creates a risk of harm only because the invitee
does not discover the condition or realize its danger, then the open and obvious doctrine
will cut off liability if the invitee should have discovered the condition and realized its
danger. On the other hand, if the risk of harm remains unreasonable, despite its
obviousness or despite knowledge of it by the invitee, then the circumstances may be
such that the invitor is required to undertake reasonable precautions. The issue then
becomes the standard of care and is for the jury to decide. [Id. at 610-611 (emphasis
in original) (citations and footnote omitted).]
Plaintiff alleges that the cause of her fall was the uneven level and dilapidated condition of the
sidewalk. However, “differing floor levels were not ordinarily actionable unless unique circumstances
surrounding the area in issue made the situation unreasonably dangerous.” Id. at 614 (emphasis in
original). The Court announced that public policy favored encouraging a person to “look where he is
going” and “take appropriate care for his own safety,” id. at 616, then stated as follows:
If the proofs create a question of fact that the risk of harm was unreasonable, the
existence of duty as well as breach become questions for the jury to decide. If the jury
determines that the risk of harm was unreasonable, then the scope of the defendant’s
duty to exercise reasonable care extended to this particular risk. At any rate, the trial
court may appropriately consider the specific allegations of the breach of the duty of
reasonable care, such as failure to warn, negligent maintenance, or dangerous
construction. If the plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to warn of the danger, yet
no reasonable juror would find that the danger was not open and obvious, then the trial
court properly may preclude a failure to warn theory from reaching the jury by granting
partial summary judgment. [Id. at 617 (citation omitted).]
Accordingly, for sidewalks of differing levels to be actionable, unusual circumstances must be present to
warrant the imposition of liability. As this Court stated in Novotney v Burger King Corp (On
Remand), 198 Mich App 470, 475; 449 NW2d 379 (1993), “The question is: Would an average user
with ordinary intelligence have been able to discover the danger and the risk presented upon casual
inspection? That is, is it reasonable to expect that the invitee would discover the danger?”
After reviewing the photographs of the sidewalk included in the record, we conclude that an
average user with ordinary intelligence would have readily discovered the imperfections where the two
concrete slabs in question meet. Although the precise extent of the unevenness may be difficult to gauge
on casual observation, rather than engage in any such calculation a user of ordinary perception and
prudence could simply and easily step over that minor imperfection.
Nor do the photographs suggest that there was anything unusual about the condition of the
sidewalk that rendered it unreasonably dangerous despite its open and obvious nature. The two
concrete slabs appear neither cracked nor uneven, except where they meet. A person walking down
any sidewalk must expect to encounter irregularities of this sort. Thus, this sidewalk does not present
any unusual circumstances suggesting the possibility of unreasonable dangerousness sufficient to warrant
presenting the standard-of-care inquiry to the trier of fact.
-2
Plaintiff argues that the open and obvious doctrine applies only to the duty to warn and does not
to the duty to maintain, inspect, and repair. We disagree. The open and obvious doctrine concerns the
duty element of a negligence action, regardless of the nature of any alleged breach. “[W]here the
dangers . . . are so obvious that the invitee might reasonable be expected to discover them, an invitor
owes no duty to protect or warn the invitee unless he should anticipate the harm despite knowledge of it
on behalf of the invitee.” Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676
(1992) (emphasis added). Thus, although “the open and obvious doctrine does not relieve the invitor of
his general duty of reasonable care,” Bertrand, supra at 611, the openness and obviousness of the
hazard remains relevant to an inquiry into a premises owner’s liability where a party claims injury
resulting from a condition on the premises. “‘A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical
harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to
them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.’”
Id. at 610, adding emphasis and quoting 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 343A(1), p 218. We note that
there is no limiting language in Bertrand to indicate that the open and obvious doctrine only applies to
the duty to warn. The appropriate inquiry remains whether the condition was open and obvious, and, if
so, whether the risk of injury was unreasonable despite the obviousness of the condition.
In this case, the defect in the sidewalk presented no unusual or unreasonable risk, and thus its
open and obvious nature negated any duty on defendant’s part to warn or otherwise protect plaintiff
with regard to it.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the open and obvious doctrine violates public policy. However, as
noted above, our Supreme Court has stated that public policy favors encouraging people to look where
they are going and to take reasonable care for their own safety. Bertrand, supra at 616. For these
reasons, the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
1
Because plaintiff Fred Wicker’s interest in this suit is derivative of that of plaintiff Melzine Wicker, for
convenience in this opinion the term “plaintiff” will refer exclusively to the latter.
-3
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