KENT CNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSN V KENT CNTY SHERIFF
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KENT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS’
ASSOCIATION,
UNPUBLISHED
June 4, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
KENT COUNTY SHERIFF and KENT COUNTY,
No. 209620
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 97012379 CL
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Gage, P.J., and White and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right an order of the circuit court granting defendants’ motion and denying
plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
Plaintiff and defendants, parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), arbitrated a dispute
over the CBA’s prescription drug co-pay for retirees. The arbitrator issued an award determining that
defendant did not violate the contract when it took the position that the contract provided for a $3.00
co-pay, and that the CBA provision referencing a $2.00 co-pay for retirees resulted from a clerical
error and oversight. Plaintiff filed an action in circuit court to vacate the arbitration award. The circuit
court upheld the arbitration award, finding that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority.
An arbitrator exceeds her contractual authority where she disregards a contract provision
expressly limiting arbitral authority. Port Huron Area School Dist v Port Huron Ed Ass’n, 426 Mich
143, 152; 393 NW2d 811 (1986).
Although divided into separate arguments, plaintiff essentially asserts that the arbitrator
exceeded her authority when she modified the parties’ CBA because the CBA specifically limits an
arbitrator’s powers to the “application and interpretation” of the CBA “as written” and, states that an
arbitrator “shall have no power to amend, alter or modify” the CBA. 1 Plaintiff asserts that the contract
was clear and unambiguous, and required no interpretation or explanation.
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Plaintiff concedes that the grievance was arbitrable, in the sense that plaintiff claimed that
defendant violated the contract by applying the $3.00 co-pay to retirees, and that contract dispute was
subject to arbitration under the contract. Plaintiff argues, however, that the arbitrator exceeded her
authority when she altered the written agreement rather than enforcing it according to its express terms.
We disagree.
The parties requested that the arbitrator determine whether the employer violated the CBA by
applying the $3.00 co-pay to retirees. Defendants claimed that the failure to change the reference to a
$2.00 co-pay in § 12.8 of the CBA was an oversight, and that the parties never intended that the retiree
co-pay be different from the employee co-pay rider described in § 12.6. Plaintiff contended that the
CBA language was unambiguous and that the retiree co-pay was $2.00, as stated in § 12.8. The
arbitrator found that defendants’ position requiring a $3.00 prescription co-pay for retirees did not
violate the CBA because the $2.00 co-pay referenced in § 12.8 was the result of a clerical error and
oversight. The arbitrator corrected the inconsistent language in § 12.8.
“The question for the court is not whether one interpretation or another is correct, but whether
the parties have agreed that an arbitrator shall decide which of the competing interpretations is correct.”
Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School Dist No 6 v Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School Teachers’ Ass’n,
393 Mich 583, 595; 227 NW2d 500 (1975). In this case, the arbitrator did not go beyond the specific
provision and issue submitted for arbitration, and thus, did not exceed her authority. Further, she did
not base her determination solely on the past practice of the parties and write a new contract in
accordance with that practice. Rather, she determined that the contract had an internal inconsistency
that required interpretation, and that reformation was required to conform the contract to the intent of
the parties. Her finding merely determined the issue that the parties submitted for arbitration and she did
not exceed her authority in correcting the language of §12.8 to read, “except the $3 co-pay drug
rider.”
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that the arbitrator was not bound by the clear
and unambiguous words of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, and that the arbitrator did not
commit a significant error of law in admitting parol evidence to interpret clear and unambiguous contract
terms.
Whether contract language is ambiguous is a question of law. Port Huron Ed Ass’n v Port
Huron Area School Dist, 452 Mich 309, 323; 550 NW2d 228 (1996) [“Port Huron II”]. If the
contract language is unclear or susceptible to multiple meanings, interpretation is a question of fact. Id.
A lower court’s function is not to review whether the arbitrator made errors of law or fact in interpreting
a contract. Ferndale Ed Ass’n v School Dist for City of Ferndale, 67 Mich App 637, 643; 242
NW2d 478 (1976). An award is legitimate so long as it draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement. Port Huron, supra at 152. The circuit court did not err in concluding that the
drug co-pay terms in the CBA were either ambiguous or susceptible to two meanings, and were
therefore subject to interpretation by the arbitrator. The issue submitted to arbitration was essentially
whether the co-pay was $2.00 or $3.00. The arbitrator interpreted the co-pay language in § 12.8 to
refer back to the co-pay provision of §12.6 and decided that the retiree co-pay was $3.00. The
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arbitrator’s decision was supported by her finding that the CBA provision regarding retiree drug co-pay
was ambiguous.
Further, we find no error of law in the admission of parol evidence. Generally, an arbitrator
does not exceed her authority by accepting parol evidence in interpreting a disputed section of a
contract. Kheel, Arbitration Process, § 24.04[3][c], 6 Labor Law (1989). In weighing two possible
interpretations of the parties’ CBA, the arbitrator agreed with defendants’ interpretation, and found that
the different co-pay amounts signaled an error in the CBA. The arbitrator found that the parties had not
bargained for a $2.00 retiree co-pay as opposed to the general $3.00 co-pay. “The agreement
embodies mutual assent and, during the duration of the contract, either party should be able to rely on
the provisions previously bargained for during negotiation of the agreement.” Port Huron II, supra at
330; emphasis added. Defendants alleged that the co-pay in § 12.8 had been amended by mutual
agreement.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by approving the arbitrator’s reformation of the
contract. An arbitrator’s choice of remedy is generally broad. The test is not whether the reviewing
court agrees with the interpretation of the contract, but whether the remedy fashioned is rationally
explainable as a logical means of furthering the aims of the contract. Mich Ass’n of Police v Pontiac,
177 Mich App 752, 759; 442 NW2d 773 (1989). “When the parties agree to submit a matter to
arbitration, they invest the arbitrator with sufficient discretion to resolve their dispute in a manner which
is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. at 760. An arbitrator’s decision must stand as long as the
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority. Id.
The parties requested that the arbitrator determine whether requiring a $3.00 drug co-pay for
retirees violated the CBA. The arbitrator determined that it did not. It would be illogical for the
arbitrator to determine that the $3.00 co-pay was the correct amount, but to leave the CBA with
inconsistent language. Mellon v Bd of Ed of Fitzgerald Public Schools, 22 Mich App 218, 221, n 2;
177 NW2d 187 (1970). Reformation of the co-pay amount in §12.8 of the CBA was within the
authority conferred on the arbitrator.
The arbitrator determined that reformation of the contract was appropriate. Judicial review is
limited to whether the arbitrator exceeded her contractual jurisdiction and authority. Michigan State
Employees Ass’n v Dep’t of Mental Health, 178 Mich App 581, 583; 444 NW2d 207 (1989). The
arbitrator did not exceed her authority in deciding that the prescription drug co-pay for retirees was
$3.00 and reforming the CBA to correct the inconsistency. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting
defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
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/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Jane E. Markey
1
§ 5.6 of the CBA provided in part:
… the arbitrator’s powers shall be limited to the application and interpretation of this
agreement as written. He shall be at all times wholly governed by the terms of this
agreement, and he shall have no power or authority to amend, alter or modify this
agreement either directly or indirectly.
§ 15.20 provided:
It is the intent of the parties hereto that the provisions of this agreement, would
supersede all prior agreements and understandings, oral or written, express or implied,
between such parties, shall govern their entire relationship and shall be the sole source
of any and all claims which may be asserted in arbitration hereunder, or otherwise.
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