PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN CHANDLER EWING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 4, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204068
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 84-018867 FH
JOHN CHANDLER EWING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and MacKenzie and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court for consideration as on leave
granted. 454 Mich 921 (1997). Defendant appeals the circuit court’s order denying his motions for
relief from judgment and to withdraw his July 15, 1985, nolo contendere plea to third-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC III), MCL 750.520d(1)(b); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(d), for which he was sentenced
to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment.1
According to the complainant, on the evening o September 29, 1980, she was riding her
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bicycle when a man grabbed her off the bicycle, dragged her into a ditch by the side of the road and
then into a cornfield, and raped her. The complainant identified defendant as her assailant after a 1984
lineup2 and again at the preliminary examination. After the preliminary examination, defendant was
bound over on the charge of CSC III. On July 15, 1985, he pleaded nolo contendere to CSC III.
After defendant was sentenced, he moved to withdraw his plea. First, he argued that by
charging him with CSC III, the prosecutor violated the terms of a plea agreement executed in a separate
Washtenaw County case, in which defendant pleaded nolo contendere to CSC I and received a ten- to
twenty-five-year sentence. Defendant contended that the prosecutor had promised to dismiss all future
Washtenaw County criminal sexual conduct charges against him in exchange for his nolo plea to CSC I.
Second, defendant argued that his plea was involuntary and made unknowingly because although he had
been given one police report before trial, a second report had not been disclosed prior to trial.
Defendant asserted that the subsequently disclosed six-page document, written by Ann Arbor Police
Detective William Eskridge, detailed the “grave doubts” Eskridge, the investigating officer, had
concerning the truthfulness of the CSC III complainant’s account. Defendant stated that he would not
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have agreed to plead nolo contendere to the CSC III charge had he known of the weaknesses in the
case against him, as cataloged in the undisclosed report. Lastly, defendant argued that his plea was
involuntary and made unknowingly because his trial counsel was not prepared for trial and had failed to
make several evidentiary challenges before the scheduled trial date, which defendant alleged would have
been successful and would have severely compromised the strength of the case against him.
In a July 24, 1989, opinion and order, the circuit court rejected defendant’s arguments and
denied his motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea. Defendant sought leave to appeal the circuit
court’s decision and, on December 12, 1989, this Court vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded
the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether (1) the plea bargain alleged by defendant was put on the record in 1984 as
required by MCR 6.101(F)(2); (2) unfulfilled promises of leniency were made to
defendant by the prosecutor or by defendant’s trial counsel . . .; (3) defendant’s plea
was coerced by his trial counsel’s assertion that conviction after trial on CSC I would
result in a harsher sentence than a plea of nolo contendere, or by counsel’s
unpreparedness on the date set for the CSC III trial. [People v Ewing, unpublished
order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 12, 1989 (Docket No. 119707).]
After holding the mandated evidentiary hearing, the circuit court again denied defendant’s
motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea to the CSC III charge by opinion dated May 13, 1994.
The circuit court found “absolutely no credible evidence” that it, the prosecutor, or defendant’s trial
counsel, extended an offer to dismiss the CSC III charge if defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the
CSC I charge. Further, the circuit court did not believe that defense counsel told defendant that he
would receive a greater sentence if he chose to go to trial rather than offer a plea. Lastly, the circuit
court addressed defendant’s claim that he would have exercised his right to a jury trial if he and his
attorney had had access to Eskridge’s six-page report. The circuit court found that the police retained
this document innocently and also questioned whether the report would have been admissible at trial.
Regardless, the circuit court found that little evidence in the withheld report was unavailable to defense
counsel at the time of defendant’s plea.
Defendant filed a motion for rehearing, arguing primarily that the circuit court failed to comply
with the directive of the Court of Appeals “to determine whether . . . the defendant’s plea was coerced
. . . by counsel’s unpreparedness on the day set for the CSC III trial.” In an April 5, 1995, opinion and
order the circuit court reiterated that defendant himself confirmed at the plea hearing that no promises of
leniency had been made to him in return for his nolo plea. The circuit court affirmed its finding that
neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel promised leniency to defendant. Further, the circuit court
again stated that it did not believe defense counsel told defendant that the court would impose a harsher
sentence if he chose to go to trial on the CSC III charge. Finally, the circuit court rejected defendant’s
contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, causing him to plead nolo contendere to the
CSC III charge. The circuit court observed that defense counsel had represented defendant in other
criminal sexual conduct cases in Washtenaw County and other jurisdictions, and found that defense
counsel had adequate time to prepare for trial in the instant matter. This Court denied defendant’s
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application for leave to appeal the circuit court’s decision, and the Supreme court remanded for
consideration as on leave granted.
Many of defendant’s arguments on appeal center on his trial counsel’s effectiveness in preparing
for trial. Defendant first argues that the circuit court shirked its duty to determine whether his plea was
coerced by counsel’s failure to prepare adequately for trial and, therefore, remand is necessary. We
disagree.
Findings of fact are sufficient if they are brief, definite, and pertinent. Detailed elaboration of
factual findings is not necessary. MCR 2.517(A)(2); People v Lewis, 168 Mich App 255, 268; 423
NW2d 637 (1988). Findings are sufficient if it appears that the trial court was aware of the issues
before it and applied the law correctly. People v Smith, 211 Mich App 233, 235; 535 NW2d 248
(1995).
Admittedly, the circuit court’s May 1994 opinion does not address the issue whether
defendant’s nolo contendere plea to CSC III was coerced by defense counsel’s failure to prepare for
trial. However, defendant moved for rehearing and in a subsequent opinion the circuit court stated:
This Court finds that nothing was presented at the evidentiary hearing or at any other
time that would indicate defendant’s plea was coerced by defendant’s trial counsel’s
being unprepared on the date set for trial.
Although defendant and his father testified that defense counsel was not ready for trial, the circuit court
concluded, consistent with defense counsel’s testimony, that counsel was prepared to try the case. We
defer to the circuit court’s resolutions of factual issues, especially where issues of credibility are
concerned. People v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 555; 563 NW2d 208 (1997). Further, although
defendant argues that defense counsel’s failure to make several pretrial motions challenging the
admissibility of evidence on various legal grounds indicates that defense counsel was unprepared, there
is no reason to assume that defense counsel would have neglected to make these motions at some point
during defendant’s trial. Indeed, defense counsel testified that, if the CSC III matter had gone to trial,
he would have sought a hearing to determine the admissibility of the similar acts evidence. Accordingly,
we find that the circuit court’s findings are adequate and there is no reason to remand this matter for
further findings of fact.
Defendant next attacks the substance of the circuit court’s ruling, arguing that, notwithstanding
the circuit court’s findings, his plea was coerced because his trial counsel was unprepared and
ineffective because 1) he expected the case to be dismissed; 2) he was not aware of the serious
shortcomings of the state’s case because the six-page report had been withheld; and 3) Detective
Eskridge’s investigatory misconduct was calculated to assure defendant’s conviction despite his
innocence.
Defendant’s nolo contendere plea is an admission of all the essential elements of a charged
offense and, thus, is tantamount to an admission of guilt. People v New, 427 Mich 482, 493 n 10; 398
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NW2d 358 (1986). Generally, “[t]here is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once it has been
accepted by the trial court. When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is brought after sentencing, a trial
court’s decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in a miscarriage of
justice.” People v Montrose (After Remand), 201 Mich App 378, 380; 506 NW2d 565 (1993).
When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from a guilty plea, this Court must
determine whether the defendant’s plea was voluntary and made understandingly. People v Bordash,
208 Mich App 1, 2; 527 NW2d 17 (1994).
Defendant’s plea of nolo contendere waives consideration on appeal of his claims involving
Detective Eskridge’s allegedly underhanded investigatory tactics. Defendant alleges that Eskridge
tricked him into coming to the Ann Arbor police station. Then, according to defendant, police held him
at the police station against his will, failed to inform him of his Miranda3 rights, refused to allow him
access to his attorney, and ultimately forced him to have his photograph taken, which the police
subsequently used in numerous photographic showups. Defendant’s nolo contendere plea waives
consideration of issues concerning the legality of the police search and seizure, see People v Harvey,
203 Mich App 445, 449; 513 NW2d 185 (1994), as well as his argument alleging the violation of his
Miranda rights, see People v Sells, 164 Mich App 219, 222; 416 NW2d 388 (1987).
We also reject defendant’s argument that counsel was rendered ineffective, and defendant’s
plea was coerced, by the totality of Eskridge’s behavior, including the failure to disclose the exculpatory
six-page report. The trial court found that the failure to disclose this report was unintentional. The six
page report was indeed exculpatory in that it expressed Eskridge’s reasons for doubting the veracity of
the complainant’s allegations. However, the fifteen-page report that had been provided to defense
counsel before the plea was also clearly skeptical regarding the complainant’s story. While the six-page
report included certain details that the fifteen-page report did not, the six-page report did not change
what otherwise appeared to be a strong prosecution case into a weak one. Rather, it revealed
additional problems in what already appeared to be a case with flaws. Further, the record of the
evidentiary hearing reveals that defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the instant charge for pragmatic
reasons that would not have been affected had the six-page report been disclosed prior to the plea.
Defendant had already been sentenced to a ten-year minimum sentence in the CSC I case (the
maximum sentence permissible in the instant case), and a trial of the instant CSC III case would have
been expensive. We conclude that the circuit court did not err in concluding that defense counsel was
not rendered ineffective, and defendant’s plea was not rendered involuntary or unknowing, by the failure
to disclose the six-page report.
Lastly, defendant contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to apply the
standard articulated in People v Schirle, 105 Mich App 381, 385; 306 NW2d 520 (1981), in
determining whether unfulfilled promises of leniency were made by defendant’s trial counsel. If the
prosecutor made an unfulfilled promise of leniency to induce defendant to plead guilty to CSC III, see
People v Haynes (After Remand), 221 Mich App 551, 562; 562 NW2d 241 (1997), or if defense
counsel made an unfulfilled promise of leniency or a misleading statement to defendant, Schirle, supra
at 385, this might be grounds for granting a motion to withdraw the plea. Generally, however, this
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Court will reject a defendant’s assertion that promises of leniency were made where the defendant has
sworn on the record that no such promises were made. Haynes, supra at 562.
Here, defendant swore on the record at the plea proceeding that promises of leniency were not
made to him in connection with his nolo contendere plea to CSC III, and there is no evidence that the
prosecutor or defense counsel conveyed to him any promises of leniency in connection with his CSC III
plea. Rather, the allegation is that such promises were made in connection with his nolo plea to a
separate CSC I charge. Accepting as true defendant’s assertions that he was promised that the instant
CSC III case would be dismissed if he tendered a nolo plea to the CSC I charge, when it became
apparent that the prosecutor intended to pursue the instant CSC III charge, defendant should have
sought to withdraw his plea in the CSC I case, not the case at hand.
Assuming that defendant can challenge the instant plea based on unfulfilled promises made in
exchange for a plea in a different case, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in concluding that
no such promises were made. There was evidence that the prosecutor or defense counsel may have
discussed offering defendant leniency in connection with his nolo plea. Assistant Prosecutor John W.
Stanowski sent a letter to defense counsel in which he stated, “If Defendant wishes to waive and plead
to one C.S.S.-1st Degree [sic] and agree to clear up the rest of the C.S.C. cases, not including
Homicide, then no other cases involving C.S.C. will be authorized in Washtenaw County.” However,
prosecutor Lynwood E. Noah promptly informed defense counsel that William Delhey, the chief
prosecutor, was the sole person who could make an agreement in the CSC I matter. Ultimately, the
agreement that the prosecutor and defense counsel reached in the CSC I case concerned the CSC I
case only. Defense counsel testified that the prosecutor and circuit court agreed to allow defendant to
plead nolo contendere to the CSC I charge with the understanding that if the court decided to sentence
defendant to a minimum term of incarceration that exceeded the guidelines’ recommended sentence of
ten years, defendant would be allowed to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. While defense
counsel was hopeful that the prosecutor would come to regard pursuing the CSC III charge a waste of
prosecutorial resources in light of the fact that defendant was already serving a life sentence for a CSC I
conviction in Jackson County and, therefore, the circuit court would most likely accept a ten-year
sentence in the Washtenaw CSC I case, which it did, there was no agreement that the CSC III charge
would be dismissed.
As to the specific issue whether trial counsel, as opposed to the prosecutor, made
representations that the case would be dismissed, the circuit court concluded that defendant was being
truthful when he said at the time of his plea that no other promises were made to him other than those
stated on the record. Defendant asserts, in effect, that the court was obliged to accept his and his family
members’ testimony that they believed, based on representations of counsel, that the CSC III charge
would be dismissed. We conclude that the testimony, taken as a whole, permitted the circuit court to
reach a contrary conclusion.
As for the instant plea, it is clear that defendant’s plea of nolo contendere to the charge of CSC
III was made both knowingly and voluntarily. Again, defendant acknowledged on the record that he
made his plea understandingly and voluntarily and without a promise of leniency. Moreover, the record
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does not support defendant’s argument that his counsel’s alleged failure to prepare for trial, whether
caused by the police failure to turn over the Eskridge document or defense counsel’s own negligence or
ineptitude, caused him to plead nolo contendere against his will. As his own testimony made clear,
defendant had serious doubts about the legality of Detective Eskridge’s investigation before he decided
to plead nolo contendere. Moreover, defendant was aware before he pleaded that the testimony of the
prosecutor’s prior acts witnesses might prove assailable in a Golochowicz4 hearing. Further, both
counsel and defendant were aware of the weakness of the complainant’s account and identification
testimony. Moreover, even if defendant’s decision to plead nolo contendere was influenced by his trial
counsel’s advice to plead guilty to avoid the expense of trial on the CSC III charge, and trial counsel’s
advice seems bad on hindsight, defendant cannot now seek to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that
he received bad advice of counsel, especially where the facts show that defendant was aware of the
possible defenses that were available to him. See People v Jackson, 203 Mich App 607, 613-614;
513 NW2d 206 (1994). In light of the evidence, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by
denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, and that decision did not result in a miscarriage of
justice.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Helene N. White
1
The sentence in the instant case is to be served concurrently with a ten- to twenty-five-year sentence
imposed for a separate conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I) in Washtenaw
County, and a sentence of life imprisonment imposed in Jackson County for still another conviction of
CSC I. See People v Ewing, 435 Mich 443; 458 NW2d 880 (1990).
2
The lineup was held after the complainant was shown a composite sketch of defendant about four
years after the incident. She viewed the lineup twice and did not identify defendant at the actual lineup,
but afterward told the detective who accompanied her to the lineup that she thought defendant was the
perpetrator.
3
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
4
People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298; 319 NW2d 518 (1982).
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