RAPHAEL WASHINGTON V MARIE ANN WEBSTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RAPHAEL WASHINGTON,
UNPUBLISHED
May 21, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 205557
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-525552 NI
MARIE ANN WEBSTER,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
CITY OF DETROIT and ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a final order of dismissal entered after the trial court granted
summary disposition in favor of defendant Marie Ann Webster (defendant) pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). We reverse and remand for reinstatement of plaintiff’s claim against Webster only.
On June 11, 1996, plaintiff, a Detroit police officer, was struck and injured by a vehicle driven
by defendant. On that day, plaintiff was assigned to a special detail that was providing a motorcycle
escort for a motorcade that was driving a visiting South African dignitary between Pontiac and Detroit.
At the time of the collision, plaintiff and other motorcycle officers dropped out of the motorcade after it
began to rain and took shelter under a highway overpass. After donning protective clothing, the other
motorcycle officers left to rejoin the motorcade. However, plaintiff continued to wait along the side of
the highway. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was struck by defendant’s car. In ruling that plaintiff’s
negligence claim against defendant was barred by the firefighter’s rule, the trial court reasoned:
Because the plaintiff was admittedly on I-75 in connection with his duties as a
traffic officer, the Court finds that the [firefighter’s] rule bars recovery. Plaintiff argues
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that the rule should not apply because he was not injured while in the process of
escorting a motorcade. However, in Stehlik [v Johnson (On Rehearing), 206 Mich
App 83; 520 NW2d 633 (1994)] . . . , the Court held that the rule applied even though
Stehlik was not actually on patrol but was returning from an appearance in court
because he was on duty . . . and was in his patrol area at the time the accident
occurred. Plaintiff here was likewise on duty and in an area to which he had been
assigned.
The firefighter’s rule generally bars police officers from recovering for injuries (1) sustained as a
result of the negligence that caused the officer’s presence, or (2) stemming from the normal risks of the
officer’s profession. Woods v City of Warren, 439 Mich 186, 196; 482 NW2d 696 (1992). “The
rationale for the rule is that ‘the purpose of safety professions is to confront danger and, therefore, the
public should not be liable for damages for injuries occurring in the performance of the very function
police officers . . . are intended to fulfill.’” Atkinson v Detroit, 222 Mich App 7, 10; 564 NW2d 473
(1997), quoting Kreski v Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co, 429 Mich 347, 368; 415 NW2d
178 (1987). A creature of public policy, application of the firefighter’s rule depends in great part on the
specific facts of any given case. Gibbons v Caraway, 455 Mich 314, 322; 565 NW2d 663 (1997).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition because at the time he
was injured he was not engaged in his duties as a police officer. We agree. “On appeal, a trial court’s
determination of a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.” Atkinson, supra at 9. A
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
tests the factual basis underlying a plaintiff’s claim. MCR 2.116(C)(10) permits
summary disposition when, except for the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue
concerning any material fact and the moving party is entitled to damages as a matter of
law. A court reviewing such a motion must consider the pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in favor of the opposing party and
grant the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing party. [Stehlik v Johnson
(On Rehearing), 206 Mich App 83, 85; 520 NW2d 633 (1994).]
After reviewing the documentary evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that
plaintiff’s claim should not be barred because such an action does not further the public policy rationale
which underlies the firefighter’s rule. Plaintiff had dropped out of the motorcade to take shelter from a
downpour, approximately ten minutes had elapsed since the motorcade left the area, and the traffic that
had been blocked by the police escort had been released. Plaintiff was not blocking ramps or
intersections, the duties performed by motorcade escorts, but was waiting for the weather to clear so he
could rejoin the motorcade and resume those duties. See Atkinson, supra at 11 (observing that the
plaintiff-officer in that case “was not engaged in his specific police assignment . . . at the time of his
injury”). Instead, he was injured during a discretionary break in his motorcade duties. See id. We do
not believe that plaintiff’s injury stems from the normal risks associated with his profession. Woods,
supra at 196. Accordingly, we reverse the trial
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court’s decision to grant summary disposition in favor of defendant and remand for reinstatement of
plaintiff’s action against her.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
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