PEOPLE OF MI V SHANNON T JAMISON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 30, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204810
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-146293 FC
SHANNON T. JAMISON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Doctoroff, and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial conviction of delivery of 225 to 649 grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(ii), for which he was sentenced to twenty
to thirty years’ imprisonment. Defendant was originally charged with possession with intent to deliver
650 or more grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i), and delivery of
225 to 649 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(ii). We affirm.
First, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecution’s loss of the tape
recording made by the police informant during the drug transaction for which defendant was convicted.
We disagree. We review constitutional questions de novo. People v Pitts, 222 Mich App 260, 263;
564 NW2d 93 (1997).
Due Process requires that criminal prosecutions comport with notions of fundamental fairness.
California v Trombetta, 467 US 479, 485; 104 S Ct 2528, 2532; 81 L Ed 2d 413 (1984). This
means that a criminal defendant must have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.
Trombetta, supra, 467 US 485; 104 S Ct 2532; 81 L Ed 2d 413. “To safeguard that right, the Court
has developed what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence.”
Trombetta, supra, 467 US 485; 104 S Ct 2532; 81 L Ed 2d 413. In Brady v Maryland, 373 US
83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194, 1196-1197; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held
that:
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the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
The Brady rule requires the prosecutor to disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused, evidence
that if suppressed would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. United States v Bagley, 473 US 667,
675; 105 S Ct 3375, 3380; 87 L Ed 2d 481 (1985). The “materiality of the evidence” requirement
mandates that the suppressed evidence may have affected the outcome of the trial. Bagley, supra, 473
US 674-675; 105 S Ct 3379; 87 L Ed 2d 481. “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Bagley, supra, 473 US 682, 685; 105 S Ct 3383, 3385; 87 L Ed 2d 481 (opinion
Blackmun, J.) (White concurring).
In Trombetta, supra, the concern expressed regarding “potentially exculpatory evidence” that
is permanently lost is that the import of the materials are unknown to the defendant and oftentimes
disputed. Trombetta, supra, 467 US 486; 104 S Ct 2533; 81 L Ed 2d 413. However, in the instant
case, defendant’s attorney heard the contents of the cassette tape at the preliminary examination before
the cassette tape was lost. Moreover, an evidentiary hearing was held to determine whether the tape
recorded conversation was material to defendant’s case. Accordingly, the import of the cassette tape
was not unknown to defendant. Trombetta, supra, 467 US 486; 104 S Ct 2533; 81 L Ed 2d 413.
In spite of this knowledge, defendant fails to offer a concrete explanation of how the missing
cassette tape would have been favorable and material to his defense. United States v ValenzuelaBernal, 458 US 858, 872; 102 S Ct 3440, 3449; 73 L Ed 2d 1193 (1982). Defendant cannot
establish a violation without “making some plausible explanation of the assistance he would have
received from” the introduction into evidence of the cassette tape. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, 458 US
871; 102 S Ct 3448; 73 L Ed 2d 1193. Defendant has offered no such explanation. Accordingly, this
Court will not reverse defendant’s conviction.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s request for an
instruction regarding the missing tape recording. We disagree. The determination whether a jury
instruction is accurate and applicable in view of all the factors present in a particular case lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court. People v Perry, 218 Mich App 520, 526; 554 NW2d 362 (1996).
In People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 514-515; 503 NW2d 457 (1993), the defendant
argued that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that, if the prosecution failed to make
reasonable efforts to preserve material evidence, the jury may infer that the evidence would have been
favorable to the defendant. The Davis Court held that because the defendant did not demonstrate that
the prosecution acted in bad faith in failing to produce the evidence and because the evidence simply did
not exist or could not be located, failure to give the instruction was not error. Davis, supra, 199 Mich
App 515.
Defendant argues that Davis, supra, is inapplicable because the defendant, in that case, was
required to establish bad faith on the part of the prosecution and in the instant case defendant was not
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required to make such a showing. Defendant is correct in his assertion that he was not required to
establish bad faith on the prosecution’s part. Brady, supra, 373 US 87; 83 S Ct 11996-1197; 10 L
Ed 2d 215. However, the same reasoning applies.
In Davis, supra, this Court ruled that the trial court did not err in failing to give a missing
evidence instruction because the defendant failed to establish bad faith on the part of the prosecution
which the defendant was required to do. Davis, supra, 199 Mich App 515. In the instant case, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in denying a missing evidence instruction because defendant
failed to make a showing that the evidence was material in that it would have affected the outcome of
the trial. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, 458 US 871; 102 S Ct 3448; 73 L Ed 2d 1193.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it read the jury the
standard jury instruction regarding flight. We disagree.
In order to give a particular instruction to a jury, it is necessary that there be evidence to support
the giving of that instruction. People v Johnson, 171 Mich App 801,804; 430 NW2d 828 (1988).
The term “flight” has been defined as fleeing the scene of the crime, leaving the jurisdiction, running from
the police, resisting arrest and attempting to escape custody. People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 4;
532 NW2d 885 (1995). Evidence was introduced at trial to support a flight instruction, i.e., that
defendant ran from the police in an attempt to avoid arrest. Coleman, supra, 210 Mich App 4; People
v Biegajski, 122 Mich App 215, 220; 332 NW2d 413 (1982).
When Deputy Dare entered the apartment, he saw defendant running toward the stairs and
chased him upstairs. Deputy Dare chased defendant into a bedroom where he tackled defendant on the
bed and handcuffed him. Accordingly, there was evidence to support the trial court’s reading of the
flight instruction to the jury, and as a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Helene N. White
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