JANE OWENS V CHRYSLER CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JANE OWENS,
UNPUBLISHED
April 27, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
CHRYSLER CORPORATION and THOMAS I.
SHEPPARD,
No. 205210
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-525019 CZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-appellant Jane Owens appeals as of right the trial court’s orders granting defendants’
motion for summary disposition regarding her discrimination claim, denying her motion for rehearing or
reconsideration, dismissing her defamation claim, and denying her motion for reconsideration and/or
reinstatement. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
Defendant-Appellee Chrysler Corporation (“Chrysler”) hired Owens, a female AfricanAmerican, in January, 1977. Correspondence in Owens’ personnel file indicated that her supervisors
were pleased with her performance.
In 1993, however, Owens updated her employee personnel file to reflect that she had
completed the requirements for a Bachelors Degree from Wayne State University in December, 1992.
In June, 1994, Owens again revised her personnel file, listing that she had a BA degree from Wayne
State University. Owens had been asked twice to submit proof of her degree, but did not submit any
proof until June, 1994, when she was requested for the third time to submit proof of her degree.
Owens’ academic advisor at Wayne State, at Owens’ request, indicated in a correspondence that
Owens had completed graduation requirements in the fall of 1992. However, pursuant to
correspondence from the personnel administrative supervisor at Wayne State University, as of midMay, 1995, Owens had attended, but had not received a degree from that University.
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Owens admitted in her deposition that when she modified her personnel file to show that she
had received her degree from Wayne State University, she did not have her degree. She testified that
she “falsified [her] PHR to reflect that [she] had a bachelors degree.” Owens further testified that she
understood she had received her degree pursuant to information she had received from Wayne State
University and that she subsequently learned that she was five credits short of qualifying for her degree.
Owens subsequently received her Bachelor’s Degree in interdisciplinary studies in May, 1996.
In early February, 1994, defendant-appellee Thomas I. Sheppard issued a written reprimand to
Owens alleging she was “unprofessional, abusive and insubordinate” during a meeting between the two
of them. The letter alleged that Owens stated that Sheppard “. . . didn’t know a god damn thing about
pensions” and otherwise directed obscenities at Sheppard. In addition, Sheppard reprimanded Owens
regarding the inaccuracy of her time card and for reporting extended lunch hours and personal time
away from the plant as overtime. Owens wrote a letter of rebuttal which stated, in part:
The fictious [sic] statements that have were [sic] written in this letter does not reflect my
charter [sic] as a professional individual. This letter is far from the truth and is
incriminating libel literature. I feel this letter was written by Tom Sheppard with efforts
of demoralizing my self-esteem, self-respect and dignity as a female. I also feel this
letter was part of a personal endeavor against me and ongoing hostile harassment from
Tom Sheppard for the past two years.
During her deposition, Owens denied using the obscenities, but admitted to calling Sheppard a “stupid
fat ass.”
In late June, 1995, Sheppard advised Owens that he had received information that she had not
obtained a Bachelors Degree from Wayne State University as she had claimed. Although Owens asked
Sheppard if she was going to have a chance to resolve the discrepancy between her belief that she had
received a degree and the information he had received, he refused her the opportunity and told her to
gather her belongings and leave immediately.
Chrysler terminated Owens from her employment in late June, 1995. The letter of discharge
stated the following:
You have repeatedly claimed to be a graduate of Wayne State University but
have failed to provide substantiation to support this claim. In June of 1994, you
submitted a Personnel History Record and a Salaried Personnel Development Data
Form again claiming to have a Bachelors Degree but again failed to provide the
supporting documentation. The fact that you had not provided proof of degree was
also noted on the Career Interest/Development section of the 1994 Performance
Appraisal.
In May of 1995 you submitted a letter again claiming to have graduated from
Wayne State in an attempt to substantiate your claim. A verification check at Wayne
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State’s Central Records revealed that you had not met degree requirements and have
not graduated.
This lack of integrity and gross misconduct is in violation of the Corporation’s
Standards of conduct-Rule #1 and will not be tolerated.
You are now advised that your employment with Chrysler Corporation is
terminated immediately.
Signed: T. Sheppard
Owens filed her complaint against defendants in late August, 1995. She alleged defendants
violated the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq (the
“ELCRA”) because she was disciplined for acts for which white employees who committed the same
acts were not disciplined.1 Owens further alleged defamation as a result of the memo placed in her
personnel file indicating that she had demonstrated unprofessional, abusive and insubordinate conduct
during a meeting. Moreover, Owens alleged that Sheppard made slanderous statements to three
employees which were false and defamatory and caused harm to her reputation. 2
Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10).
Defendants argued that Owens’ race discrimination claim failed because “plaintiff cannot rebut
Chrysler’s articulated non-discriminatory reason for having terminated her employment.” Moreover,
defendants argued that Owens’ defamation claim was privileged, untimely and failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact.
In the hearing of defendants’ motion, Owens’ counsel agreed that Sheppard had a qualified
privilege, as Owens’ employer, to write the reprimand of Owens. However, Owens’ counsel argued
that the privilege was lost because Sheppard wrote the reprimand with malice. In support of the claim
of malice, Owens’ counsel pointed out that it was Sheppard who called Wayne State University to
determine whether Owen had received a degree and never provided her with an opportunity to explain
the discrepancy. Moreover, Owens’ counsel argued, Sheppard was the one who signed Owens’
termination letter. Owens’ counsel also argued that proof that Owens was terminated because she was
a black female was shown by the fact that defendants hired a white male, who had also falsified his
educational background; Owens’ counsel admitted, however, that he had no evidence to show that
Sheppard’s participation in the hiring of this individual was more than merely the presentation of
information.
The trial court ruled on defendants’ motion for summary disposition, as follows:
So the Court will decline to grant the summary disposition as relates to the two denied
statements of defamation. It was my understanding, and therefore the question of
defamation goes forward on those two assertions, the g.d. and the too stupid. On the
issue of the Elliott-Larsen claim, this focuses solely on, I think, I guess it doesn’t solely,
because I’m going to say solely on two things, can’t do that.
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Focus on two issues, one, whether or not Mr. Shepard [sic] was a decision maker who
was able to affect the wages, hours, terms or conditions of employment of Ms. Owens
and did so based upon race and/or sex, and whether or not the plaintiff can meet her
burden of going forward on pretext.
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Shepard [sic] was a decision maker or a person with significant
influence on the decision to terminate Ms. Owens due to her failure to obtain a degree
and her assertion that she had one on employment papers.
She alleges this in part because she says that Mr. Shepard treated, approached the
situation relative to Ms. Owens’ termination differently than his approach to the situation
regarding Mr. Johnstone. In support of this, she has offered deposition testimony of
Mr. Brown and of Mr. Fox. Mr. Fox indicating that he based his decisions on
information from the plant without a specific person from whom he got it, and Mr.
Brown’s admission that he received information from Mr. Shepard on both Ms. Owens
and Mr. Johnstone. In looking at the Johnstone situation, the Court can see that the
ultimate result was different, certainly. That he was, in fact, hired and kept on and that
Ms. Owens was, in fact, terminated.
In the Johnstone situation, there is no evidence but that the decision to hire Mr.
Johnstone was made in concert with persons from the hiring committee, whose names
I’m not going to try to remember or pronounce and Mr. Brown.
There is no testimony upon which the rationale [sic] trier of fact could make an inference
that Mr. Shepard proceeded favorably relative to Mr. Johnstone. This leaves us, then,
to look to whether or not Mr. Shepard acted negatively as relates to Ms. Owens.
Plaintiff alleges that he acted negatively as relates to Ms. Owens by virtue of his
presenting – no, by virtue of his failure to convene a meeting prior to the
recommendation to terminate from Mr. Brown to Mr. Fox. There is no showing that he
convened a meeting relative to Mr. Johnstone, so the Court can’t find that this is a
difference.
The next assertion is that he acted differently in the manner of his presentation of
material. The plaintiff would have the Court assume that only portions of a file were
given in the case of Ms. Owens, and that the mere selection of the materials significantly
influenced the decision. The Record, however, is absolutely void as to information –
any information as to whether all of Mr. Johnstone’s file was presented to Mr. Brown
or not. That being the case, the Court can’t find that there was – that Mr. Johnstone
was treated differently relative to the selection of materials to be presented to Mr.
Brown differently than Ms. Owens.
The Court cannot find that the plaintiff meets her burden of going forward of showing
that Mr. Shepard as a decision maker or a significant person of influence treated Ms.
Owens differently than Mr. Shepard treated Mr. Johnstone, the Court believes,
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reluctantly, that Ms. Owens[’] claim under Elliott-Larsen has to be dismissed. The case
will go forward on the defamation claim.
Owens filed a motion for rehearing or reconsideration on defendants’ motion for summary disposition
arguing that a palpable error was committed and that she had produced sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable juror could conclude that she was discriminated against because of her race and sex. The
trial court denied the motion, stating that it was not persuaded of error.
A Notice of Trial was sent to the parties in early December, 1996. The notice stated the
following:
1. This case is scheduled for trial no earlier than 4/28/97 and no later than 5/19 in
room 1719 City-County Building for 7 days.
2. Jury selection will occur on 5/19/97, or on the day of trial, if trial commences before
that date.
3. You will receive no less than twenty-four hours telephonic notice before jury
selection if the date is other than the one at number 2, and at least forty-eight hours
notice before commencement of trial unless it occurs on the last date in number 1.
[Appendix F.]
Owens’ counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel in late February, 1997. The motion indicated
that the relationship between Owens and counsel had broken down and that counsel’s firm could not
litigate the case because it placed an unreasonable financial burden on the firm. The trial court granted
the motion in mid-March, 1997, and gave Owens twenty-nine days to secure further counsel. The
order also indicated that a status conference would take place in mid-April, 1997, and that “the trial
scheduled for April 28, 1997/May 19, 1997 [was] not postponed.”
Owens sent the trial court correspondence dated late March, 1997, requesting additional time
to find counsel and requesting an explanation of the order to withdraw as counsel. The trial court
responded in correspondence to both parties:
The order indicates that there will be an in-person status conference on April 14, 1997
at 10:00 a.m. The trial date continues to be between April 28, 1997 and May 19,
1997. A stay is in effect until April 11, 199 [sic]. After that date if you do not have
new counsel you may proceed representing yourself.
Please remember that you must appear on April 14, 1997 either by yourself or with an
attorney. Failure to appear may result in dismissal of your case.
Owens filed a motion to adjourn trial in late April, 1997. In the motion, Owens indicated that although
she had diligently sought new counsel, she was unable to locate such counsel as a result of the pending
trial date. Owens requested a ninety-day adjournment of the trial date. During the hearing on this
motion, on May 9, 1997, the trial court ruled as follows:
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I am not going to adjourn the trial on an, if, if a lawyer comes in.
If a lawyer comes in who shows up in this courtroom and says, I have in my right hand
an appearance, I have in my left hand a motion to withdraw, and I will do one, if you
give me the other then I’m prepared to do that.
On May 19, 1997, when Owens did not appear as required by the notice of trial, the trial court
entered an order dismissing the case pursuant to MCR 2.504(B)(1). Owens filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or for reinstatement in early June, 1997, in propria persona. Owens argued that she
was not provided with notice that she had to appear in trial court on May 19, 1997. The trial court
denied Owens’ motion.
II. Standard Of Review
A. Summary Disposition
MCR 2.116(C)(10) permits summary disposition when “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial
judgment as a matter of law.” When deciding a motion for summary disposition, a court must consider
the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, admissions and other documentary evidence available to it in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on
which reasonable minds could differ. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co v Stark, 437 Mich 175, 184-185;
468 NW2d 498 (1991); Shirilla v Detroit, 208 Mich App 434, 437; 528 NW2d 763 (1995). “[A]n
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but must, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” MCR 2.116(G)(4). This Court reviews the grant of summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10) de novo. McGuirk Sand & Gravel, Inc v Meridian Mut Ins Co, 220 Mich App
347, 352; 559 NW2d 93 (1996).
B. Abuse of Discretion
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to dismiss an action under the abuse of discretion
standard. Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 506; 536 NW2d 280 (1995).
III. Summary Disposition
Owens argues that a question of fact exists concerning whether defendants discriminated against
her on the basis of her gender or race. We disagree.
In an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ELCRA by showing that the plaintiff was a member of a class entitled to
protection under the statute and that, for the same or similar conduct, she was treated differently by the
employer than a person outside that class. Reisman v Regents Wayne State Univ, 188 Mich App
526, 538; 470 NW2d 678 (1991).
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Once a plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a prima facie case of
discrimination exists, for purposes of the ELCRA, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Town v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 455 Mich
688, 695; 568 NW2d 64 (1997) (Brickley, J.); Reisman, supra at 539. If the defendant is able to
articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the plaintiff is then given the opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons for its actions, but were a mere pretext for proscribed discrimination. Town, supra at 696-698
(Brickley, J.); Reisman, supra at 539.
Applying these standards and viewing the evidence at trial in a light most favorable to Owens,
we are persuaded that she did not carry her burden of proof sufficient to support an inference that
defendants intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of race or gender or that defendants’
actions against her were motivated by racial or gender considerations. As an African-American female,
Owens was able to establish that she was a member of two classes entitled to protection under the
statute. However, she was unable to show that she was treated differently because she was an AfricanAmerican or female. There was testimony that when Chrysler learned that a white female employee did
not have her Master’s Degree as she claimed, Chrysler also terminated that white female’s employment.
However, there was also testimony regarding a white male who misrepresented his education
background in a resume he sent to Chrysler. Although the white male told the individuals who
interviewed him that he did not have a college degree as he claimed in his resume, Chrysler nevertheless
hired him.
We find that the white female was in the same or similar circumstances as Owens and that the
white female received substantially the same treatment as Owens . However, we find that the white
male applicant was not engaged in the same or similar conduct as Owens. The white male was not an
employee of Chrysler when he misrepresented his educational background and he advised Chrysler of
the misrepresentation prior to being hired. Owens was an employee of Chrysler when she
misrepresented her background and presumably would have benefited from her misrepresentation
during the remainder of her career at Chrysler. Thus, Owens’ conduct was significantly more egregious
than the apparent misconduct by the white male prior to his employment.
In addition, although Owens argued that Sheppard was the only employee of Chrysler who
discriminated against her, she did not present any evidence that Sheppard was involved in the decision
to terminate her. Therefore, because Owens failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination (or
to present direct evidence of discriminatory animus in relation to her discharge, Harrison v Olde
Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 609-610; 572 NW2d 679 (1997)), we hold that summary
disposition on her discrimination claims was proper.
IV. Abuse Of Discretion
Owens argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for reconsideration
of the order dismissing her defamation claim when she failed to appear for the day scheduled to begin
trial or for reinstatement. We again disagree.
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As noted above, Owens’ attorney withdrew subsequent to the dismissal of her discrimination
claim and the receipt of the notice of trial. Owens did not retain new counsel prior to the date
scheduled for trial. When Owens failed to appear for the beginning of trial, the trial court dismissed the
case pursuant to MCR 2.504(B)(1). Owens then filed a motion for rehearing pursuant to MCR
2.119(F) and 2.612(C)(1)(a) and (f), asserting that the trial court erred because she had a valid excuse
for not appearing on the first day of trial and that she had never before shown a disregard of the trial
court’s orders.
Owens argues that she was unaware that she had to appear for trial on May 19, 1997, despite
the trial notice. Although Owens indicated her confusion regarding the meaning of this notice through
correspondence to the trial court, the trial court responded in correspondence, as noted above, with the
statement that,
The trial date continues to be between April 28, 1997 and May 19, 1997. A stay is in
effect until April 11, 199 [sic]. After that date if you do not have new counsel you may
proceed representing yourself.
Moreover, Owens showed her awareness of the date scheduled for trial in her motion to adjourn trial, in
which she indicated that she was unable to locate new counsel because new attorneys were reluctant to
take the case because of the pending trial date. Furthermore, the trial court specifically stated during the
hearing of Owens’ motion to adjourn trial that it would not adjourn trial.
In light of this evidence, we find it incredible that Owens was unaware that trial was scheduled
to commence on May 19, 1997, and that she should appear before the trial court. As Owens did not
demonstrate “a palpable error” entitling her to reconsideration, MCR 2.119(F), we hold that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion, Vicencio, supra, in denying Owens’ motion for reconsideration.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
However, Owens testified in her deposition that only Sheppard discriminated against her.
2
Owens also claimed wrongful discharge for discharging her without just cause. However, she
subsequently conceded that this claim should be dismissed.
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