PEOPLE OF MI V WALI ABDULLAH AHMAD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 30, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 205653
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 97-140439 FH
WALI ABDULLAH AHMAD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Smolenski and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.479; MSA
28.747, fleeing and eluding a police officer, MCL 750.479a; MSA 28.747(1), and driving on a
suspended license, MCL 257.904(1); MSA 9.2604(1). Defendant appeals of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
This case arises out of an incident which began in the early morning hours in mid-March, 1997
in Muskegon. Officer Roger DeYoung testified at trial that he received a police safety bulletin regarding
a yellow 1982 Lincoln, that was possibly being driven by Darese Sanders, a wanted felon who was
believed to be armed, wearing a bulletproof vest and dangerous to police. When Officer Chris
Mandoka spotted the 1982 yellow Lincoln and attempted to stop the vehicle, it fled. When asked how
he knew the driver of the Lincoln was fleeing, Officer Mandoka stated:
[I]t’s very difficult not to notice the siren on our cruisers let alone the overheads and
then the high beams. You’d have to be blind not to see this car and especially if it’s a
fully marked white with reflectors cruiser, you don’t miss them. You can’t miss them.
Officer Mandoka testified that he pursued the Lincoln, whose driver was later apprehended and
identified as defendant. Before he was apprehended, defendant led the police on a relatively high-speed
chase. Officer DeYoung testified that, when he first encountered defendant in the Lincoln, defendant
tried to hit Officer DeYoung’s patrol car head-on and that Officer DeYoung was forced to drive up
onto the curb to avoid the collision. Officer DeYoung stated that, when defendant tried to hit him,
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defendant was driving sixty to seventy miles per hour and was being pursued by another patrol car,
which had its overhead lights and flashing high beams activated.
Officer DeYoung testified that, after he rejoined the pursuit, he observed defendant accelerating
through stop signs at speeds as fast as eighty miles per hour. Officer Pete Boterenbrood testified that,
when he was in pursuit of defendant, he observed no brake lights coming on as defendant passed
through stop signs at speeds as high as seventy miles per hour. Officer DeYoung stated that defendant
did not yield as he went through a stop sign and struck a Blazer in the rear quarter panel, tearing the
bumper loose and spinning the vehicle around.
After the collision, defendant abandoned the Lincoln and fled on foot. The officers in pursuit of
defendant identified themselves as police and y
elled for defendant to stop. Officer Boterenbrood
testified that when he pursued defendant he was in uniform and that he eventually stopped identifying
himself as a police officer because it had become obvious that he was a police officer, the officers were
pursuing defendant, and defendant was not going to stop. Officer Boterenbrood testified that
defendant’s flight ended in a parking lot where, while defendant ran between two parked cars, he was
cut off by a police cruiser in front. Officer Jeff Geiger testified that he drove the cruiser that stopped in
front of defendant.
Officer Boterenbrood also testified that, when defendant’s path was blocked by the police car
in front and two parked cars on either side, defendant turned and faced Officer Boterenbrood, who was
the first officer in pursuit behind defendant. Officer Boterenbrood further testified that defendant’s body
language indicated to him that defendant was not trying to fight, but rather was trying to escape past the
officer. When defendant attempted to pass Officer Boterenbrood, the officer threw his shoulder into
defendant, causing defendant to collide with one of the parked cars and fall to the ground.
Several of the officers testified that, once on the ground, defendant continued to resist by putting
his arms underneath himself and resisting being handcuffed. Officer DeYoung testified that, after a brief
struggle, the five or six officers at the scene were able to take defendant into custody.
The prosecutor and defense counsel entered a stipulation that stated that:
[T]he defendant - - Wali Abdullah Ahmad’s - - his operator’s license was suspended
or revoked on or about March 13, 1997, and he knew that it was suspended or
revoked.
Defendant called no witnesses at trial and, as noted above, the jury found the defendant guilty of all
three counts. In his statement to the probation officer who conducted defendant’s presentence
investigation, and at his allocution at sentencing, defendant stated that he was doing a favor for the
owner of the vehicle by retrieving the car for its owner. Defendant further stated that his flight was
motivated by the fact that he was on parole at the time and was “high” on cocaine.
At the sentencing, the trial court found sufficient evidence that defendant was an habitual
offender who had been convicted of his third felony offense. The trial court considered this in adjusting
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the guidelines which had been scored at six to twelve months for defendant’s conviction for resisting and
obstructing a police officer. The trial court also considered defendant’s prior record, including his
parole status at the time of the current offenses, the severity of the offenses, defendant’s rehabilitative
potential, and other prevalent sentencing considerations before pronouncing sentence.
II. Standard Of Review
This Court reviews the proportionality of defendant’s sentence for an abuse of discretion by the
trial court. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Defendant has caused a
copy of his presentence report to be provided to this Court and has argued the issue of proportionality
of sentence on appeal. This is sufficient to preserve this issue for review. People v Hill, 221 Mich App
391, 397; 561 NW2d 862 (1997); People v Oswald, 208 Mich App 444, 446; 528 NW2d 782
(1995); MCR 7.212(C)(6).
III. Sentencing Proportionality
The only issue raised by defendant on appeal is whether his sentence of two to four years for his
conviction for resisting and obstructing a police officer violates the principle of proportionality. We hold
that it did not.
First, we note that the trial court found sufficient evidence to sentence defendant as an habitual
offender pursuant to MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083, increasing the maximum possible sentence for this
crime from two years to four years. Next, the sentencing guidelines are not applicable to this defendant
as an habitual offender. People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 612; 560 NW2d 354 (1996).
The highest minimum sentence that could be given under the law is two-thirds of the maximum sentence,
or twenty-eight months. People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 690; 199 NW2d 202 (1972). The
sentence given by the trial court is less than is allowable under Tanner. Id.
We have reviewed the transcript of the trial, the transcript of the sentencing hearing and
defendant’s brief and find that defendant’s habitual offender status, lack of prior rehabilitation, parole
status at the time of the current offenses, and the danger caused by defendant driving up to eighty miles
per hour through stop signs while, on his own admission, “high” on cocaine, make defendant’s sentence
proportionate to the offense and the offender. Milbourn, supra, 435 Mich 636. Therefore, we find no
abuse of discretion. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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