THOMAS ELECTRIC LC V SAGINAW SCHOOL DISTRICT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THOMAS ELECTRIC, L.C.,
UNPUBLISHED
March 9, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 203531
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 96-015231 CZ
SAGINAW SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: White, P.J., and Markman and Young, Jr., JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Thomas Electric, L.C. appeals as of right an order granting summary disposition to
defendant School District of the City of Saginaw pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm.
This equal protection case arose in the spring of 1996 when defendant began taking bids for the
reconstruction of two parking lots in the school district. Plaintiff, a non-union contractor, entered an
electrical subcontracting bid with a general contractor, Pyramid Paving Company (Pyramid) and its
owner Bruce Weiss, who then bid on the reconstruction project. The advertisement of the
reconstruction and bidding process contained the following reservation:
The subject reserves the right to waive any informality in any bid, to reject any or all
bids, or accept any bid which is considered most favorable to the Owner.
The bid notice itself obtained from the school district contained the following language:
RIGHT OF THE OWNER TO ACCEPT OR REJECT BIDS. The Owner reserves
the right to accept or reject any and all bids, or parts thereof, and to waive any
irregularities in the bid except those specifically mentioned above.
This language is similar to that in MCL 380.1267(5); MSA 15.41267(5), which states that, in
connection with the construction of a new school building, “[t]he board or board of directors may reject
any or all bids.”
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The lowest bid was eventually submitted by Pyramid. However, each contract relating to the
parking lots had to be approved by the Saginaw School Board, and defendant requested a list from
Pyramid of all of its proposed subcontractors. Daniel Lapan, the director of buildings and grounds for
defendant, said that he investigated the list of subcontractors in order to determine if there had been
problems in the past with any of them. According to Lapan, there were some concerns with plaintiff
arising from his work on a previous job-- the paving of the Career Opportunity Center (COC)-- where
Lapan had been required to investigate out-of-state “scab labor” brought in by plaintiff to work on the
project. Lapan stated that two board members had prompted this earlier investigation by making
inquiries into plaintiff’s hiring practices, and that his investigation revealed that plaintiff had retained one
worker from out-of-state to work for him, but that he was not in violation of any school district policy.
After completing the investigation in the instant case, Lapan concluded that he had no problems
working with plaintiff. He subsequently recommended that all subcontractors be approved, including
plaintiff. According to Lapan, after he makes a recommendation, it then has to be approved by the
buildings and grounds committee of the school district. For reasons not communicated to Lapan,
plaintiff was vetoed as a subcontractor by this committee.
After sending the school district a list of the subcontractors, Weiss claimed he was told that
there might be a problem with plaintiff because plaintiff was non-union. Weiss was also allegedly told
that defendant did not want to use plaintiff because he was not licensed in Saginaw. Richard Powell,
defendant’s Director of Facilities, said that he did not accept plaintiff’s bid on the parking lot job
because Powell had spent approximately two weeks the previous summer trying to determine if plaintiff
was in conformance with board policy regarding prevailing wage payments, costing his office time and
money. Powell further said that no one had spoken to him about plaintiff’s non-union status. Lapan
also stated that the bid instructions and the contracts used by the school district did not require union
contractors, nor had anyone expressed to him a desire for union contractors. In the end, the electrical
subcontract bid for the parking lot jobs was awarded to a union electrician.
On July 25, 1996, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging two counts: intentional
interference with a contract when defendant “unreasonably objected” to plaintiff as a subcontractor for
Pyramid, and intentional interference with a business relationship or expectancy when defendant
“induced or otherwise caused Pyramid Paving Company to disrupt or terminate” the business
relationship with plaintiff. On December 10, 1996, after taking depositions, defendant filed a motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion,
arguing that defendant violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights when it rejected his bid based on his non
union status. Plaintiff argued that, because he was bidding on a governmental contract, defendant was
prohibited by the equal protection clause from discriminating against him. However, plaintiff never
sought to amend his complaint to add an equal protection claim. On May 6, 1997, the trial court issued
its order and opinion granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition. The lower court held that
the ‘right to reject’ clause included in the bidding contract was valid and enforceable based on MCL
380.1267; MSA 15.41267 and Leavy v City of Jackson, 247 Mich 447, 450; 226 NW 214 (1929).
The court also determined that defendant’s reason for rejecting plaintiff's bid, i.e., wanting to avoid a
repeat of past problems with plaintiff, was valid. However, the court stated that “even if defendant
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denied plaintiff the subcontract based on plaintiff’s non-union status. . . defendant was entitled to do
so,” because nonunion or union status does not constitute a protected class for purposes of equal
protection analysis. The court stated that since it had granted defendant’s motion on equal protection
grounds, it need not discuss “the other issues raised in this motion,” apparently referring to plaintiff’s
tortious interference with a contract, and tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy
claims.
Plaintiff has not raised its claims of tortious interference with a contract, and tortious interference
with a business relationship or expectancy, on appeal. Plaintiff only argues here that the trial court erred
when it granted summary disposition to defendant u
nder MCR 2.116(C)(8) because the denial of
plaintiff’s bid based on his status as a non-union contractor violated his constitutional equal protection
rights.1 This Court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo to determine if the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stehlik v Johnson (On Rehearing), 206
Mich App 83, 85; 520 NW2d 633 (1994).
MCR 2.116(C)(8) permits summary disposition when the opposing party has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion under this subsection
determines whether the opposing party’s pleadings allege a prima facie case. The court
must accept as true all well-pleaded facts. Only if the allegations fail to state a legal
claim is summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) valid. [Id.]
The federal and the Michigan State Constitution co-extensively provide for equal protection of
the laws, US Const, Am XIV, § 1; Const 1963, art 1, § 2. City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living
Center, 473 US 432, 439; 105 S Ct 3249; 87 L Ed 2d 313 (1985); Frame v Nehls, 452 Mich 171,
183; 550 NW2d 739 (1996). Since the United States Supreme Court has determined that union/non
union classifications deserve only the most limited form of equal protection review-- the level of review
accorded to any mere legislative or state classification-- we must apply the rational basis test in the case
at hand. Lyng v UAW, 485 US 360, 370; 108 S Ct 1184; 99 L Ed 2d 380 (1988); Hoke Co, Inc v
Tennessee Valley Authority, 854 F2d 820, 828 (CA 6, 1988). Legislation and state action will be
upheld if a classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Cleburne, supra at 440; Neal
v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 226 Mich App 701, 717; 575 NW2d 68 (1997). This rational basis test
is “typically quite deferential and legislative classifications are ‘presumed to be valid.’” Lyng, supra at
370, quoting Massachusetts Board of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307, 314; 96 S Ct 2562; 49 L
Ed 2d 520 (1976). This is because “the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative
task and an unavoidable one.” Id. Particularly in cases involving social and economic benefits, the
courts have consistently refused to invalidate on equal protection grounds state action that they deem
“unwise or unartfully drawn.” United States Railroad Retirement Board v Fritz, 449 US 166, 174;
101 S Ct 453; 66 L Ed 2d 368 (1980). As long as the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ the
equal protection clause does not allow courts to impose their views as to what constitutes wise
economic or social policy. Id. Further, the rational basis test is satisfied when the action is supported
by any state of facts either known or that could reasonably be assumed. Neal, supra at 719. “The
Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
processes.” Cleburne, supra at 440.
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In Hoke, supra, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a case that appears to be directly
on point with the case at hand here. There, the plaintiff argued that by choosing to award a coal
purchase contract to a union contractor, rather than to the plaintiff, a non-union contractor, the
defendant discriminated against non-union coal contractor in violation of equal protection. The Court of
Appeals assumed, for the purposes of analyzing the claim, that Hoke’s non-union status was the sole
reason that TVA awarded the contract to the union contractor instead of Hoke. Id. at 828. The court
found that “in Lyng v UAW, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether union members
constituted a protected class for purposes of equal protection analysis and found that they did not. . .
nor do union or non-union contractors.” Id. at 828 (citation omitted). Thus, the court applied the
rational basis test and although it stated that its opinion should not serve as a “carte blanche
authorization to favor union contractors over non-union contractors in the award of bids for public
contracts without the presence of other relevant extenuating circumstances,” the court found that the
determination was rationally related to a legitimate government interest in the effective operation of the
TVA. Id. at 828-29.
In the case at hand, plaintiff similarly argues that defendant violated equal protection by choosing
a union subcontractor over plaintiff, a non-union subcontractor.2 In analyzing the trial court’s
determination that plaintiff failed to state a claim for an equal protection violation, we accept as true for
the purposes of this appeal plaintiff’s allegation that his bid was rejected because he was not a union
subcontractor. MCR 2.116(C)(8). Accordingly, we apply the rational basis test to the facts of this
case to determine whether a union distinction here was rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. We begin with the presumption that the action of the representatives of the people in Saginaw
County was valid. Lyng, supra at 370. The burden of proving that this action lacks a rational basis,
and is therefore arbitrary, rests with plaintiff. Neal, supra at 719. Although plaintiff here recognizes the
determination in Hoke, supra, that the award of a bid on the basis of union status was rationally related
to a legitimate government interest, and thus did not violate equal protection, plaintiff argues that this
conclusion was based on the unique circumstances of that case and does not apply here.3 However, we
need not rely exclusively on defendant’s explanation-- or lack thereof here-- in evaluating whether there
is a rational basis to defendant’s action, but instead may base our determination on any facts known or
reasonably assumed. Neal, supra at 719.
We subscribe to the specific reasoning above of the Court in Hoke and find that, accepting the
facts as alleged by plaintiff, the circumstances of the case at hand are not sufficiently distinguishable from
those in Hoke to justify a different conclusion. Here, defendant expended time and resources in
connection with the COC project to investigate plaintiff’s compliance with school board policies such as
the prevailing wage policy. It is not irrational for defendant to conclude that using a union subcontractor
would avoid the need to ascertain compliance with the board’s policies on an individual basis, and thus
save time and resources.4 Further, avoiding potential labor problems is a legitimate and rational
objective. Hoke, supra. Plaintiff has failed to sustain its burden of establishing that these concerns, in
the context of the instant case, are arbitrary and irrational. In our judgment, the specific reasoning of
Hoke is applicable in this case: defendant’s alleged classification of the bidders for the reconstruction
projects as union and non-union subcontractors is not so arbitrary or irrational that it is clearly
prohibited by the Constitution.5
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On the basis of the above analysis, we conclude that plaintiff failed to state a legal claim for
which relief could be granted. MCR 2.116(C)(8). Even accepting plaintiff’s version of the facts,
plaintiff had no equal protection claim because defendant here could constitutionally base a decision to
reject a subcontractor’s bid on his non-union status. The union/non-union distinction receives only
deferential, rational basis review. Whether or not this Court agrees with the wisdom of awarding school
contracts on the basis of such a distinction, this is an issue that rests within the scope of the school
board’s authority. Ultimately, it is the electorate that must assess the merits of such a policy. We have
faith that any “improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.” Hoke,
supra at 829.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
1
Defendant argues on appeal that its reservation of the right to “reject any and all bids, or parts
thereof,” along with MCL 380.1267(5); MSA 15.41267(5), which provides the authority for school
boards to “reject any or all bids,” allowed defendant to unilaterally reject plaintiff’s bid. See Leavy v
City of Jackson, 247 Mich 447, 450; 226 NW 214 (1920). However, plaintiff does not disagree with
defendant’s contention that defendant had the statutory authority to reject bids, arguing only that the
statute’s authority is limited by the federal and state Constitutions. Since all legislation and state action
must indeed comply with the federal and state Constitutions, and since plaintiff does not contest the
statutory authority of defendant to reject bids as long as such rejection does not violate equal protection,
we will address only the equal protection issue appealed by plaintiff.
2
There appears to be a question of fact remaining whether defendant rejected plaintiff’s bid on the basis
of some policy to bar non-union subcontractors, or because of past problems in confirming plaintiff’s
compliance with school board policies, or a combination of both. Therefore, summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) would be inappropriate.
3
Plaintiff also argues that because the purpose of MCL 380.1267; MSA 15.41267 is to “obtain school
buildings at the lowest possible cost to the school district,” Hatch v Maple Valley Twp Unit School,
310 Mich 516, 536; 17 NW2d 735 (1945), and because rejecting its bid based on its non-union status
was not rationally related to that purpose, it has stated a claim on which relief may be based. However,
the bid price is not necessarily the only project cost to be considered.
4
While we view the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff does not dispute that this
investigation took place. Rather, plaintiff asserts that it was exonerated, and impliedly challenges the
motivation for the investigation as originating in the close relationship of one or two school board
members with the unions. We accept these allegations as true in reaching our conclusion.
5
We emphasize that we do not attempt here to make judgments regarding the relative merits of union
and non-union businesses or workers in any particular business, labor or economic circumstance, but
simply to accord deference to the representatives of the people in choosing policies which they believe
to be in the best interests of their communities and which are not clearly barred by the Constitution.
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