IN RE CARNELL SPENCER TERRELL MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CARNELL SPENCER TERRELL,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 16, 1999
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 209356
Kalamazoo Juvenile Court
LC No. 87-000040 NA
AUDREY R. TERRELL,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Markman, P.J., and Bandstra and J.F. Kowalski*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals as of right the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights pursuant
to MCL 712A.19b(3)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(i). We affirm.
Respondent’s parental rights to six other children were terminated in 1987 and 1992 as a result
of substance abuse problems.1 Thus, soon after respondent gave birth on September 20, 1997, the
Family Independence Agency (“FIA”) filed a petition for permanent custody, and respondent stipulated
to the existence of the statutory grounds for termination-- the previous termination of her parental rights.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(i). In addition, she conceded that during the final
month of her pregnancy with Carnell, she used two or three rocks of cocaine a day, and drank alcohol
and smoked cocaine on the night she went into labor. She had never completed a drug treatment
program, although she had managed to stay sober for almost two years in 1987 before relapsing, and at
the time of the adjudication hearing, there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest. However, at the
time of the adjudication hearing, respondent was in a drug treatment program where she was doing well
and had shown a commitment to completing the program. The program would have allowed her to care
for her child in a supervised environment for a maximum of six months. Respondent’s counselor
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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testified that she believed that respondent could be a good mother as long as she stayed sober. The
juvenile court found that although termination was not in respondent’s best interests, it was in the child’s
best interest. The court stated that respondent’s heavy drug use during her pregnancy, despite her
knowledge of the effects such behavior would have on her child, was the fact that “tips the balance” in
favor of termination.
Respondent does not dispute that the statutory ground for termination was sufficiently
established. Rather, she contends that termination of her parental rights was clearly not in the child’s
best interests where the child could reside with her in a treatment program. Respondent acknowledged
that her parental rights had been terminated with regard to six other children and that she had a long
term substance abuse problem. She further admitted that she used cocaine daily throughout her
pregnancy, and consumed both cocaine and alcohol on the night that the child was born. In view of
respondent’s long history of substance abuse, her actions toward the child at issue during the pregnancy,
and the fact that the solutions proposed involved relatively short-term programs, the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that termination was in the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ John J. Kowalski
1
Another daughter was removed to a permanent guardianship while respondent was in prison.
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