PEOPLE OF MI V JODY L ROTHMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 2, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 200287
Mason Circuit Court
LC No. 96-001354 FC
JODY L. ROTHMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Murphy and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his conviction by jury of safe breaking, MCL 750.531; MSA
28.799, and breaking and entering a building with intent to commit larceny, MCL 750.110; MSA
28.305. The trial court sentenced defendant to five to twenty-five years’ imprisonment for the safe
breaking conviction and three to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the breaking and entering conviction.
We affirm.
I
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. In assessing
whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict, we examine the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627,
641; ___ NW2d ___ (1998). The elements of safe breaking are: (1) that defendant broke into a safe;
and (2) that he did so with the intent to commit larceny. MCL 750.531; MSA 28.799. These elements
were supported at trial by the following testimony: (1) paper money, including a large amount of $2
bills, as well as Susan B. Anthony dollars, Kennedy half-dollars, and wheat pennies, were taken from
the victims’ safe around the same time that their house key disappeared; (2) Robin Smith knew that the
victims kept a house key in their garage, knew where the safe was located, knew the safe’s
combination, and wanted to steal from the victims because he felt cheated by them; (3) Smith asked
defendant to steal from the safe and defendant agreed to do so; (4) defendant bought a portable
scanner so that he would know if the police had been notified while he was inside the residence; (5)
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defendant admitted to Smith and to Lisa Mears that he committed the safe breaking, and he gave some
of the proceeds to Smith; (6) some coins in defendant’s own safe were the same type as coins missing
from the victims’ safe; and (7) defendant gave Thomas Coffman $40 worth of $2 bills. This testimony
taken as a whole was sufficient for the jury to find that the essential elements of safe breaking were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Although some of this testimony was contradicted at trial, we do
not disrupt the jury’s resolution of credibility disputes when deciding whether there was sufficient
evidence to sustain a verdict. People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 660; 509 NW2d 885 (1993).
The elements of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with intent to commit larceny are:
(1) a breaking and entering; 2) of an occupied dwelling; and (3) with the intent to commit larceny within
the dwelling. See People v Brownfield, 216 Mich App 429, 431; 548 NW2d 248 (1996); MCL
750.110; MSA 28.305. These elements were established at trial by the testimony summarized above,
as well as the testimony that the victims occupied the house in which the safe was located and that
defendant used a key to enter the house. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
have found that the essential elements of breaking and entering were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
II
Next, defendant argues that the amount of restitution the trial court ordered was arbitrary and
that the trial court erred by failing to consider defendant’s financial circumstances when ordering
restitution. We review a trial court’s findings of fact regarding a restitution order for clear error. People
v Guajardo, 213 Mich App 198, 201-202; 539 NW2d 570 (1995).
The trial court based the restitution amount on the evidence presented at trial. The amount was
adequately supported by the evidence and the court’s explanation of the amount demonstrates that it
was not arbitrary.
Defendant did not contest his ability to pay when restitution was considered and imposed. The
court was therefore not required to hold a separate hearing or to make express findings on the record
respecting defendant’s ability to pay. People v Grant, 455 Mich 221, 243-244; 565 NW2d 389
(1997). Further, while defendant correctly observes that the presentence report revealed that defendant
had limited assets and a meager income, the report also revealed that defendant was in good health and
able to work. Additionally, defendant’s position at sentencing was that the court should fix restitution at
$9360. Thus defendant effectively admitted an ability to pay.
III
Next, defendant argues that prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial. We review claims
of alleged prosecutorial misconduct to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial
trial. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
We conclude that the prosecutor did not file the habitual offender enhancement in retaliation for
defendant’s derogatory remark to and about the prosecutor at a prior hearing. Rather, one of the legal
assistants responsible for routinely filing enhancements based on criminal history records did so. In any
event, defendant was not prejudiced because the enhancement did not take effect.1 Defendant has not
established that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. Although the mere
appearance of impropriety can be sufficient to warrant disqualification of a prosecutor, “[t]here is no
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appearance of impropriety unless there are facts
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demonstrating an emotional or personal stake in the litigation which warrants recusal.” People v Doyle,
159 Mich App 632, 644, 646; (1987), reversed on other grounds 161 Mich App 743; 411 NW2d
730 (1987). Here, the prosecutor’s statement responding to an inflammatory remark by defendant
does not evidence an emotional stake in the case such that recusal was necessary.
IV
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Thomas Coffman’s
testimony that he returned some $2 bills defendant had given him because he had heard rumors that
defendant had broken in and taken money from the victims, and he wanted nothing to do with it.
Defendant argues that Coffman’s testimony, to which he objected, constituted prejudicial hearsay
requiring reversal. We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. People
v Lugo, 214 Mich App 699, 709; 542 NW2d 921 (1995).
We reject the prosecution’s claim that Coffman’s out-of-court statements were admissible not
to prove that defendant committed the crime, but to show why Coffman did not keep the $2 bills
defendant had given him. Although Coffman’s receipt of the money was relevant to show that
defendant possessed money consistent with that taken from the victims’ safe, that Coffman did not keep
the $2 bills had no relevance to the case. The statements were relevant only in that they helped to prove
the truth of the matters asserted -- that defendant had broken in and stolen money from the victims. The
statements constituted inadmissible hearsay.
The test to determine whether this evidentiary error was harmless is whether it is highly probable
that the challenged evidence did not contribute to the verdict. People v Gearns, 457 Mich 170, 203
205 (Brickley, J., with whom J. Mallett concurred), 207 (Cavanagh, J. concurring in relevant part, with
whom J. Kelly concurred); 577 NW2d 422 (1998). The untainted evidence connecting defendant to
the crimes was circumstantial but ample, in view of the strength and extent of the testimony of Robin
Smith and Lisa Mears. We thus conclude that the erroneous admission of the challenged testimony was
harmless in light of the strength of the untainted evidence.
V
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court misscored an offense variable of the sentencing
guidelines and that his resulting sentence was disproportionate. Application of the sentencing guidelines
states a cognizable claim on appeal only where 1) a factual predicate is wholly unsupported; 2) a factual
predicate is materially false, and 3) the sentence is disproportionate. People v Winters, 225 Mich App
718, 729-730; 571 NW2d 764 (1997); see also People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 174-177; 560
NW2d 600 (1997). Appellate courts are not to interpret the guidelines or to score and rescore the
variables for offenses and prior record to determine if they were correctly applied. Mitchell, supra at
178. We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. People v Odendahl, 200 Mich App
539, 540-541; 505 NW2d 16 (1993), overruled on other grounds People v Edgett, 220 Mich App
686; 560 NW2d 360 (1996). Sentences must be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances
surrounding the offense and the offender. Odendahl, supra at 540; People v Milbourn, 435 Mich
630, 635-636, 654; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
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Defendant’s challenge regarding the guidelines is not directed to the accuracy of the factual basis
for his score, but rather to application of PRV 7, and thus does not state a cognizable claim. Mitchell,
supra at 176-177. Defendant’s argument that his sentences are disproportionate is unpersuasive, as it
hinges on his argument that PRV 7 was misscored. We conclude that defendant’s sentences are
proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.
Odendahl, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Helene N. White
1
The prosecution subsequently learned that the convictions were based on events that occurred after
the safe breaking and stated at the hearing on defendant’s motion to disqualify the prosecutor that the
enhancement was inappropriate.
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