IN RE JAMIE ROMANO MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JAMIE ROMANO, Minor
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 11, 1998
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 207482
Chippewa Juvenile Court
LC No. 97-011828 NA
MICHELLE ROMANO,
Respondent-Appellant.
and
WAYNE ROMANO,
Respondent.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 207532
Chippewa Juvenile Court
LC No. 97-011828 NA
WAYNE ROMANO,
Respondent-Appellant
and
MICHELLE ROMANO,
Respondent.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Hood and Gribbs, JJ.
-1
PER CURIAM.
In this consolidated action, respondents appeal by right from the juvenile court order terminating
their parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(i) and (j), and 25 USC 1912. We affirm.
In Docket No. 207482, respondent Michelle Romano raises two issues. First, she argues that
the trial court improperly introduced into evidence findings of fact from a prior termination proceeding,
and improperly instructed the jury that it must accept the prior findings as true. We disagree. Both the
trial court’s prior decision and its prior findings were a matter of court record and could be determined
by referring to court files. Further, the accuracy of the prior findings is not subject to reasonable
dispute. MRE 201(b). Courts regularly take judicial notice of their own records or other courts’
records. In re Thurston, 226 Mich App 205, 216 n 10; 574 NW2d 374 (1997). The trial court
properly instructed the jury in compliance with MRE 201(f). See also MCL 600.2106; MSA
27A.2106; In re Sumpter Estate, 166 Mich App 48, 56-57; 419 NW2d 765 (1988). Nor did the
properly admitted written findings constitute testimony by the trial judge.
Respondent Michelle Romano also argues that no active efforts were made to provide remedial
and rehabilitative services to prevent the breakup of this Indian family or that such efforts were
unsuccessful. She contends that there was no evidence that the child was at risk, either physically or
emotionally, in her parents’ home. There is no merit to this issue.
Under federal law, petitioner must show by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage. 25 USC 1912(f). In re Elliott, 218 Mich App 196, 209; 554 NW2d 32 (1996); MCR
5.980(D). In addition, under Michigan law, the juvenile court must find that there is clear and
convincing evidence to support termination of rights under one or more of the statutory grounds.
Elliott, supra at 209.
Here, petitioner had already provided extensive services to respondent in the past and she failed
to benefit from the services or e
ven acknowledge that she needed to improve her parenting skills.
Petitioner had assistance available to respondent Michele Romano while she was pregnant, but on a
voluntary basis. Until respondent’s fourth child was born, services could only be provided if respondent
requested them. Nothing in § 1912(d) of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USA 1901 et seq.,
precludes petitioner from seeking termination of parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing where,
as here, active efforts to reunite the family have proven unsuccessful in the past. Respondent Michelle
Romano’s involvement in the sexual abuse of her other children, her inability to either seek treatment or
see the need for treatment, and her refusal or inability to acknowledge her parenting problems made it
clear that further efforts to provide services in this case would have been futile.
In Docket No. 207532, Respondent Wayne Romano argues that termination was improper in
this case because his circumstances were different than when his parental rights to another child were
terminated six years previously, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the
-2
child would be seriously harmed if placed in his custody. The court’s findings of fact are reviewed for
clear error. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The juvenile court did not
clearly err in this case.
The evidence of respondent’s prior termination of parental rights was properly considered by
the juvenile court. Evidence of how a parent treats one child is probative of how that parent will treat
another child. In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 588; 528 NW2d 799 (1995). There was ample
evidence that the minor child here would be at risk of harm if placed in respondent’s custody. Although
respondent Wayne Romano eventually gave up his rights to a prior child when he was physically unable
to care for her, the child lived for a long time with another family because respondent was not providing
for the child’s care. And, although the prior child’s mother was largely responsible for the situation,
respondent took little action for several years prior to the termination.
Moreover, in this case, respondent Wayne Romano refused to believe that respondent-mother
posed a risk of harm to the infant child and refused to believe that she had done anything improper with
her previous children despite her testimony to the contrary. Finally, although there was some evidence
that respondent Wayne Romano’s physical condition had improved since the prior termination, there
was no evidence that his serious medical condition, which did not permit him to work at a job, would
enable him to respond to the demands of a small child.
Next, respondent Wayne Romano contends that, although the court did not say so, the juvenile
court improperly terminated his parental rights because respondent did not believe that respondent
mother had previously acted in a sexually inappropriate manner with her other children. Evidence at trial
showed that respondent-mother admitted to performing certain sexual acts in front of her previous three
children. There was also evidence that respondent-mother may have participated in sex acts involving
the children or, at least, that she allowed such acts to occur. It was critical that respondent Wayne
Romano recognize possible dangers to the minor child, and the evidence of his lack of insight into
problems with both respondent-mother and his former partner was relevant to the trial court’s
determination here.
Respondent Wayne Romano also argues that it was improper for the juvenile court to admit into
evidence its findings from the prior termination proceedings in which respondent’s parental rights to a
prior child were terminated. As noted previously, the findings in the prior termination proceedings were
properly admitted. Contrary to respondent’s contention, the findings were relevant to the consideration
of his parenting skills despite the differences between this case and the prior termination proceeding.
We do not agree that respondent Wayne Romano was prejudiced by admission of findings regarding
respondent-mother during the determination whether the juvenile court would take jurisdiction over the
minor child. The pertinent circumstances concerning both parents were relevant to the decision in this
matter.
Finally, respondent Wayne Romano argues that the juvenile court erred by not requiring that
petitioner adopt a case service plan in this case. As was the case with respondent-mother, respondent
Wayne Romano was offered numerous services in the past and did not benefit from those services. He
could also have had the benefit of voluntary services in this case, but he did not see any need for
-3
assistance. Respondent Wayne Romano incorrectly believed that he no
-4
longer had any parenting problems and refused to believe that respondent-mother was a risk to the
child. Petitioner showed that providing further services to this family would have been futile and would
have only delayed these proceedings, to the detriment of the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
-5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.