IN RE SHANTELL ROMELL TRAMMER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SHANNON MARIE RUDOLPH,
KELVON DESHAWN FENNER, SHANTELL
ROMELL TRAMMER, and JAVON DESHAWN
EARL, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 25, 1998
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
TRACY CHARESE RUDOLPH, a/k/a TRACEY
CHARESE RUDOLPH and TRACY CHARISE
RUDLOPH, and LANDOREN T. TRAMMER,
Nos. 206593; 206745
Wayne Juvenile Court
LC No. 94-313395
Respondents-Appellants,
and
KENNETH JOSEPH EARL, CARLTON
DOSSIER, COREY RAYMON DAWSON,
and KEVIN FENNER,
Respondents.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Griffin and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 206593, respondent Rudolph appeals as of right from the juvenile court order
terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). In Docket No. 206745, respondent Trammer appeals as of
right from the juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to Shantell Trammer under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (h) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g), (h) and (j). We affirm.
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The juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were
established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to both respondents. MCR 5.974(I); In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further, the juvenile court did not err in
terminating respondents’ parental rights, inasmuch as both respondents failed to demonstrate that
termination of their parental rights was clearly not in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5);
MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472; 564 NW2d 156 (1997).
We are not persuaded by Trammer’s argument that the juvenile court’s failure to obtain his
physical presence at the termination hearing resulted in a constitutional violation of his right to due
process. US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; People v Capriccioso, 207 Mich App 100,
102; 523 NW2d 846 (1994). Contrary to the implications of Trammer’s argument, a respondent in a
termination proceeding does not have an absolute right to be present physically at the proceeding. In re
Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 48; 501 NW2d 231 (1993).
Although Trammer’s interest in his parental rights is “a compelling one,” id. at 48, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of his parental rights was not increased by the failure to obtain his physical
presence at the hearing. Trammer was represented by an able attorney who cross-examined the
witnesses presented against his client. He was also provided with a telephone link to the courtroom,
enabling him to hear all of the witnesses’ testimony and to fully converse with his attorney and the court
during the hearing. He was accorded the opportunity to provide his attorney and the court with
information valuable to his defense and to otherwise participate meaningfully in the termination hearing.
The fact that he was not physically present in the courtroom did not effect the outcome of this case.
We also agree with petitioner that the state had an interest in avoiding the risk of procuring
Trammer’s physical presence at the termination hearing. The termination petition alleged that Trammer,
who was incarcerated, had been convicted of escape for walking away from a corrections center in
which he had been placed. Because Trammer was an apparent escape risk, the state had an important
interest in keeping him incarcerated during the termination hearing.
Because, under the circumstances, Trammer’s physical absence from the hearing did not
increase the chance of an erroneous deprivation of his parental rights and the state had an interest in
preventing Trammer from being presented with another opportunity for escape, the juvenile court did
not violate Trammer’s right to due process by failing to obtain his physical presence at the termination
hearing. Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335; 96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976); In re
Vasquez, supra.
Next, respondent Rudolph contends that the juvenile court failed to make adequate findings of
fact to support its decision to terminate her parental rights. We disagree. As to Rudolph, the court both
stated on the records its findings and conclusions of law and incorporated the findings and conclusions
of the juvenile court referee as the court’s own. Thus, Rudolph’s position that the court failed to make
findings and conclusions, as MCR 2.517(A)(1) mandates, is incorrect. See Lud v Howard, 161 Mich
App 603, 614; 411 NW2d 792 (1987). Further, our review of the court’s findings and conclusions
reveals them to be brief, definite, and pertinent to the issues contested at the termination hearing.
Therefore, the court’s findings and conclusions are sufficient. MCR 2.517(A)(2).
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Rudolph also contends that the juvenile court was biased against her and impermissibly
allocated the burden of proving her parental fitness. We find no indication from the record that the court
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Rudolph. Similarly, the record does not support Rudolph’s
allegations of bias. In any event, Rudolph was required to pursue her claim of disqualification below in
order to preserve it for appeal. In re Schmeltzer, 175 Mich App 666, 673; 438 NW2d 866 (1989).
She did not raise this issue in the lower court, and thus failed to preserve it for appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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