REBECCA SUE COON V WILLIAM HAROLD COON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
REBECCA SUE JORDAN, f/k/a REBECCA SUE
COON,
UNPUBLISHED
July 31, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 203346
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 93-000608 DM
WILLIAM HAROLD COON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from an order awarding legal and physical custody of the parties’
children to plaintiff. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the trial court failed to make findings of fact sufficient to satisfy
MCR 2.517(A)(1) and (2), because the court did not mention allegedly significant facts developed
during the custody hearing. We disagree. Defendant concedes that “the law does not require detailed
findings on every factual point raised by the parties.” His concession is consistent with Michigan case
law holding that the trial court need not comment on every matter in evidence or declare acceptance or
rejection of every proposition argued. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 883; 526 NW2d 889
(1994) (Brickley, J). Accordingly, there was no error.
Defendant next argues that the trial court committed clear legal error when, following the
custody hearing, it referred certain matters dealing with parenting time, child support and arrearage
amounts to the friend of the court for calculation and recommendation. We find no substantiation in the
record for defendant’s allegations. The trial court made substantive determinations on these issues and
then referred them to the friend of the court for “fine-tuning.” Pursuant to defendant’s objection to the
friend of the court recommendations, a hearing was held at which the questions of parenting time and
child support were addressed at length by the trial court, and the court liberalized summer visitation time
for defendant. No error occurred.
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Defendant next contests the trial court’s finding that an established custodial environment for the
children existed with plaintiff. The existence of an established custodial relationship is a
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question of fact that the trial court must resolve pursuant to the statutory criteria set forth in MCL
722.27(1)(c); MSA 25.312(7)(1)(c). Hayes v Hayes, 209 Mich App 385, 387-388; 532 NW2d 190
(1995). The court’s findings regarding the existence of an established custodial environment should be
affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. Ireland v Smith, 214
Mich App 235, 241-242; 542 NW2d 344 (1995), aff’d 451 Mich 457 (1996).
In an earlier trial of this case, the court granted the parties joint legal custody of the children,
with primary custody to plaintiff. The children have lived with plaintiff since the parties separated, and
plaintiff has provided guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort for them since that
time. The trial court’s finding regarding an established custodial environment is supported by the great
weight of the evidence.
Defendant further maintains that the trial court erred in its determination of the “best interest”
factors to be considered pursuant to MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3). The court’s determination
regarding each custody factor should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the
opposite direction. Ireland, supra at 242.
Defendant agrees with the trial court’s conclusion that the parties are equal regarding factor (a).
Respecting factor (b), the court found the parties equal, but defendant contends that this factor
should have been decided in his favor. However, adequate evidence was introduced regarding
plaintiff’s capacity and disposition to give the children love, affection and guidance to preclude a finding
of error.
The court found that factor (c) favored plaintiff. We agree. The evidence confirms that, since
well before the divorce, plaintiff has furnished the majority of the children’s support, while defendant,
although apparently able to engage in remunerative employment, has elected not to do so, and as a
result has accumulated substantial and long-standing arrearages in his child support obligations. There
was no error.
The court determined that factor (d) slightly favored plaintiff. Defendant strongly disagrees,
citing evidence that plaintiff’s current husband has an apparent alcohol problem and that plaintiff is a
self-admitted cigarette addict. The court was very concerned about the impact of these problems upon
the “satisfactory environment” requirement enunciated in factor (d), but nevertheless ruled for plaintiff.
Although we are keenly aware of the deleterious effects of “secondhand smoke” and a drinking
problem on the household, we are not prepared to state that as a matter of law custody may not be
awarded to a parent like plaintiff who finds herself in those circumstances. Notwithstanding these
negative facts, the evidence considered as a whole indicates that the children have lived with plaintiff in a
stable, satisfactory environment and that the desirability of maintaining continuity outweighs the possible
benefit of transferring custody to defendant, who does not have these problems. The trial court’s
determination is therefore not contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
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With regard to factor (e), the trial court ruled for plaintiff “for the reasons highlighted in factors
(c) and (d).” Defendant argues that the court’s determination is legally and factually untenable because
his home is permanent while plaintiff’s home is undesirable.
In Ireland, supra at 463-468, the Court noted that factor (e) concerns the permanence of the
custodial home, not its acceptability. Consequently, it is error for the trial court to base its finding
regarding factor (e) on the acceptability of a party’s home. Id. at 464. Complicating this issue is the
trial court’s resolution of factor (e) solely by reference to factors (c) and (d), without making
independent findings regarding factor (e). Furthermore, the court’s discussion of factor (d) reveals its
concern that unless plaintiff’s present husband aggressively addresses his alcohol problem, “the
continued stability of Plaintiff’s home environment will most definitely be in jeopardy,” a comment that
weakens the court’s conclusion that factor (e) favors plaintiff. We therefore conclude that factor (e)
favors defendant, but decline to reverse this case because the error is harmless in light of the fact that the
court properly awarded plaintiff custody based on its resolution of the other best interest factors. See
Fletcher, supra at 889 (Brickley, J), 900 (Griffin, J).
The trial court found the parties equal regarding factor (f). In Fletcher, supra at 886-887, the
Court held that factor (f), like all the other statutory factors, relates to a person’s fitness as a parent.
The pivotal question is not which party is morally superior, but instead “concerns the parties’ relative
fitness to provide for their child, given the moral disposition of each party as demonstrated by individual
conduct.” Id. at 887. As the trial court recognized, each party has faults, and although defendant
describes plaintiff’s shortcomings in great detail, his own liabilities include his propensity to place the
children in the center of this litigation, his inability to accept the fact of plaintiff’s remarriage, and his
chronic arrearage in child support, indicative of “morally questionable conduct relevant to one’s moral
fitness as a parent.” Id. at 887 n 6. The trial court therefore did not err by finding the parties equal
regarding factor (f).
The court’s finding that the parties are equal regarding factor (g) is supported by the great
weight of the evidence. As the court observed in its discussion of factor (f), both parties could benefit
by undergoing counseling.
Plaintiff was found to prevail on factor (h) because the court found that “[d]espite his well
meaning concern, Defendant’s behavior is contributing to cognitive difficulties in the children which he is
not educationally or financially positioned to address. Defendant must work more cooperatively with
Plaintiff, respect her commitment to the children’s well-being, and allow therapy and schooling to
address the challenges facing both Russell and Amanda.” This finding is not against the great weight of
the evidence.
Regarding factor (i), the trial court stated that it had “considered the evidence introduced
regarding the reasonable preferences of the children.” This statement is ambiguous because it fails to
reveal whether the court interviewed the children, and, if so, what their preference was, or, alternatively,
whether the court considered evidence from third parties concerning the children’s alleged preferences.
If the latter, the court acted improperly. However, reversal is unnecessary because the error, if any,
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was harmless in terms of the ultimate award of custody to plaintiff. Fletcher, supra at 889 (Brickley,
J), 900 (Griffin, J).
In connection with factor (j), the trial court’s finding that plaintiff was more willing than
defendant to encourage close parent-child relationships is not contrary to the great weight of the
evidence.
The court correctly determined that factor (k) favors defendant because of plaintiff’s greater
propensity for violence.
Finally, the trial court adjudicated factor (l) in plaintiff’s favor by attributing to defendant the high
degree of conflict regarding various issues that the court noted in this case. We find no error.
Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that it was in the children’s
best interests to remain with plaintiff.
As his last allegation of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by imputing income
to him for the purpose of calculating child support. We disagree.
Defendant furnished little evidence regarding the true state of his finances. He did testify that
although he was unemployed, he received rental income of $795 a month, or $9,540 a year. In view of
convincing evidence that defendant possessed the health and skills to maintain regular employment, the
trial court did not err by imputing to him income of $15,000 annually. Ghidotti v Barber (On
Remand), 222 Mich App 373, 377-380; 564 NW2d 141 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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