IN RE EST OF ROBERT E BOUGHTON DEC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the Estate of ROBERT E.
BOUGHTON, Deceased.
__________________________________________
DENNIS BOUGHTON,
UNPUBLISHED
June 16, 1998
Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
BARBARA CARVER, ALLAN BOUGHTON, and
CALVIN BOUGHTON,
No. 200750
Calhoun Probate Court
LC No. 96-000057 IE
Respondents-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants.
DENNIS BOUGHTON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
BARBARA CARVER, ALLAN BOUGHTON, and
CALVIN BOUGHTON,
No. 201318
Calhoun Probate Court
LC No. 96-000057 IE
Respondents-Appellees.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Kelly and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals, and respondents cross appeal, from a judgment of the probate court
concerning the division of property in decedent’s estate. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
-1
Petitioner and respondents are the children of the decedent, who died intestate. Decedent
owned a farm in Calhoun County. While all of the children worked on the farm while growing up, only
petitioner remained involved in the farm’s operations as an adult. Petitioner maintains that he developed
a business partnership with decedent in the farming operations, while respondents maintain that he did
not. Accordingly, petitioner maintains that he is entitled to his partnership share of the farming
operation, including both equipment and real estate, plus his one-quarter share of the remainder as an
heir. Respondents maintain that petitioner is only entitled to his one-quarter share of all of the property
as an heir. There was no formal partnership agreement executed and conflicting evidence was
presented in the trial court regarding whether decedent had, in fact, formed a partnership with his son.
The trial court submitted the question to a jury, which concluded that a partnership did, in fact,
exist. The trial court, however, concluded that it was not bound by the jury verdict to the extent that it
infringed upon the court’s equitable discretion and that it would not be equitable to find that a
partnership existed as to all of the assets, including the real estate.1 Accordingly, the trial court awarded
petitioner a one-half interest in the dairy cattle, stored crops used for cattle feed, and to the dairy
equipment. The remainder of the property, including all of the real estate, was treated as part of the
decedent’s estate. The trial court partitioned the property and awarded petitioner one-quarter of the
real estate.
We first address a question raised in the cross appeal, namely whether the trial court erred in
submitting the question of the existence of a partnership to the jury. Respondents argue that, because
this is a case in equity, the trial court erred in so submitting the question. We disagree.
Certainly the general rule is that there is no right to jury trial in an action at equity. See, e.g.,
Sokel v Nickoli, 356 Mich 460, 467; 97 NW2d 1 (1959). However, it is recognized that, in probate
actions, a party may demand a jury trial for issues for which there is a right to a jury trial. MCR 5.508.
Furthermore, a right to jury trial in a probate proceeding is recognized by statute. MCL 600.857(1);
MSA 27A.857(1). Specifically, that statute recognizes a right to a jury trial in probate court if, prior to
1971, there was a right to a jury trial on a particular issue of fact in an appeal from probate court to
circuit court. Earlier authority recognized a right to trial by jury on issues of fact in such appeals. See,
e.g., In re Weiss’ Estate, 315 Mich 276, 278; 24 NW2d 123 (1946) (“ ‘and if there shall be any
question of fact to be decided, issue may be joined thereon, under the direction of the court, and a trial
thereof had by jury’ ”, quoting Stat Ann 1943 Rev § 27.3178[42]).
Respondents argue that the older decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court which recognize a
right to jury trial are bad law. Perhaps so. However, we are aware of no decisions of the Supreme
Court which change that law. Accordingly, we are bound to follow it. It is the prerogative of the
Supreme Court, not this Court, to decide that prior Supreme Court decisions were incorrectly decided.
Until the Supreme Court so decides, which must follow those prior cases.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court correctly submitted the factual disputes to the
jury. The next issue for our determination is whether the trial court erred in substituting its findings for
that of the jury’s findings. We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred.
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We begin by noting that the trial court did not grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Rather, it merely concluded that it would not be equitable to follow the jury’s verdict. That was
improper. As discussed above, petitioner was entitled to have the disputed issues of fact resolved by
the jury. The jury having done so, the trial court was obligated to base its decision upon those findings
of fact. The jury concluded that the farm real estate was part of the partnership assets. Therefore, the
trial court was obligated to include the farm real estate in awarding petitioner his share of the partnership
assets. That did not implicate the trial court’s equitable authority. The court’s equitable powers were
not involved until it reached the question of how to divide the property.
That is, petitioner’s share of the property was to be determined by adding his partnership
interest in the property (as determined by the jury) to his share as an heir (as determined by the laws of
intestacy). Because this was less than 100% of the property, the trial court was then faced with an
equitable decision of how to divide the property and distribute the estate. But, the trial court’s
discretion did not lie in the amount of petitioner’s share, only in how that share was to be distributed.
This leads us to petitioner’s other issue on appeal, namely whether the trial court erred in
partitioning the property and allowing respondents to sell their portions at auction rather than forcing a
sale of the property to petitioner based upon the jury’s finding of the value of the property. We decline
to answer the question because the trial court’s actions are essentially irrelevant in light of our resolution
of the above issues. That is, how the trial court should or would distribute the estate may be different
where petitioner is entitled to a majority share of the property than when he is only entitled to a one
quarter share of the property. Because the trial court might choose to exercise its discretion differently
in light of the fact that petitioner is entitled to more than a one-quarter share of the real estate, we
believe that the best resolution of the issue is to remand the matter to the trial court to redetermine the
appropriate means of distributing the estate.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Petitioner may tax costs.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
1
It is undisputed that the farm house itself and five surrounding acres are not part of the farming
operations and is not part of the partnership. Petitioner maintains a partnership claim only to the
remaining real estate.
-3
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