THOMAS M BIALEK V JOSEPH F PILLARS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THOMAS M. BIALEK,
UNPUBLISHED
April 7, 1998
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
v
No. 196263
Oscoda Circuit Court
LC No. 95-002280-CH
JOSEPH F. PILLARS and CAROL J. PILLARS,
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs/Third-Party Appellants.
and
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Jansen and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants/counterplaintiffs/third-party plaintiffs (“defendants”) appeal by right an order
granting summary disposition to plaintiff/counterdefendant (“plaintiff”) pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8)
and (10), and to their title insurer, third-party defendant, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). Plaintiff filed a
complaint requesting injunctive relief to compel defendants, the adjacent land owners, to remove several
encroachments from his property. Defendants filed a counterclaim asserting that plaintiff was not the
true owner of the parcel in question and requesting that the court quiet title in the land as a private road.
Defendants also filed a third party claim seeking to compel their title insurer to defend them during this
litigation and to indemnify them. After reviewing the trial court’s decision to grant plaintiff’s and third
party defendant’s motions de n
ovo, West Bloomfield Twp v Karchon, 209 Mich App 43, 48; 530
NW2d 99 (1995), we affirm.
I
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Defendants first argue that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition because there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the grantor originally
intended the disputed property to be dedicated for public use. We disagree.
We will affirm the grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) where, except
with regard to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161;
516 NW2d 475 (1994); Fitch v State Farm Fire and Casualty Co, 211 Mich App 468, 470-471;
536 NW2d 273 (1995). We must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any
other documentary evidence in favor of the nonmoving party and grant the benefit of any reasonable
doubt to the opposing party. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). The
opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must, by affidavit or
other documentary evidence, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. MCR
2.116(G)(4).
The parties agree that in August 1953, the DeWitts, the original plattors of the property,
conveyed the disputed property to the Wiltons, who are plaintiff’s predecessors in interest. Upon
reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court that this deed was the ultimate indicator of the original
grantor’s intent regarding the disputed property and, as discussed below, that it effectively withdrew any
prior offer to dedicate the property to the public. See Kraus v Michigan Dep’t of Commerce, 451
Mich 420, 427-431; 547 NW2d 870 (1996). Indeed, DeWitts’ conveyance to plaintiff’s predecessors
in interest was inconsistent with public ownership. Id. at 431. Moreover, defendants never challenged
the validity of this deed. Thus, the trial court was correct in determining that further fact-finding, in light
of the 1953 deed, would not be required.
Defendants also argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of
plaintiff because the disputed property was dedicated to and accepted by the public in its entirely. We
disagree. A valid dedication of land for a public purpose requires two elements: (1) a recorded plat
designating the areas for public use that evidences the plat proprietor’s clear intent to dedicate those
areas to public use, and (2) acceptance by the proper public authority. Kraus, supra at 424; see also
Marx v Dep’t of Commerce, 220 Mich App 66, 76-79; 558 NW2d 460 (1996) (in light of Kraus,
supra, mere township or other public approval of the plat, without reference to acceptance of the
property dedicated in the plat, is insufficient to constitute acceptance of a valid dedication of land to the
public). In order for the public acceptance of the dedication to be valid, the acceptance must be: (1)
timely, and (2) disclosed through a manifest act by the public authority. Kraus, supra. The requirement
of public acceptance by a manifest act, whether formally by confirmation of the dedication or informally
by the exercise of authority over it, was necessary to prevent the public from becoming responsible for
land that it did not want or need, and to prevent land from becoming waste property, owned or
developed by no one. Id. Absent timely acceptance by the public, the offer to dedicate may lapse or
be withdrawn. Id. at 425, 431. As long as the plat proprietor took no steps to withdraw the offer to
dedicate by using the property in a way inconsistent with public ownership, the offer will be treated as
continuing. Id. at 427. Whether the offer to dedicate lapsed or continued depends on the circumstance
in each case. Id.
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In this case, however, whether the disputed property was indeed offered for dedication
becomes immaterial because it was clear that the DeWitts withdrew any offer to dedicate when they
made the August 1953 conveyance of the disputed property to plaintiff’s predecessors in interest.
Before that date, no public authority made a manifest act of acceptance, such as passing a formal
resolution, opening the road to the public, or exercising regulatory control over it. Kraus, supra at 424,
431. Given DeWitts’ conveyance to plaintiff’s predecessors in interest, which was inconsistent with
public ownership, we find no error.
II
Defendants next argue that the trial court erred when it barred their claim under the marketable
record title act, MCL 565.101 et seq.; MSA 26.1271 et seq., which states in part that “[a]ny person .
. . who has an unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in land for 40 years shall at the end of
such period be deemed to have a marketable title to such interest. . . .” MCL 565.101; MSA
26.1271. The statute also exempts, however, certain claims from being extinguished even after the
forty-year period has ended. MCL 565.101; MSA 26.1271; MCL 565.104; MSA 26.1274.
Specifically, MCL 565.101; MSA 26.1271 allows exemptions for certain interests created through
hostile possession, and MCL 565.104; MSA 26.1274 allows exemptions for certain “clearly
observable” easements. Defendants concede that the land in dispute has been in plaintiff’s chain of title
for the requisite forty years. They claim, however, that these exemptions apply. We believe that
defendants’ actions failed to constitute “hostile possession” because their activities of walking, driving,
and plowing snow were not “hostile” as they could be done without a claim of right. Cf. Cook v
Grand River Hydroelectric Power Co, Inc, 131 Mich App 821, 826; 346 NW2d 881 (1984).
Another indicator of defendants’ lack of hostility was that they requested the trial court to deem the
property a “private road” rather than their property. Possession which is permissive or consistent with
the title of another is not considered hostile or adverse. See Burns v Foster, 348 Mich 8, 15; 81
NW2d 386 (1957). With regard to the easement exemption, physical manifestations of an easement
would have to exist before the expiration of the requisite forty years in order to exempt defendants’
interest. MCL 565.104; MSA 26.1274. From the record, we believe that any “clearly observable”
manifestations did not occur until after the requisite forty year period elapsed. Accordingly, the
statutory exemptions contained in § 1 and § 4 of the marketable record title act do not apply.
III
Finally, defendants argue that the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition in favor
of their title insurer. Defendants maintain that the dispute was covered by the policy as evidenced by its
definition of “land” to include “together with use of private drive as laid out and dedicated in plat known
as Big Creek Terrace.” Based on this definition, defendants assert that the insurer had a duty to defend
and indemnify. We disagree.
In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), we look
to the pleadings, accept as true all factual allegations and their reasonable inferences, and uphold the
grant where no factual development could possibly justify a right of recovery. Simko v Blake, 448
Mich 648, 654; 532 NW2d 842 (1995); ETT Ambulance Service Corp v Rockford Ambulance,
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Inc, 204 Mich App 392, 395-396; 516 NW2d 498 (1994). In a dispute regarding a contract,
however, the trial court may examine the contract itself in conjunction with the motion for summary
disposition for failure to state a claim. Woody v Tamer, 158 Mich App 764, 770; 405 NW2d 213
(1987). When the contract dispute concerns an insurer’s duty to defend, the court must examine the
language of the insurance policy to determine the scope of coverage. Royce v Citizens Ins Co, 219
Mich App 537, 542; 557 NW2d 144 (1996). An insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to
indemnify and arises in instances where coverage is arguable, even though the claim may be groundless
or frivolous. Polkow v Citizens Ins Co, 438 Mich 174, 178; 476 NW2d 382 (1991); Royce, supra.
The title insurance policy provided coverage if: (1) the insured title vested in a manner otherwise
than as stated in the title insurance policy; (2) it was unmarketable; (3) it was subject to liens or
encumbrances; or (4) there was no right of access to and from the land. The policy described its
coverage by defining the specific “land” and including the language “together with use of private drive as
laid out and dedicated in plat known as Big Creek Terrace.” The policy further described “land” in its
definition section as not including “any right, title, interest, estate, or easement in abutting streets, roads,
avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or waterways, but nothing herein shall modify or limit the extent to which a
right of access to and from the land is insured.”
Notably, defendants did not claim title to the disputed property but rather requested that the trial
court quiet title to the property as a “private road.” Indeed, this property interest was not covered by
the policy. Even if defendants argue that the private drive referenced on the original plat map was an
easement or a right of access, that interest would not be included in the policy’s definition of “land”
because the access to defendants' own property was never disputed. The language of the policy
unambiguously provided that this type of claim was not covered. Therefore, the insurer had neither the
duty to defend nor indemnify for this claim.
We affirm.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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