MARGARET ELLEN ALEX V RICHARD CHARLES WILDFONG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARGARET ALEX, Personal Representative of the
Estate of JAMIE YOUNGO, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
RICHARD CHARLES WILDFONG, JR.,
FRUITPORT TOWNSHIP FIRE DEPARTMENT,
and FRUITPORT TOWNSHIP, a Michigan municipal
corporation,
No. 194121
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 93-030820 NI
Defendant-Appellees.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and MacKenzie and Neff, JJ.
MacKENZIE, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, Haberl v Rose, 225 Mich App 254; 570 NW2d 664
(1997), upon which the majority relies, is inapposite because plaintiff’s complaint in this case did not
allege that Wildfong was liable under the civil liability statute, MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1).
Rather, liability was premised on violations of MCL 257.626; MSA 9.2326 (reckless driving), MCL
257.626b; MSA 9.2326(2) (careless driving), MCL 257.627; MSA 9.2327 (speed restrictions), MCL
257.684; MSA 9.2384 (failure to display lighted headlamps), MCL 257.632; MSA 9.2332 (speed
exemption for emergency vehicles), and the common law duty to use due care. It seems fundamentally
unfair to premise liability on a theory that was never pleaded by plaintiff.
I would hold that the trial court properly applied the gross negligence standard rather than the
ordinary negligence standard as the basis of defendants’ potential liability. MCL 691.1407(2); MSA
3.996(107)(2) governs individual immunity for lower-level governmental employees, including
volunteers, and provides that they are immune from tort liability provided that they are acting within the
scope of their authority, the governmental agency employing them is engaged in the exercise of a
governmental function, and the employees are not grossly negligent. Haberl notwithstanding, in my
opinion this statute is controlling. MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(107)(2) explicitly provides that
governmental employees are immune from liability “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section.”
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Because the civil liability statute is not part of that section, it must give way to individual immunity.
Consequently, I would hold that the gross negligence standard was properly applied with regard to
defendant Wildfong pursuant to MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(107)(2).
As for the municipal defendants, governmental agencies may be held vicariously liable when
their employee, acting during the course of employment and within the scope of authority, commits a tort
while engaged in an activity that is nongovernmental or proprietary or that falls within a statutory
exception to governmental immunity. Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567,
625; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). Fire fighting is a nonproprietary governmental function. See Powell v
Village of Fenton, 240 Mich 94, 95; 214 NW 968 (1927). Thus, to hold the municipal defendants
vicariously liable under Ross, Wildfong’s conduct would have to fall within one of the statutory
exceptions to governmental immunity. A statutory exception exists when injuries result from the
ordinary negligence of a governmental employee operating a government-owned motor vehicle. That
exception does not apply in this case, however, because the vehicle involved was a privately owned
vehicle. Fiser v Ann Arbor, 417 Mich 461; 339 NW2d 413 (1983), and Ewing v Detroit, 214 Mich
App 495; 543 NW2d 1 (1995), upon which plaintiff relies, are distinguishable since those cases both
involved government-owned cars. Furthermore, Haberl notwithstanding, I am of the opinion that
neither the civil liability statute nor MCL 257.603; MSA 9.2303, exempting drivers of authorized
emergency vehicles from provisions of the motor vehicle code, give rise to vicarious liability. Again,
MCL 691.1407(1); MSA 3.996(107)(1) explicitly provides that governmental agencies are immune
from liability “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act.” Neither the civil liability statute nor the
emergency vehicles statute is an exception to governmental immunity enumerated in the governmental
immunity act. But for Haberl, therefore, I would hold that because Wildfong’s conduct did not fall
within a statutory exception to governmental immunity as required under Ross, the municipal defendants
were not vicariously liable for the death of plaintiff’s decedent.
Finally, even if I agreed with the holding of Haberl and with the majority’s conclusion that it
applies to this case as it was pleaded and tried, I am persuaded that there are important policy reasons
for not extending Haberl to the facts of case. A large percentage of firefighters in this state are either
volunteers or on part-time status. In order to get to the scene of a fire, these individuals must be on call
and must use their own vehicles, equipped for emergency runs. By holding these firefighters to an
ordinary negligence standard rather than the gross negligence standard when responding to an
emergency call, and by making them individually liable, this Court is raising a significant disincentive to
serve as a volunteer firefighter to the detriment of rural areas and small communities throughout the state.
Accordingly, I would affirm.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
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