PEOPLE OF MI V BRADLEY DALE BURTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 3, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 191400
Kalkaska Circuit Court
LC No. 95-001496-FC
BRADLEY DALE BURTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree,
MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a), and criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, MCL
750.520c(1)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(a). Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor created error requiring reversal by eliciting testimony
that defendant decided to remain silent following the administration of Miranda warnings, and not to
take a lie detector test. We find that, by making some statements, defendant waived his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent. People v McReavy, 436 Mich 197, 221; 462 NW2d 1 (1990).
The facts do not suggest that defendant subsequently was induced to revoke his waiver by implicit
assurances contained in Miranda warnings. Id. at 218-219. It was therefore proper for the prosecutor
to question defendant regarding his lack of cooperation with the investigating officers.
Defendant did not object when the prosecutor first asked a police officer about defendant’s
refusal to submit to additional questioning. Absent a timely objection, we must consider if the prejudicial
effect of the remark was so great that it could not have been cured by an appropriate instruction.
People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 575; 540 NW2d 728 (1995). We find that defendant did not
suffer prejudice that could not have been cured by a timely instruction.
Although the prosecutor’s question might have signified to defendant an implicit reference to a
lie detector test, it was defendant who first mentioned the term “lie detector.” Then, given the
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opportunity, defendant failed to give the simple explanation that he refused to take it on the advice of
counsel. Moreover, the isolated reference was brief, and the court immediately ruled that the subject
was irrelevant, not admissible, and totally out of order. We find no prosecutorial error.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court’s instruction on reasonable doubt consistently
denigrated the standard by including a burden shifting requirement that the jury “assign a true,
substantive reason” to any doubt before acquitting defendant. We review de novo a claim of
instructional error. People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 487; 552 NW2d 493
(1996). We find that the judge’s instructions, when read in their entirety, did not shift the burden that
had to be satisfied, but rather, properly advised the jurors of the prosecutor’s burden of proof and
required them to have a reason to doubt defendant’s innocence. Id. at 488.
III
Defendant argues next that the trial court abused its discretion and deprived defendant of the
right to present his defense when it barred the testimony of an expert witness on the appropriate
interviewing protocols for investigating claims of sexual abuse of children. The qualification of a witness
as an expert and the admissibility of his testimony are in the trial court’s discretion and will not be
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. People v Gambrell, 429 Mich 401, 407; 415
NW2d 202 (1987).
A witness may be qualified to give expert opinion testimony where the witness' "skill,
knowledge, training, experience, or education" will assist the trier of fact. MRE 702. Here, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the proposed expert testimony would not
assist the jury. We agree that the jury was qualified to evaluate the defense theory that the children
were coached, asked inappropriately leading questions, and otherwise subjected to suggestive
interviewing techniques, without the assistance of an expert witness. We further note that our Supreme
Court has held that expert references to the truthfulness of children’s testimony go beyond that which is
allowed under MRE 702. People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 376; 537 NW2d 857 (1995). The trial
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the proposed expert testimony, which had the main
purpose of explaining why the complainants’ testimony was likely not to be truthful.
IV
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor deprived defendant of a fair trial by evoking
sympathy for the alleged victims and by denigrating the legitimate efforts of defense counsel. We review
claims of prosecutorial misconduct case by case, examining the record and evaluating the alleged
improper remarks in context. The test is whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.
People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
Defense counsel did not object to the remarks he now claims were an improper attempt to
evoke sympathy for the victims. Therefore, appellate review is precluded unless a curative instruction
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could not have eliminated the prejudicial effect or the failure to consider the issue would result in a
miscarriage of justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Our review
of the record reveals that the prosecutor urged that in light of the victim’s age and the passing of time, it
was understandable for the young victims to give somewhat inconsistent versions of the events at issue.
The prosecutor also argued that the victims’ demeanor on the witness stand demonstrated their
truthfulness. Moreover, the prosecutor expressly urged the jury not to allow sympathy for the victims or
prejudice against the defendant to enter its deliberations. We conclude that the prosecutor did not
commit error that could not have been cured by a cautionary instruction upon a proper request from
defense counsel. Id.
Regarding defendant’s challenge to the prosecutor’s comment that defendant had defense
counsel “try to confuse the kids,” we find this isolated comment, though improper, did not deny
defendant a fair trial. Paquette, supra at 342. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted here.
V
Defendant next argues that the trial judge demonstrated a pattern of bias toward the prosecution
through its instructions, remarks, and rulings, which resulted in a denial of a fair trial. Although a trial
judge has wide discretion and power in matters of trial conduct, People v Collier, 168 Mich App 687,
698; 425 NW2d 118 (1988), a criminal defendant has the right to expect a neutral and detached
magistrate. People v Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470, 480; 549 NW2d 584 (1996). “The test is whether
the judge’s questions and comments may have unjustifiably aroused suspicion in the mind of the jury
concerning a witness’ credibility and whether partiality quite possibly could have influenced the jury to
the detriment of the defendant’s case,” thereby depriving defendant of due process and a fair trial. Id.
We have carefully reviewed each of defendant’s challenges to the trial judge’s conduct and
comments during trial, and find that the record as a whole fails to demonstrate bias on the part of the
trial judge. Consequently, we hold that the trial judge’s conduct and comments did not influence the
jury to the extent that it deprived defendant of a fair and impartial trial.
VI
Defendant’s final argument is that the thirty to sixty year sentence in this case was
disproportionate, a doubling of the guidelines maximum recommended minimum range for reasons
scored in the guidelines, and based upon psychological assumptions for which the trial court had no
evidence. We review a trial court’s decision to depart upward from the sentencing guidelines for an
abuse of discretion. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636, 657 n 25; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
The key test of proportionality is not whether the sentence departs from or adheres to the
recommended guidelines range, but whether it reflects the seriousness of the matter. People v
Houston, 448 Mich 312, 320; 532 NW2d 508 (1995). In the present case, defendant abused his
position of trust and authority, as the boyfriend of the victims’ mother and occasional caretaker of the
two girls. This relationship between defendant and his victims is an important factor not included in the
guidelines calculations. Id. at 323. The trial court also noted, correctly, that group activity such as
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defendant’s sexual abuse of the girls in each other’s presence was not reflected in the guidelines.1 We
further note that the judge’s factual predicates that a child has less resilience than an adult in dealing with
sexual matters and that children suffer psychological injury from sexual exploitation by an adult are
neither materially false or wholly unsupported. In sum, we find that the trial court appropriately
departed from the guidelines and that defendant’s sentence does not violate the principle of
proportionality.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
1
Although the guidelines make provision for multiple victims in OV 6, the guidelines do not necessarily
reflect a situation presented here, where sexual abuse is performed with multiple children, indeed sisters,
in each other’s presence.
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