MARC MASZARA V JOSEPH A SULLIVAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARC MASZARA and TINA MASZARA,
UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 1998
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 200192
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 92-235444 NO
JOSEPH A. SULLIVAN,
Defendant,
and
MICHIGAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Doctoroff and Smolenski, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Plaintiffs appeal by right summary disposition of their garnishment claim. Summary disposition is
predicated on the terms of the garnishee defendant’s insurance policy, the circuit court finding that the
policy provides no coverage for the incident giving rise to the default judgment against the principal
defendant-insured. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
We affirm.
Garnishee defendant’s homeowner’s insurance policy, against which plaintiffs seek to satisfy
their default judgment against the insured Sullivan, provides coverage only for “occurrences,” which are
defined in the policy in standard language indistinguishable from that considered by the Court in Group
Ins Co of Michigan v Czopek, 440 Mich 590, 596; 489 NW2d 444 (1992).1 Under that definition,
Joseph Sullivan’s action of pushing plaintiff Marc Maszara from behind was intentional, even if the
result, the personal injury, was unintentional and undesired. This assault was intentional; also, the
resulting injury was entirely foreseeable as a natural consequence of the force applied. Because
“occurrence” is defined in the insurance policy in terms of “accident,” and the latter terminology
requires a result which is, inter alia, unforeseen and unexpected, Guerdon Industries, Inc v Fidelity
-1
& Casualty Co of New York, 371 Mich 12, 18-19; 123 NW2d 143 (1963), the circuit court correctly
concluded that the injuries to plaintiff Marc Maszara do not constitute an “occurrence” and therefore do
not come within the terms of garnishee defendant’s homeowner’s policy. Czopek, supra, 440 Mich at
598. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider whether the exclusionary clause in the policy limiting
liability for personal injury to damage that is neither “expected nor intended” by the insured might also
preclude coverage. Michigan Basic Property Insurers Assoc v Wasarovich, 214 Mich App 319,
327-328; 542 NW2d 367 (1995).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
1
In Czopek, supra, “occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions,
which results, during the policy term, in bodily injury on property damage.”
-2
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