PEOPLE OF MI V TONY LEYRAUD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 24, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 198880
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-144178 FH
TONY LEYRAUD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Fitzgerald and M.G. Harrison*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver more than 50
but less than 225 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii). On this
appeal of right, defendant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that his incriminating statement,
made during custodial interrogation by the police, was admissible. We affirm; this appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
At a Walker1 hearing, defendant testified that at the outset of the interrogation, he was hooded,
which made his breathing difficult, and handcuffed, and that the atmosphere was highly coercive; this
testimony was contradicted by the two police officers involved, who testified how they made every
effort to place defendant at his ease, offering him a soft drink and making certain that he was
comfortable. The trial court concluded at the end of the hearing that, based on the credibility of the
conflicting testimony, it saw no evidence of any violation of defendant’s constitutional rights. In terms of
findings of historical fact, this credibility finding, made by the judge who saw and heard the witnesses
testify before him, is subject to appellate review under the clearly erroneous standard. Thompson v
Keohane, 516 US ___; 116 S Ct 457; 133 L Ed 2d 383 (1995). Hence, defendant’s claims about
being hooded, uncomfortable, and coerced must be rejected.
Defendant further claims, however, that he was subjected to interrogation without the benefit of
Miranda2, warnings and, after making an initial incriminating statement, he was Mirandized and made
the statement which was admitted into evidence at his trial. Although the prosecutor contends that
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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defendant made no incriminating statement before being given his Miranda warnings, the trial court’s
findings are insufficiently explicit on this point, and for present purposes defendant’s version will be
accepted.
Assuming, therefore, that defendant was interrogated for thirty minutes to an hour, made an
incriminating statement, was given his Miranda warnings, and then repeated that incriminating statement
or made another incriminating statement, only the latter being admitted into evidence at trial, no violation
of defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights has been established. The first statement, of course, would be
inadmissible as the product of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. However, since that
statement was not the product of coercive or otherwise improper police interrogation tactics, but rather
voluntary in the constitutional sense, see New York v Quarles, 467 US 649, 654; 104 S Ct 2626; 81 L
Ed 2d 550 (1983); Michigan v Tucker, 417 US 433, 444; 94 S Ct 2357; 41 L Ed 2d 182 (1974),
defendant’s subsequent statement, after receiving Miranda warnings, was properly deemed admissible,
for the reasons elucidated in detail in Oregon v Elstad, 470 US 298, 311-318; 105 S Ct 1285; 84 L
Ed 2d 222 (1985).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael G. Harrison
1
People v Walker (On Reh), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
2
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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