MARGARET COBB V BEATTY CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARGARET COBB, individually and as a personal
representative of the Estate of ALLEN E. COBB,
UNPUBLISHED
February 6, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
BEATTY CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC and JOHN
BEATTY, D.C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 187421R
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 91-11189 NO
ON REHEARING
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Reilly, and E. Sosnick,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us on rehearing. We originally reversed the trial court’s order granting
defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Defendants argue that our original opinion misconstrued
the effect of the chiropractic act, MCL 333.16401 et seq.; MSA 14.15(16401) et seq., on the scope
of the duty owed to plaintiff’ s decedent by defendant Beatty. Upon further review, we vacate our prior
ruling and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition.
Although the chiropractic act does not establish a standard of care for chiropractors, it does set
the parameters of the practice of chiropractic. Wengel v Herfert, 189 Mich App 427, 430; 473
NW2d 741 (1991). Accordingly, this Court has reasoned that, because general physical examinations
are outside of the scope of the practice of chiropractic, as defined by the chiropractic act, a jury could
not properly find a defendant chiropractor negligent for failing to conduct a thorough physical
examination. See Wengel, supra at 430-432. Relying on Wengel, supra, in our original opinion, we
held that plaintiff was “precluded from establishing that defendants breached the standard of care (e.g.
were negligent) by not performing a thorough physical examination.” However, we also held that
plaintiff stated a claim when she alleged that, “during the course of the chiropractic examination, Beatty
should have suspected that plaintiff’s decedent was suffering from a serious medical condition and
referred plaintiff’ s decedent for medical care.” We now hold that Beatty was under no such duty to
“suspect” and “refer.”
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Interpreting the chiropractic act in Attorney General v Beno, 422 Mich 293, 313-315; 373
NW2d 544 (1985), the Michigan Supreme Court explained that the Legislature did not intend to
authorize chiropractors to undertake differential diagnostic techniques to diagnose or rule out the
existence of localized non-spinal ailments. As noted in Beno, the House rejected the following
proposed amendment to § 16401 of the chiropractic act:
[The practice of chiropractic includes:]
Advising a patient to consult a health professional licensed under another section
of this act in the event the patient’s condition cannot in whole or in part, be treated
under this part. [Beno, supra at 315, quoting 1977 Journal of the House 1694.]
The Supreme Court then reasoned that the Legislature’s rejection of this (and another) p
roposed
change indicated “an intent that the scope of the practice of chiropractic not include the duty to originally
diagnose non-spinal ailments to determine whether they are treatable by chiropractic or whether the
treatment should be done by another health-care professional.” Beno, supra at 315. We are
persuaded, based on this interpretation of the chiropractic act, that suspecting the existence of a serious
medical condition during a chiropractic examination and then referring the patient for treatment of that
condition are duties beyond the scope of the practice of chiropractic. The imposition of such a duty
would potentially hold chiropractors liable for failing to discover the existence medical conditions outside
of the parameters of the practice of chiropractic. Therefore, we hold that Beatty cannot be held
accountable for malpractice for his alleged failure to suspect plaintiff’ s decedent’s serious condition and
refer him for medical treatment. Wengel, supra at 431.
Plaintiff also alleged that Beatty was negligent for failing to warn plaintiff’ s decedent that, as a
chiropractor, he was “not allowed by statute to diagnose or treat any condition other than subluxation.”
In her supplemental brief, plaintiff cites Wengel, supra, and Janssen v Mulder, 232 Mich 183; 205
NW 159 (1925), in support of her proposition that chiropractors have an affirmative duty to warn
patients of the limits of their profession. In Janssen, a case pre-dating the chiropractic act, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that a d
efendant chiropractor had a duty to use reasonable care and skill to
ascertain whether his patient’s ailments “were of the class to which his treatment applied” and, if not,
“to so advise plaintiff, in order that she might secure the services of one familiar with such ailments.”
Janssen, supra at 192-193. Thus, under Janssen, the chiropractor’s duty to advise his patient of the
limitations of the practice of chiropractic was tied to and dependent upon the chiropractor’s duty to
undertake differential diagnostic techniques for the purpose of ruling out the existence of non-spinal
ailments. However, as noted supra, with the passage of the chiropractic act, the Legislature has since
made the policy decision that such measures are beyond the scope of the practice of chiropractic. The
Wengel case involved allegations by the plaintiff that the defendant chiropractor had practiced outside
the scope of chiropractic and misrepresented to the plaintiff that chiropractic treatment could help
diabetes. Wengel, supra at 433. Nothing in Wengel addressed the existence or nonexistence of an
affirmative duty on the part of chiropractors to warn their patients of the limits of the practice of
chiropractic. We are not persuaded that the law requires chiropractors, as opposed to any other
professionals, to affirmatively warn their clients of the limits of their profession.
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For these reasons, we now hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to
defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
/s/ Edward Sosnick
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