MOUNT HOLLYWOOD LTD V LIQUOR CONTROL COMM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MOUNT HOLLYWOOD, LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
UNPUBLISHED
November 4, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 194724
Court of Claims
LC No. 95-015748-CM
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Young, P.J., and Markman and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Mount Hollywood, Limited Partnership, appeals as of right an order granting summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) in favor of defendant Liquor Control Commission.
We affirm.
Defendant canceled plaintiff’s request for the transfer of a class C liquor license from the owner
of the license, 27 Walnut, Inc., to plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a complaint against defendant in the Court
of Claims. The complaint asserted that plaintiff was the assignee of the license pursuant to an October,
1993, agreement entered into between plaintiff and 27 Walnut. (We note that this agreement was
executed on behalf of 27 Walnut by James J. McCarthy, the president of and a shareholder in 27
Walnut. McCarthy is also a partner of plaintiff Mount Hollywood). The complaint further asserted,
however, that a Frederick Duemling had obtained a judgment in Macomb Circuit Court ordering that
the license should be transferred to Duemling. (We note that. McCarthy, as president of 27 Walnut,
had previously entered into security agreements with and assigned the license to Duemling in June,
1993). Plaintiff’s complaint contended that defendant’s transfer of the license to Duemling would
constitute a taking of plaintiff’s property without due process of law. Plaintiff’s complaint, therefore,
requested injunctive relief, specifically, an order enjoining defendant from transferring the license to any
other person or entity except plaintiff and an order compelling d
efendant to transfer the license to
plaintiff. Finally, plaintiff’s complaint requested damages incurred as a result of defendant’s failure to
transfer the license to plaintiff and attempted transfer of the license to Duemling.
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Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Defendant
contended that plaintiff, as a mere applicant, had no property interest protected by due process in the
license.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion on both grounds. In granting the motion pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court refused both to issue an order compelling defendant to transfer the
license to plaintiff and to reverse defendant’s decision to deny plaintiff’s application to transfer the
license. In granting the motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), the trial court found that plaintiff was
“merely a potential transferee” and therefore had no property interest in the license. The trial court
concluded that defendant, accordingly, had neither taken plaintiff’s property nor denied plaintiff due
process of law.
On appeal, plaintiff again argues that it has a property interest in the license that is protected by
due process of law.
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) test the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone.
Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 432; 526 NW2d 879 (1994). All factual allegations in support
of the claim are accepted as true. Marcelletti v Bathani, 198 Mich App 655, 658; 500 NW2d 124
(1993). The motion should be granted only when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of
law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. Id. In this case, plaintiff’s due process
claim was not so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly
justify recovery. Rather, the conclusion that plaintiff had no protected property interest in the license
could only have been made after considering matters outside the pleadings. Thus, we conclude that the
trial court erred in granting summary disposition of plaintiff’s due process claim under MCR
2.116(C)(8).
However, we will nevertheless affirm where the trial court has reached the right result, albeit for
the wrong reason. Zimmerman v Owens, 221 Mich App 259, 264; 561 NW2d 475 (1997).
Summary disposition of all or part of a plaintiff’s claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) is appropriate
only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Osman v Summer Green Lawn Care, Inc, 209 Mich App 703, 706; 532 NW2d 186
(1995).
With respect to due process, this Court explained as follows in St Louis v Michigan
Underground Storage Tank Financial Assurance Policy Bd, 215 Mich App 69; 544 NW2d 705
(1996):
The federal and state constitutional guarantee that a person will not be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . . Invocation of the right to
due process necessarily requires involvement of a life, liberty, or property interest. . . .
For a property interest in a benefit . . . to exist, a person must have more than just a
need, desire for, or a unilateral expectation of the benefit. . . . A claimant must have a
legitimate claim of entitlement. [Id. at 74-75.]
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The holder of a class C liquor license who seeks renewal of that license has an interest in
property such that he is entitled to due process protection. Bundo v Walled Lake, 395 Mich 679,
683; 238 NW2d 154 (1976).. However, this Court has opined that the mere expectation that a new
license applicant or transferee might possess does not rise to the level of a property interest entitled to
due process protection. Bunn v Liquor Control Comm’n, 125 Mich 84, 90; 335 NW2d 913 (1983);
Barr v Pontiac City Comm’n, 90 Mich App 446, 451; 282 NW2d 348 (1979).
In Bunn, the plaintiff sold the real and personal property that constituted his bar business to
Lawson. Id. at 87. The sale agreements also contained a reassignment clause requiring Lawson to
reassign the liquor licenses to plaintiff in the event of a default. Id. Lawson defaulted. Id. Plaintiff
successfully foreclosed and reacquired the bar premises. Id. 88. In the meantime, the defendant liquor
control commission had revoked Lawson’s licenses pursuant to the recommendation of the city
commission. Id. at 87-88. The commission subsequently refused plaintiff’s request for a hearing
concerning his petition to have the city recommend reinstatement of his liquor licenses. Id. at 88.
Plaintiff filed a complaint and subsequently moved for summary judgment. Id. The trial court granted
plaintiff’s motion and ordered the defendant liquor control commission to grant plaintiff’s application for
the retransfer of his liquor licenses. Id. at 88, 93. The defendant liquor control commission appealed.
Id.
This court affirmed in part and modified in part the grant of summary judgment. Id. at 95. This
Court held that once the plaintiff foreclosed upon the bar property he held a reasonable and legitimate
claim of entitlement to the liquor licenses that entitled him to due process protection. Id at 92-93. In so
holding, this Court noted that it was appropriate to look to the nature of the transaction and the
agreements involved. Id. at 90 (citing Barr, supra at 453). This Court noted that a licensing rule
prohibited a licensee from selling or transferring an interest in the underlying business licensed by the
liquor control commission without the commission’s prior written approval. Id. at 93 (citing 1980
AACS, R. 436.1023). Thus, this Court concluded:
In the present case, because plaintiff’s sale of the business, including the
underlying contractual arrangements, was approved by the MLCC, his expectation of
retransfer, should any problems arise, was legitimate. As the Court noted in Perry
Sindermann [408 US 593, 601; 92 S Ct 2694; 33 L Ed 2d 570 (1972)], “[a]
person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process purposes if there
are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim or entitlement to
the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.” [Bunn, supra at 93.]
Thus, like Bunn, we look to the nature of the transaction and the agreements involved in this
case to determine whether plaintiff had a protected property interest in the license. Plaintiff places much
emphasis on the existence of the assignment agreement. It is true that the courts have recognized that
agreements to assign a liquor license are valid and enforceable. See, e.g., Brown v Yousif, 445 Mich
222, 232-233; 517 NW2d 727 (1994); Commercial Acceptance Corp v Benvenuti, 341 Mich 100,
103; 67 NW2d 129 (1954), overruled in part on another ground Bundo, supra at 691-692. However,
such transfers are subject to the approval of the liquor control commission. MCL 436.17; MSA
18.988; Brown, supra at 232, n 18; Bunn, supra at 92. Indeed, in this case, the assignment agreement
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explicitly provided that the assignment of the license was subject to defendant’s approval. Thus, we
disagree that the assignment agreement gave plaintiff anything more than a unilateral expectation of
entitlement to the license.
Plaintiff also emphasizes the allegedly substantial investments it has made in the license.
However, we can envision a situation wherein an applicant for a liquor license, who has no property
interest in his desire for or expectation of obtaining a license, may also make substantial investments in
preparation for a license. However, we conclude that such investment simply gave plaintiff a unilateral
expectation of entitlement to the license.
What we fail to discern in plaintiff’s argument is any indication that plaintiff relied on any rules
promulgated by or mutually explicit understandings with defendant that would give rise to a legitimate
expectation of entitlement to the license. Cf. Bundo, supra at 695 (reliance on a licensing practice that
provided for renewal as a matter of course); Bunn, supra at 93 (reliance on the liquor control
commission’s approval of the original sale of the bar business, including the license reassignment clause).
We acknowledge that defendant did direct plaintiff and 27 Walnut to amend the assignment contract, in
relevant part, as follows:
That until such assignment, conveyance, and transfer is fully approved by the
State of Michigan, and/or other required governmental agencies, Mount Hollywood
shall have the right to operate the establishment pursuant to the License of 27 Walnut . .
..
However, where the amendment only gave plaintiff a right to operate under 27 Walnut’s license pending
defendant’s approval, we conclude that the very amended language itself fails to raise a legitimate
expectation that plaintiff was entitled to the license.
In summary, even granting the benefit of any reasonable doubt to plaintiff, we conclude that
plaintiff failed to create a question of fact concerning whether it had a legitimate claim of entitlement to
the license. Stehlik v Johnson (On Rehearing), 206 Mich App 83, 85; 526 NW2d 633 (1994).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff did not have a protected
property interest in the license.
In Bunn, this Court held that the proper remedy for the failure to accord the plaintiff a due
process hearing on his transfer application was not an order directing the liquor control commission to
grant the transfer, but rather was a remand for a due process hearing. Id. at 93. Thus, in this case,
even if we had held that plaintiff had a protected property interest, the proper remedy would not be an
order compelling defendant to transfer the license to plaintiff, but rather would be to simply remand to
defendant for a due process hearing. However, we have concluded that plaintiff has no protected
property interest. Therefore, we need not remand for a due process hearing. Because there is no need
for a due process hearing, we cannot say on the facts of this case that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to grant plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief. Soergel v Preston, 141 Mich App
585, 590; 367 NW2d 366 (1996); Bunn, supra. We decline plaintiff’s invitation to become enmeshed
in other litigation that is irrelevant to the resolution of the merits of the limited issues raised in this appeal.
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We likewise decline plaintiff’s invitation to review defendant’s final administrative decision to cancel
plaintiff’s transfer request where the proper procedure for such review was a direct appeal of that
decision. See, e.g., J&P Market, Inc v Liquor Control Comm’n, 199 Mich App 646; 502 NW2d
374 (1993).
Affirmed.
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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