PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID RUSSELL SMITH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 31, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 174367
Hillsdale Circuit Court
LC No. 17-6964
DAVID RUSSELL SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and MacKenzie and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court for reconsideration as on rehearing
granted in light of People v Miles, 454 Mich 90; 559 NW2d 299 (1997). We affirm our prior
decision.
Defendant contends that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court amended the
judgment of sentence to provide that he serve his sentence consecutive to his sentences in other cases
without first holding a resentencing hearing. We addressed defendant’s assertion that he is subject to
consecutive sentencing in our June 30, 1995, opinion, stating:
Defendant also argues that he is subject to consecutive sentencing. However,
the judgment of sentence does not so provide. Indeed, both the presentence report and
the prosecutor represented in a document entitled Applicability of Consecutive
Sentencing that consecutive sentencing is not applicable to this defendant.
Defendant moved for rehearing on July 18, 1995, arguing that he was serving consecutive sentences
even though the judgment did not so provide. Defendant attached a letter from Jeff Stewart, Record
Office Supervisor of the Department of Corrections, indicating that despite the terms of the judgment,
the DOC believed that defendant’s sentence should be served consecutive to his other sentences.
Stewart also stated that he would contact the trial court to obtain an amended judgment providing for
consecutive sentences, and if the court refused, the DOC would compute defendant’s sentences as
running concurrent. On July 27, 1995, the court entered an amended judgment providing for
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consecutive sentencing. That judgment was not before us when we denied defendant’s motion on
August 29, 1995.
Defendant applied for leave to appeal in our Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court erred in
entering the amended judgment without formal resentencing. Defendant conceded that the court did not
enter the amended judgment until after he moved for rehearing in this Court. However, he maintained
that he presented “circumstantial evidence that he was serving a consecutive sentence.” In lieu of
granting leave to appeal, the Court remanded this case to us for reconsideration as on rehearing granted.
People v David Smith, 454 Mich 909; 564 NW2d 897 (1997) (summary disposition).
We will not consider the amended judgment in reviewing defendant’s allegation of error because
it is not part of the original record. This Court hears appeals on the original record, consisting of the
original papers filed in the lower court or a certified copy, the transcript of relevant proceedings, and the
exhibits introduced. MCR 7.210(A)(1). If the record is not correct, the complaining party must
institute proper proceedings for certification of the correct record. Cartwright v Grand Trunk
Western Railroad, 288 Mich 316, 322; 284 NW 727 (1939). Under MCR 7.216(A)(4), this Court
may permit amendments, corrections and additions to the record. However, a party must move to
amend the record before this Court issues its decision because we ordinarily will not grant a rehearing
on the basis of defects or errors in the record. 5 CJS, Appeal and Error, § 680, p 93. In this case,
defendant has never sought to amend the record.
Even if defendant had moved to amend and made the amended judgment part of the record, we
would not reconsider our decision on the basis of the amended judgment because the trial court entered
it after we issued our original opinion. A motion for rehearing in this Court is subject to the restrictions
contained in MCR 2.119(F)(3). MCR 7.215(G). That court rule provides:
Generally, and without restricting the discretion of the court, a motion for rehearing or
reconsideration which merely presents the same issues ruled on by the court, either
expressly or by reasonable implication, will not be granted. The moving party must
demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and the parties have been misled and
show that a different disposition of the motion must result from the correction of the
error.
As the court rule aptly demonstrates, rehearing is designed to correct an error by this Court in its
original decision, and ordinarily may not be used by parties to raise new issues or inject new evidence.
5 CJS, Appeal and Error, § 678, pp 90-93. In this case, defendant’s allegation of error is predicated
on events that occurred after we issued our original opinion. We will not consider these events because
to do so would defeat the purpose of rehearing. 5 CJS, Appeal and Error, § 683, p 94; Layfield v
Lewis, 268 Ala 666, 670; 109 So2d 838 (1959). See Vanneter v Grossman, 39 Mich 610, 611-612
(1878). Considering the original record, we affirm our prior decision. The judgment of sentence does
not provide for consecutive sentencing.
Our disposition of this case does not leave defendant without a means for raising the allegation
regarding improper consecutive sentences. The amended judgment is obviously void because the trial
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court did not have jurisdiction to enter it. Once a defendant files a claim of appeal, the trial court may
not amend the judgment except by order of this Court, stipulation of the parties or as otherwise
provided by law. MCR 7.208(A). The trial court regains jurisdiction when this Court returns the
record. People v Kennedy, 384 Mich 339, 343; 183 NW2d 297 (1971). In this case, this Court did
not return the record. It retained jurisdiction pending our decision on defendant’s motion for rehearing
and the Supreme Court’s decision on defendant’s application for leave to appeal. People v George,
399 Mich 638, 640; 250 NW2d 491 (1977). Because we did not grant leave to amend the judgment
in this case, the amended judgment is void and the original judgment remains in effect.
Defendant may raise the argument concerning consecutive sentencing in a motion for relief from
judgment under MCR 6.500 et seq. MCR 6.429(B)(4). If the trial court grants the motion, that court
should consider the impact of Miles, supra, on the procedure for entering an amended judgment. While
defendant may appeal the court’s decision regarding whether to grant resentencing by leave only, he
may appeal by right from the amended judgment if the court orders that he serve his sentence
consecutive to his other sentences. People v Martinez, 193 Mich App 377, 379-382; 485 NW2d
124 (1992).
Affirmed.
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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