IN RE KAREN TENILLE PERRY MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KAREN T. PERRY, a/k/a KAREN
FOSMIRE, Minor.
__________________________________________
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
October 24, 1997
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 201402
Kalamazoo Juvenile Court
LC No. 94-000040-NA
AUSTIN PERRY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
HOPE FOSMIRE,
Respondent.
Before: White, P.J., and Cavanagh and Reilly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, Karen
Tenille Perry, a/k/a Karen Fosmire. Respondent’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) (without regard to intent, parent has failed to provide
care and custody, and there exists no likelihood of change within a reasonable amount of time). We
affirm.
I
Respondent first argues that the probate court violated his rights by failing to appoint appellate
counsel in order to appeal the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. We disagree. Respondent was not
denied appointed counsel; rather, he failed to comply with the court’s request that he submit a statement
-1
regarding his financial status before it appointed him counsel. Respondent argues that providing financial
information was unnecessary because his financial status was on record and he was represented by
appointed counsel in the probate court proceedings. However, because respondent’s financial situation
could have changed, his right to appointed counsel might have been affected. Accordingly, we find no
error.
II
Respondent next argues that the probate court erred in basing its decision to terminate his
parental rights in part on psychological evidence admitted at the dispositional phase in February 1997.
Respondent contends that, pursuant to MCR 5.974(D), the probate court should have based its findings
only on the evidence introduced at trial when the court assumed jurisdiction.
MCR 5.974(D) provides:
The court shall order termination of the parental rights of a respondent at the initial
dispositional hearing held pursuant to MCR 5.973(A), and shall order that additional
efforts for reunification of the child with the respondent shall not be made, if
(1) the original, or amended, petition contains a request for termination;
(2) the trier of fact found by a preponderance of the evidence that the child
comes under the jurisdiction of the court on the basis of MCL 712A.2(b);
MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b);
(3) the court finds on the basis of clear and convincing legally admissible
evidence introduced at the trial, or at plea proceedings, on the issue of
assumption of court jurisdiction, that one or more facts alleged in the
petition:
(a) are true,
(b) justify terminating parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing,
and
(c) fall under MCL 712A.19b(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)
unless the court finds, in accordance with the rules of evidence as provided in subrule
(F)(2), that termination of parental rights is clearly not in the best interest of the child.
[Emphasis added.]
Interpretation of a court rule is subject to the same basic principles that govern statutory
interpretation. A court rule should be construed in accordance with the ordinary and approved usage of
the language in light of the purpose to be accomplished by its operation. Smith v Henry Ford Hosp,
219 Mich App 555, 559; 557 NW2d 154 (1996).
-2
The language of the court rule is clear. When termination is sought at the initial disposition, as in
the present case, the evidence supporting the court’s findings on the statutory factors must be that which
was admitted at the adjudicative phase. Therefore, we find that the probate court erred in considering
evidence that was not introduced at the trial to support the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over this
matter. Nevertheless, we conclude that the error was harmless because, as discussed in Issue III, clear
and convincing evidence was presented at the trial to support the termination of respondent’s parental
rights, and respondent presented no evidence to show that the termination of parental rights was clearly
not in the best interest of the child.
III
In his final issue, respondent claims that the termination of his parental rights was not based on
clear and convincing evidence presented at the initial dispositional hearing. We disagree.
This Court first reviews the probate court’s factual findings for clear error. A finding is clearly
erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. In re Conley, 216 Mich App 41, 42; 549 NW2d 353 (1996). After the
probate court concludes that clear and convincing evidence supports at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination, the respondent has the burden of putting forth some evidence to show that the
termination of parental rights is clearly not in the best interests of the child. In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich
App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). The trial court’s decision to terminate a parent’s parental
rights is discretionary. Conley, supra at 43.
Respondent challenges two of the probate court’s findings. The court stated that the
deterioration in Karen’s mood, demeanor, and appearance could be linked to respondent because she
was with him twenty-four hours a day in May through August 1996. Because Karen maintained contact
with her foster parents and her sister during this time, respondent argues that it was erroneous for the
court to conclude that the child was isolated with him during this time. The court also attributed Karen’s
deterioration solely to respondent’s failures as a parent. Respondent contends, however, that Karen’s
condition could be attributed to her separation from her foster family.
The probate court’s findings are not clearly erroneous. Karen was placed with respondent from
mid-May through early August 1996, and he was her primary caregiver during this time. There was
substantial evidence that respondent did not regularly feed Karen while she was with him. Respondent
consistently denied that this was a problem, yet multiple witnesses who interacted with them recognized
that the child was hungry. There was evidence that respondent failed to ensure that Karen received
sufficient rest. There was also evidence that respondent’s home was unsanitary. Although concern had
been expressed regarding the child’s reaction to cigarette smoke, respondent continued to smoke at
home and missed an appointment to take her to an allergist.
Furthermore, there was evidence that Karen changed, both physically and emotionally, while
she was in respondent’s care. Karen, who had previously been a happy, outgoing child, became
depressed and defiant while living with respondent. She talked to her therapist about hating respondent,
not wanting to live with him, running away, and wanting to kill him. Her therapist testified that, while a
-3
period of adjustment was to be expected, the longer Karen remained with respondent, the more she
deteriorated. After Karen was removed from respondent’s care, she rebounded physically and
emotionally. Based on the above evidence, we cannot conclude that the probate court clearly erred in
attributing Karen’s deterioration to respondent.
Furthermore, the probate court’s ultimate decision to terminate respondent’s parental rights was
not an abuse of discretion. There was clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unable to
provide proper care and custody for Karen. There was no evidence that respondent would be able to
do so in a reasonable time. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Karen’s best interest.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
-4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.