PEOPLE OF MI V STEVEN D DENT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 7, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 195958
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 92-119725-FH
STEVEN D. DENT,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Hood and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of possession with intent to deliver less than fifty
grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), three counts of felonious
assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, fleeing and eluding a police officer, second offense, MCL
750.479a(4); MSA 28.747(1), resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747,
reckless driving, MCL 257.626; MSA 9.2326 and being an habitual offender, third offense, MCL
769.11; MSA 28.1083. He was sentenced as an habitual offender to terms of five to forty years'
imprisonment, two to four years' imprisonment, two to four years' imprisonment, two to four years'
imprisonment, one to four years' imprisonment and two years' imprisonment, respectively. Defendant
was also sentenced to three months’ imprisonment for reckless driving. These sentences were to run
concurrently to each other and consecutively to a prior conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. The
prosecution cross-appeals defendant’s sentences. We affirm defendant’s convictions, but vacate his
sentences and remand for resentencing.
This case arose from the Pontiac Police Department setting up a controlled buy of cocaine from
defendant through Christopher Lee, a police informant. On the day of the incident, Lee called
defendant's pager. In response to the page, defendant called the police telephone line, which the police
had wiretapped. When Lee answered the call, defendant said, “this is Dent.” Lee negotiated for the
sale of approximately three ounces of crack cocaine to take place at a market in Pontiac. Defendant
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told Lee to page him with the digits 406 when he was ready to meet at the market and said that he
would be driving a late model Oldsmobile Cutlass.
Officers set up surveillance across the street from the market in the parking lot of a Dairy
Queen. After defendant was paged with the digits 406, he arrived at the market in a beige Oldsmobile
Cutlass, circled the parking lot two or three times and left. Defendant then pulled into the Dairy Queen
parking lot and exited his car. When defendant noticed an officer in full police raid gear approaching
him, he ran to his car, which was still running, and attempted to flee. The officer reached into the car
and attempted to turn off the engine. Defendant put the car in reverse and accelerated, crashing into an
unmarked police car directly behind him. He then sped away, knocking an officer off the car and
almost striking two officers who were on foot and standing directly in front of the car.
The police chased defendant in a marked police car with its lights and sirens activated.
Defendant drove in excess of 60 mph on residential streets and ignored several traffic signals and stop
signs. He eventually drove down a dirt road, slowed the car and jumped out. Defendant was
apprehended. A subsequent search of defendant, his automobile and the getaway route revealed
several plastic baggies, a false driver’s license, and approximately 45.3 grams of crack cocaine.
I
Defendant raises several claims essentially arguing that because the police officers’ conduct
amounted to an impermissible investigative stop and an unlawful arrest, all the evidence discovered
consequent to his seizure and arrest should have been suppressed as "fruit from the poisonous tree."
We find that none of defendant's arguments have merit.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its Michigan counterpart
guarantee the right of people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am
IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; People v LoCicero, 453 Mich 496, 501; 556 NW2d 498 (1996).
However, an officer is permitted to stop a party and make reasonable inquiries regarding his suspicion
when the officer observes behavior which leads him to conclude that a party has engaged, or is about to
engage, in criminal activity. Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). This
Court has held that in order to justify a seizure or an investigative pursuit and stop, the police must have
had a particularized suspicion, based on objective observations, that the person seized or stopped has
been, is, or is about to be engaged in some type of criminal wrongdoing. People v Daniels, 186 Mich
App 77, 80; 463 NW2d 131 (1990) (citations omitted).
In this case, two officers testified at both the preliminary examination hearing and Walker1
hearing that they recognized the voice in the taped conversation as defendant’s. Evidence was also
presented that a person identifying himself as “Dent” called the police telephone line and agreed to sell
three ounces of crack cocaine at a particular place. Defendant circled the location designated for the
drug transaction twice in a car that had been identified as the one which would be bringing the cocaine.
Based on the above testimony, we find that the officers had a sufficiently particularized suspicion, based
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on objective observations, that defendant was about to engage in some type of criminal wrongdoing.
Accordingly, the attempted seizure of defendant was justified.
Further, MCL 764.15(1); MSA 28.874(1), provides that a police officer may arrest without
first procuring a warrant under in the following situations:
(a) When a felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance violation is committed in the
peace officer's presence.
(b) When the person has committed a felony although not in the presence of the
peace officer.
(c) When a felony in fact has been committed and the peace officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the person has committed it.
(d) When the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that a felony has
been committed and reasonable cause to believe that the person has committed
it.
Here, the evidence presented clearly demonstrated that the officers observed defendant commit
a number of illegal activities while trying to flee from the police officers, including felonious assault,
reckless driving, and fleeing and eluding a police officer. MCL 764.15(1)(c); MSA 28.874(1)(3).
Accordingly, regardless of the attempted seizure of defendant in the Dairy Queen parking lot, the
officers had probable cause to arrest defendant. As a result, the officers also could search defendant’s
person and car incident to his arrest for the criminal acts committed during his flight. People v
Catanzarite, 211 Mich App 573, 581; 536 NW2d 570 (1995). Therefore, the discovery and
admission of the evidence of the narcotics and other incriminating evidence did not violate defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights. 2
II
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior conviction for
fleeing and eluding and the pending 1991 case in which defendant was charged with possession with
intent to deliver cocaine. The decision whether to admit evidence rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court and will not be set aside on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. People v McAlister,
203 Mich App 495, 505; 513 NW2d 431 (1994). Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. MRE 103(a).
Pursuant to MRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. People v VanderVliet, 444
Mich 52, 65; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205; 520 NW2d 338 (1994). Evidence
of another crime may be admitted if (1) it is relevant to an issue other than character or propensity, (2) it
is relevant to an issue or fact of consequence at trial, and (3) its probative value is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Catanzarite, supra at 578-579. Prior acts evidence
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may be relevant to demonstrate non-character issues, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when
material. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 674; 550 NW2d 568 (1996).
We initially note that, contrary to defendant's claim, he was not unduly surprised or prejudiced
by the prosecution's timing of the notice of intent to use the prior acts evidence. In any event, while the
court properly admitted the evidence of defendant’s pending drug case, we agree with defendant that
the admission of defendant’s fleeing and eluding conviction served no purpose other than to display
defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged. However, because defendant fails to cite any
instance where the evidence was presented before the jury, we find no error requiring reversal. People
v Griffis, 218 Mich App 95, 99; 553 NW2d 642 (1996).
III
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in admitting the recorded conversation between
himself and the police informant into evidence because the prosecution could not adequately prove that
either party to the conversation had given consent. The intercepted use of wire, oral or electronic
communications is generally prohibited. 18 USC 2511. However, 18 USC 2511(c), provides that the
warrantless recording of a telephone conversation with the consent of only one of the parties is proper
under federal law and the transcript of such a conversation may be admitted into evidence. US v
Armocida, 515 F2d 49, 52 (CA 3, 1975).
In this case, the trial court concluded after holding a Walker hearing that the tape recorded
conversation was admissible. MRE 104(a) provides:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness,
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not
bound by the Rules of Evidence except those with respect to privileges.
We find that the issue of consent constituted a preliminary question concerning the admissibility
of the wiretap evidence and therefore, the rules concerning hearsay testimony do not apply. MRE
104(a). Additionally, the rules of evidence do not apply to Walker hearings. MRE 104(a); People v
Richardson, 204 Mich App 71, 80; 514 NW2d 503 (1994). Since the determination of admissibility
occurred at the Walker hearing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recorded
conversation between the informant and defendant into evidence.
IV
On cross-appeal, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in imposing concurrent sentences. A
consecutive sentence may not be imposed unless specifically authorized by statute. People v Hunter,
202 Mich App 23, 25; 507 NW2d 768 (1993). MCL 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(3), in relevant part:
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A term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to subsection (2)(a) or section
7403(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) shall be imposed to run consecutively with any term of
imprisonment imposed for the commission of another felony.
Accordingly, defendant’s possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL
333.7403(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(iv), was clearly subject to consecutive sentencing. We
therefore vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing. People v Thomas, 223 Mich
App 9; 566 NW2d 13 (1997).
We affirm defendant's convictions, but vacate his sentences and remand for resentencing. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
1
People v Walker, 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
2
Although Michigan law provides that a person has the right to reasonably resist an unlawful arrest,
People v Reinhardt, 141 Mich App 173, 174 n 1; 366 NW2d 245 (1985), we note that defendant's
attempt to resist an arrest by crashing into an undercover police car, and nearly running over two
officers standing in front of his car is not conduct that is considered a reasonable means of resisting
arrest. See People v Daniels, 186 Mich App 77; 463 NW2d 131 (1990).
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